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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
At times it is rather difficult in a dissertation to say 
things in a straightforward manner--without footnotes, without the 
numerous qualifications that inevitably come to mind for each sen-
tence. It becomes especially difficult when, instead of advancing 
and defending a thesis, one attempts to express and explore the per-
sonal significance of an idea. Comments on such matters simply do 
not tend to fit into the structure of the dissertation. Thus in 
this Introduction I would like to discuss some of the problems in-
volved in this dissertation, some of the issues which can be touched 
upon only in a peripheral manner in the body. of the work but which 
are, at least for me, highly significant. 
Before doing that, it is nonetheless in order to introduce 
the main themes of the dissertation, for such an introduction will 
establish the context for the remarks which follow in this Intro-
duction. I am basically concerned with two things in the disser-
tation. The first of these is to show, not only that Nietzsche does 
have a philosophy of play, but also that his philosophy is a phil-
osophy of play. This involves an explication of the category of 
play in Nietzsche's philosophy and an interpretation of the main 
1 
tenets of his thought in terms of the category of play. In doing 
this, I have considered the writings centering around The Birth of 
Tragedy as a distinct group. In discussing the writings after that, 
specific topics have been approached thematically. In so doing, I 
2 
am not implying that there is no significant development in Nietzsche 'is 
philosophy after the period of The Birth of Tragedy, but rather am 
confining any discussion of development to the framework of specific 
issues. 
In addition to this, I have drawn freely upon Nietzsche's 
posthumously published manuscripts and notebooks. While it is cer-
tainly inappropriate to give them equal weight with the published 
works, they do in fact offer valuable insights into Nietzsche's own 
thinking and it would be inappropriate to ignore them. This is par-
ticularly true where they expand and deepen the positions presented 
in the works Nietzsche approved for publication. As a general guide 
to their use, I have tried to follow this principle: where they 
stand in direct conflict with his public position, they must be used 
with great caution; where the notebooks expand and deepen insight 
into positions found in the works he published, their use is entirely 
appropriate. However, this can serve only as a general principle in 
approaching the question. In specific instances, questions of con-
text and interpretation arise and a judgment must be made in relation 
to that specific case. In ambiguous cases, it becomes necessary to 
draw attention to the difference between Nietzsche's published and 
his unpublished positions and to label them as such. 
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In approaching the writings which center around The Birth of 
Tragedy, I have argued that these present themselves as a developed 
philosophy of play, a coherent whole on the conceotual level. The 
category of play is the fundamental one in terms of which Nietzsche's 
other categories for understanding existence--the Dionysian, the 
Apollinian, and the tragic--are to be understood. The adequacy of 
this category of play is questioned, both in terms of its ontological 
background of the primordial contradiction and pain of existence and 
in terms of the social background of slavery which it presupposes. 
What is at stake here is the relationship between play and what one 
might call the real world--more specifically, the relationship be-
tween play and work, a topic to which I shall return in this Intro-
duction. 
Taking up the writings which follow ~he Birth of Tragedy and 
which constitute Nietzsche's developed philosophy, I have argued that 
his position leads him inevitably to a philosophy of human activity 
as play. This is evident in a positive sense when one examines "The 
Three Metamorphoses" in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, the notion of the 
free spirit, and the doctrine of the order of rank. In each of these 
cases some form of play becomes the highest activity for man. It is 
also true in a negative sense that Nietzsche is led inevitably to a 
philosophy of human activity as play. He destroys the conditions of 
the possibility of any type of meaningful human activity except play. 
The consideration of nihilism and the critique of morality give evi-
dence of this, as does his analysis of the traditional notion of the 
self. Finally 1 a consideration of the concepts of the will to power 
and the overman conclude the investigation of human activity and pro-
vide in both cases a transition to the more fundamental type of play 
in Nietzsche's thought: the play of forces which constitutes the 
world as such. 
The final chapter considers in detail the category of play on 
a cosmic level, showing the way in which the doctrine of the eternal 
recurrence of the same gives ultimate expression to this cosmic play 
of forces and serves as an integrating category within Nietzsche's 
vision of _.the universe. 
My purpose here is not, however, merely to explicate Nie-
tzsche's category of play, but also to offer a critique of it. This 
critique takes place on two levels. First, there is a critique of 
the internal consistency of his position. This includes, for example, 
questions about whether the emphasis on the individual is compatible 
with his critique of the self, whether the notion of the will to power 
is contradicted by the critique of the will, and whether the notion 
of the overman and that of the eternal recurrence are compatible. The 
main thrust of this internal criticism is to show that Nietzsche's 
own critical philosophy, if valid, is not so devastating as to call 
into question the very grounds of his own positive philosophy. The 
tension in Nietzsche's position between his critical thought and his 
positive philosophy can best be understood and resolved in terms of 
the category of play. 
There is a second type of criticism present in the following 
4 
5 
chapters, one which centers specifically around the adequacy of the 
category of play itself as Nietzsche develops it. In this respect, 
my concern with Nietzsche is somewhat incidental to my interest in 
the category itself. Is this particular philosophy of play adequate? 
If not, what are its shortcomings? What would constitute an adequate 
philosophy of play? It is not my intention to try to provide a full 
--or even adequate--answer to this final question, but rather simply 
to raise the question itself and to explore some of its dimensions. 
To answer that question adequately would require yet another disser-
tation, hardly an enticing thought at this particular time; but in a 
sense, this dissertation is the first step toward such a second work 
in which an adequate philosophy of play can be developed. 
Granting that it is impossible to develop such a philosophy of 
play in this dissertation, I would like to take the opportunity here 
to sketch some of the dimensions of such a philosophy. There are two 
reasons for doing so. First, these remarks may give the reader some 
hint about the presuppositions with which I approach this analysis of 
Nietzsche's philosophy. Second, I hope that they may be of sufficient 
interest to the reader to stimulate him or her to further thought on 
this subject. 
The first difficulty one encounters here is arriving at a 
definition of play. I shall take the description given by Johan Hui-
zinga as a point of departure, since in fact it was my own starting-
point several years ago when I began reflecting upon the problem of 
play. 
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Sununing up the formal characteristics of play we might call 
it a free activity standing quite consciously outside "ordinary" 
life as being "not serious," but at the same time absorbing the 
player utterly and intensely. It is an activity connected with 
no material interest, and no profit can be gained by it. It pro-
ceeds within its own boundaries of time and space according to 
fixed rules and in an orderly manner. It promotes the formation 
of social groupings which tend to surround themselves with secrecy 
and to stress their difference from the common world by disguise 
or other means.l 
While this tends to be a good working definition, problems with it do 
arise. These problems can be grouped into two categories: difficul-
ties with the applicability of the specific characteristics and prob-
lems with the general category of play as such. 
A number of problems falling into this first category can be 
enumerated here. First, in what sense is play a free activity? It is 
clear that one cannot be forced to play by some external power or 
authority, but is not play often so spontaneous as to be initiated 
without the player's thinking about it? Moreover, 1s this a char-
acteristic which applies to play alone? Are we to understand that 
whatever is the opposite of play 1s an unfree activity? Second, is 
it necessary to presuppose a "real" world to which the world of play 
is juxtaposed? Would it be possible to conceive of existence merely 
as a multiplicity of play worlds, none of which has any ontological 
superiority over the others? If play does become connected with some 
material interest, does it cease to be play? Is the essential factor 
1 
Johan Huizinga, Homo Ludens. A Study of the Play-Element in 
Culture (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), p. 13. 
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the intent of the player, or is play to be defined in more objective 
terms? Is a child, for example, who is participating in play therapy 
really playing? While it is clear that play has its own spatial and 
temporal boundaries, is this not also the case for other activities? 
Does not work, for example, have its own special time and place? 
Does play always lead to the formation of social groupings, or may it 
not be a very individual activity? To what degree can it be said that 
the play world overflows into the non-play worlds, goes beyond its 
fixed boundaries and reshapes the world out of which it originally 
springs? To what extent is the reverse also true: to what degree does 
the non-play world actually permeate the world of play? To what extent 
is the world of play to be explained in terms of the contradictions 
and tensions of the non-play world? 
I 
While it is not possible to carry out this list of questions aa 
infinitwn, it is clear that it could be extended substantially to show 
the numerous ambiguities in the concept of play. It has in fact been 
maintained that the concept of play is characterized by an ontological 
ambivalence that "means first of all that play eludes a univocal def-
inition. 112 Yet I find myself wondering whether the ambivalence one 
uncovers in the concept of play is attributable to the ontological 
ambivalence of play itself or to some other source. More specifically, 
I wonder if the ambivalence of the concept of play is not located in 
2Ingeborg Heidemann, Ver Begriff des Spieles und das aesthetische 
Weltbild in der Philosophie der GegenJ.iJart (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 
1968), p. 10. 
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the specific contradictions of the contemporary experience of work. 
In an essay which I found to be rather thought-provoking, 
Helmuth Plessner suggested that the fact "that play in general has 
been made into a problem is something new and is connected with the 
development of industrial work."3 Is it possible to go even further 
here and to suggest that the ambiguities and ambivalence one finds in 
the concept of play can be traced back to the corresponding ambiguities 
and contradictions in the contemporary experience of work? While I 
am not certain that each and every aspect of the ambiguity of the 
concept of play can be traced back to the experience of work within 
our society, this line of investigation appears to be a rather fruitful 
one. 
Consider, for example, the following problem. Most play 
theorists would agree that play is a free ac.tivi ty. Schiller main-
tains this quite strongly when he argues that, "man plays only when 
he is in the full sense of the word a man, and he is only wholly man 
when he is playing. 11 4 Even if one does not want to go as far as 
Schiller has gone, it is quite difficult in most instances not to 
maintain that play is a pre-eminently free activity. This becomes 
problematic, however, when one recognizes another characteristic of 
3Helmuth Plessner, "Spiel und Sport," Diesseits der Utopie 
(Diisseldorf: Diederichs, 1966), p. 160. 
4Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a 
Series of Letters, translated with an Introduction by Reginald Snell 
(New York: Frederick Ungar, 1965), p. 80. 
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play. The separate time and place of play, the particular social 
groupings which grow up around it serve to underscore this point: 
the world of play is separate from that of everyday reality. Insofar 
as freedom is identified with the world of play, and insofar as play 
constitutes a world quite separate from everyday reality, then man's 
freedom is made ineffectual and the everyday world is absolved to that 
degree from the demand that it be made into a progressively freer 
-
world. Indeed, if one wanted to construct a world in which lip ser-
vice was paid to the ideas of freedom and personal creativity, and 
yet in which at the same time such freedom and creativity could be 
controlled in a very practical way in order to prevent them from dis-
turbing the social order, then one could hardly come up with a better 
idea than such a concept of play. 
Another problematic aspect of play reveals itself when we con-
sider this: many of the specific games we play tend to reinforce 
strongly the values of our own society. Sport offers a prime example 
of this.5 It may do this in two ways. First, these values may be 
explicitly encouraged in the game: sportsmanship, honesty, competive-
ness, unquestioning acceptance of the rules, etc. Second, undesirable 
qualities may be relegated to the sphere of play, which then functions 
as a safety-valve for certain emotions. Aggression would be a prime 
example of this: one is supposed to let out one's aggressive ten-
dencies in sports in order to avoid letting them manifest themselves 
5cf. Bero Rigauer, Sport und Arbeit. Soziologische Zusammen-
haenge und ideologische Tmplikationen (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 
Verlag, 1969). 
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in the everyday world.6 This seems to take place where the appear-
ance of the unwanted emotion or trait is considered inevitable. Yet 
if this is to be the case, how then are we to understand the idea that 
play must be done for no material interest or profit? While the in-
dividual participating in the activity may not be directly motivated 
by such material interest or profit, the society in which the games 
take place clearly has a material interest in maintaining precisely 
those games which do tend to reinforce the values which it already 
holds and provide a safe outlet for undesirable emotions. This gives 
rise to a rather peculiar situation in which the individual's play, 
perhaps without his or her knowledge, may be used for ulterior pur-
poses. 
Thus play does have a very definite social function which in-
eludes, but is not exhausted by, the following aspects: giving the 
individual a realm of freedom and creativity outside of the everyday 
world, lessening the demands that the everyday world itself become 
freer and more creative, and inculcating in the players the values 
of the society in which they live, and providing a safe outlet for 
the expression of unwanted emotions. 
One of the things I find most problematic about this situa-
tion is that freedom tends to become meaningless. Here I clearly pre-
suppose that the world of everyday experience is of primary importance 
6cf. Konrad Lorenz, On Aggression (New York: Bantam Books, 
1967), pp. 267 ff. for a suggestion of this nature. 
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and that the innnediate task before man is the improvement of that 
world. Given these two premises, I would maintain that the freedom 
which one discovers in the world of play is substantially a meaning-
less freedom for this reason: it cannot change the world of every-
day experience, only temporarily suspend it. This becomes increas-
ingly problematic as the amount of leisure time increases, for it 
puts a peculiar burden on man: not simply the burden of freedom, but 
the burden of meaningless or impotent freedom. Boredom arises, not 
simply where there is an excess of free time, but where the condi-
tions of the possibility of using that free time in a meaningful 
manner are not present. 
There is some evidence to suggest that the burden of increasing 
leisure time has already become a source of problems. The leisure 
time which one encounters upon retirement is often threatening, even 
to one's physical health.7 Long vacations, both for workers and 
students, are often difficult to cope with for the freedom which they 
present to the individual is a freedom which cannot change the world 
of their everyday experience in many cases. 
The direction in which our economy is moving indicates that we 
are going to have an increasingly large amount of leisure time in the 
future: earlier retirement, longer vacations, shorter work weeks, 
later entry into the work force. In an increasingly technological 
7cf. Work in America. Report of a Special Task 
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (Cambridge: 
Press, n.d.), pp. 77 ff. 
Force to the 
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society, this movement seems inevitable for two reasons. First, it 
is simply impossible to keep the population busy producing as an ever-
increasing amount of goods can be produced for the same number of man 
hours. Second, it is necessary to give people more time to consume 
these goods, especially as production is turned increasingly toward 
luxury products. In this regard, leisure time must be converted into 
consumer time. Insofar as this does happen, leisure is clearly put 
in the service of consumption and such things as expensive vacations, 
hobbies requiring elaborate equipment, etc., proliferate. 
The final problematic aspect of the category of play to which 
I want to call attention here concerns the relation between play and 
needs. At times play is distinguished from wo~k by suggesting that 
work is done in order to fulfill needs while play is only possible 
when one has gone beyond those needs. This position has some inter-
esting implications, not the least of which is this: play is con-
ceived against a background of forced labor. While it is possible to 
maintain that work is not forced by someone outside of the worker, 
but rather stems from the necessity imposed by his own needs, this 
distinction has little force within our own society. Today it is in-
creasingly difficult to distinguish fundamental human needs (food, 
shelter, and clothing) from second level needs, the satisfaction of 
which has at times in our own society become as necessary as the sat-
isfaction of fundamental human needs. There is clearly a distinction 
--the need for an automatic ice cube maker is not on the same level 
as the need for a minimal amount of nutrition each day. However, it 
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is not inconceivable that the day will come when the need for auto-
matic ice cube makers will be felt by some to be as strong as their 
need for nutrition. While it is then possible to maintain that the 
need for an automatic ice cube maker is a false need, one then intro-
duces a distinction which is most difficult to maintain in light of 
the way in which people actually perceive their own needs. 
Not only is it difficult to distinguish between primary and 
secondary needs, between true and false needs, but the problem is 
further complicated by the fact that the satisfaction of one need is 
usually a process which results in the creation of new needs. In 
this regard, Marx's thesis that "the creation of needs is the first 
historical act118 is quite relevant. It suggests an interesting view 
of work as becoming progressively freer insofar as it goes beyond 
the givenness of fundamental needs and transforms needs themselves 
into human creations. In this case, the restrictions which man 
feels as stemming from his personal needs would in fact have their 
foundation in man's social and economic situation. 
Thus the concept of need is problematic in two respects. First, 
the distinction between a real and a false need is rather difficult to 
draw and appears at best to be a relative one. Second, most needs 
are in a very real sense a human creation, in no way fixed or im-
mutable in themselves but rather the product of human labor. It 
8Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Die deutsche IdeoZogie in 
Werke, Volume III (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1969), p. 28. 
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seems possible that play takes place when human needs have been sat-
isfied only if one adopts a very narrow and non-dialectical notion of 
human needs, one which ignores the difficulties raised in the previous 
two paragraphs. Play is not beyond the realm of human needs. It is 
not at all unreasonable to suggest that we even have a need to play, 
remembering that such a need can be a human creation. Moreover, play 
itself can create new needs by exploring new dimensions of human 
activities which, when they are found satisfying, become an increas-
ingly important and necessary part of human life. Thus play is related 
to needs in a two-fold sense: we create a human need to play, and in 
playing we create new needs. 
Play, if it is to be understood fully, must be seen within 
the context of its societal dimensions, one aspect of which is its 
relation to needs. To treat play apart from its network of societal 
relations is to reify the phenomenon of play, to give it a false and 
independent meaning which it does not possess in the situation. As 
one begins to see play within this larger context, it becomes evident 
that, just as the contemporary situation is characterized by the ex-
perience of alienated labor, so too the notion of play that arises 
. 
out of this situation is one of alienated play. More specifically, 
we find in play precisely those elements of human activity which are 
missing in alienated labor, but they are present in such a way that 
they offer only an unreal, apparent satisfaction. If the experience 
of work is characterized by lack of freedom, then play is a pre-
eminently free activity; but the freedom one encounters in play is 
15 
powerless to change the real world of everyday experience, If work 
is always done for a purpose, play is done for its own sake, purpose-
less but meaningful; but the created meaning of play is barred from 
the everyday world precisely because it is only a game. If work is 
dorie under the pressure of needs, then play takes place in a realm 
beyond those needs; but play is both the product of such needs and, 
in turn, helps produce new needs. Yet it cannot be admitted that it 
satisfies those needs fully, for that would then allow play to be on 
equal footing with every other aspect of everyday reality. 
If one were to state this problem in terms that Marx develops 
in the economic and philosophical manuscripts of 1844, it would be as 
follows. In alienated labor, man is separated from the product of 
his labor, from the activity itself, from his species being, and from 
his fellow men. 9 In aiienated play, man is not separated from what-
ever product his play may incidentally produce, but such products are 
not given any real meaning or value in the everyday world because 
they are only play. If they do assume any much meaning or value, 
then it is as commodities, in which case the product is then an alien-
ated one. In a similar way, the activity of play is a free one, but 
this freedom is confined precisely to that which is unimportant, which 
does not change the course of history or alter the everyday world. 
While I do not find it particularly fruitful to approach this problem 
9
cf. Karl Marx, "Okonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte (1844)," 
in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Werke, Supplementary Volume, Part 
One (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1968), pp. 510-22. 
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in terms of the concept of species-being, it could be argued that if 
species-being involves active production in the objective world (it 
involves much more than this in these manuscripts), then the activity 
of play could allow such active production, but it would not be such 
that it could enter into the objective world for the same reasons 
given for the alienated character of the activity of playing. Finally, 
play does promote the rise of free associations among men, but again 
these associations are restricted to the unreal world of play and do 
not, properly speaking, involve themselves in the affairs of the every-
day world except insofar as this is necessary to prepare for the game. 
I hope that these remarks will give the reader some idea of 
some of the problems and contradictions' which I find in the idea of 
play and why I think that the generally accepted notion of play is 
actually one of alienated play. It has not been my purpose here to 
offer in any sense a complete argument on this topic, but rather to 
explore the questions themselves and to present the direction in which 
I think the answers are to be found. I suspect that, under what one 
might call ideal conditions, work and play would merge into a single 
activity. Since there appears to be no innnediate danger that such 
ideal conditions will force themselves on us on a general level in 
the immediate future, it is perhaps in order to conclude with a few 
words in defense of play. 
The main thrust of my criticism in the previous pages has been 
against an idea of play in which play is separate from the everyday 
world, in which there is, at least on the conceptual level, little or 
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no interaction between the play world and the non-play worlds. While 
there is considerable justification in the literature on play theory 
for looking at play in this way, this position does not exhaust the 
possibilities. That it is, however, a position which I think is in-
adequate and with which I want to take exception should be abundantly 
clear by this point. An alternative approach to the problem of play 
seems to offer much more promise: by recognizing the continual dia-
lectical interaction between work and play, one can view play as the 
leading edge of human activity, continually going beyond the givenness 
of the situation in order to give it an openness, a wealth of possi-
bilities, which it might not otherwise possess. In this context, work 
and play do not represent two different worlds, but rather two aspects 
or directions of the same world, each of which would be substantially 
diminished without the other. Whereas play without work to concretize 
it would be trivial freedom, work without play would be equally alien-
ated, uncreative and forced. Perhaps such a relationship would even-
tually lead to a situation in which the conditions of the possibility 
of a true union- of work and play would arise. 
CHAPTER II 
PARADIGMATIC FORMS OF PLAY: 
THE DIONYSIAN, APOLLINIAN, AND TRAGIC 
Introduction 
Although Nietzsche's main concern in The Birth of Tragedy and 
the writings which form preliminary studies for it1 was to mark out 
the way "through the labyrinth, as we must call it, of the origin of 
Greek tragedy, 112 the significance of these works is not limited to 
this topic alone. In a preface added in 1886, Nietzsche draws 
attention to one of the main problems which. in retrospect, he saw 
1of especial importance here is "Die dionysische Weltanschau-
ung," part of which are incorporated word for word into The Birth of 
Tragedy, and a revision of this same piece from June, 1870, "Die Ge-
burt des tragischen Gedankens." These are to be found in Nietzsche 
Werke, Kritische Gesamtausgabe, edited by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino 
Montinari, Dritte Abteilung, Zweiter Band (Berlin: Walter de Gruy-
ter, 1973), pp. 43-69, 71-91. 
Hereafter, all references to the Colli and Montinati edition 
of Nietzsche's works will be given with the title of the individual 
work (or an abbreviation of it) first, followed by the part number, 
then the volume number within that part, and finally the page number. 
Thus: "Die dionysische Weltanschauung," III/2, pp. 43-69. A full 
list of abbreviations is to be found in the Appendix. 
2Die Geburt der Tragodie, §7, III/l, p. 48 =The Birth of 
Tragedy, in The Birth of Tragedy and The Case of Wagner, translated 
by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 56. Hereafter, 
Die Geburt der TragBdie will be abbreviated as GT and its English 
translation as BT. 
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himself as confronting: the problematic character of science it-
3 4 
self, Indeed, when The Birth of Tragedy is seen in retrospect, 
many of the major themes of Nietzsche's later philosophy can be found 
to be present, especially if one concentrates upon the symbolism of 
the Apollinian and the Dionysian. 5 The investigation of the origins 
of Greek tragedy becomes the occasion for an inquiry, not only into 
the nature of tragedy itself, but also into fundamental questions 
about the nature and function of art, and in particular about the 
way in which art provides a means for confronting and going beyond 
the primordial pain of existence. 
In the course of his investigation Nietzsche develops, albeit 
only implicitly at times, a notion of artistic activity as play. In 
so doing, he introduces a theme which recurs throughout his writings 
3GT, "Versuch einer Selbstkritik," 2; III/l, pp. 7 f. = BT, 
"Attempt at a Self-Criticism," 2, pp. 18 f. 
4For a collection of essays written without the benefit of 
such retrospective distance, see Der Streit wn Nietzsches "Geburt 
der Tragodie", edited by Karlfried Grunder (Hildesheim: Georg Olms 
Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1969). This contains reviews by E. Rohde, R. 
Wagner, and U. v. Wilamowitz-Mollendorff. 
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5Jean Granier, in Le probZeme de Za Verite dans Za phiZosophie 
de Nietzsche (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1966), p. 539, maintains 
this thesis: "Nous allon montret, en effet, que toute l'ontologie 
nietzscheenne se trouve deja envelopee dans le noyau symbolique qui 
est l'ame de son premier ouvrage Za Naissance de Za Tragedie, et que 
les progres speculatifs de Nietzsche n'ont fait que sanctionner 
l'appropiation de la substance spirituelle qui etait deposee dans 
la symbolisme de l'apollinien et du dionysien." Granier is con-
cerned with showing that the comprehension of the duplicity of being 
as the play of art and truth is at the heart of Nietzsche's view of 
the world and that this comprehension is symbolized later in the 
figure of Dionysus and explicated in the notion of the will to power. 
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in a most elusive manner: the category of play. Present in some of 
the most crucial passages he has written--indeed, as I shall show 
below, at the heart of his description of human existence ~rid of the 
world itself--the concept itself remains unanalyzed. The elusive-
ness of the category of play, not only in Nietzsche's writings but 
also in itself,6 makes analysis and interpretation especially dif-
ficult. 
The Birth of Tragedy and the related writings from this period 
present a good example of this elusiveness. The word "play" is used 
infrequently in the final text, 7 but in "The Dionysian Worldview," 
an earlier formulation of the initial chapters of The Birth of Trag-
edy, it is a key concept for the understanding of both the Dionysian 
and the Apollinian worldviews. However, even where the word is used 
frequently, an explicit analysis of its meaning is lacking. 
6rn the section of her book dealing with the ontological def-
inition of play, Ingeborg Heidemann has commented on the fundamental 
ambivalence of the concept of play: 
Die ontologische Ambivalenz bedeutet zunachst, daB das Spiel 
sich einer eindeutigen Bestimmung entzieht •.•• Es scheint 
etwas zu sein und nicht zu sein im selben Aspekt; es ist real 
und es ist nicht real; es ist in der Welt und es ist nicht in 
der Welt. Seine Seinsweise ist die eines Unbestimmt-Bestirrnnten. 
Der Begriff des Spieles und das asthetische Weltbild in der Philos-
ophie der Gegenwart (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1968), 10. The 
ambivalence of the category of play in Nietzsche's philosophy will 
be considered below. 
7 1 .. Exp 1c1t use 
Tragedy itself is 
times, "Spiel" is 
of the word "play" ("Spiel") in The Birth of 
to be found only in Chapters 23, 24, and 25. At 
translated as "game" in the Kaufmann translation. 
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In this chapter, I shall elucidate the meaning of the category of 
play and show the way in which this category is central to Nietzsche's 
understanding of artistic activity and of existence itself insofar as 
these questions are considered in The Birth of Tragedy and the related 
writings. In particular, it will be shown that there are five dis-
tinct senses in which the word "play" is used in these writings: (1) 
dreaming as a way of playing with the real, (2) the artistic activity 
of playing with the dream, (3) intoxication as nature playing with 
the person, (4) the artistic activity of playing with intoxication, 
and (5) the interplay of the Dionysian and Apollinian forces in the 
world as constitutive of tragedy. The first two senses of play are 
Dionysian, and the second two are Apollinian. 
These paradigms are significant, not only in that they show that 
the category of play was present in Nietzsche's thought even at this 
early date, but also because they offer a way of distinguishing 
among the various meanings of play, distinctions which become rather 
blurred in his later works. In addition to this, a consideration of 
Nietzsche's category of play in relation to his view of the Greek 
state gives us an insight into a fundamental problem in Nietzsche's 
philosophy: the relationship between play and work, creativity and 
need, freedom and slavery. In this regard, I shall show that the 
category of play is central to the three main categories (the Appol-
linian, the Dionysian, and the tragic) in terms of which Nietzsche 
understands existence, and that this category of play is conceived 
against a background of work as slavery. As a result of this 
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dichotomy between creative play and work as slavery, the category of 
play in Nietzsche's early writings is, as will be shown below~ fun-
damentally one of alienated play. 
ApoZZinian and Dionysian PZay 
In "The Dionysian Worldview" Nietzsche distinguishes between 
the Apollinian and the Dionysian by presenting them as two different 
types of play. The art of the Apollinian artist, the creator, is 
playing with the dream, and the dream itself is to be understood as 
the game or play of the individual man with the real. 8 The creativity 
of the Dionysian artist, on the other hand, is to be found in playing 
with intoxication, intoxication itself being a game which nature 
plays with man. 9 Thus there is a double sense of play within both 
the Apollinian and the Dionysian. This can be represented schem-
atically as follows. 
Dionysian 
ApoZZinian 
irronediate manifestation 
intoxication: the game that 
nature plays with man 
the dream: the game that 
the individual man plays 
with the real 
artistic form 
playing with intoxica-
tion 
playing with the real 
811Die dionysische Weltanschauung," l; III/2, p. 46. "Wahrend 
also der Traum das Spiel des einzelnen Menschen mit dem Wirklichen 
ist, ist die Kunst des Bildners (im weiteren Sinne) das SpieZ mit dem 
Trawn." 
9Ibid., p. 47. "Wenn nun der Rausch das Spiel der Natur mit 
dem Menschen ist, so ist das Schaffen des dionysischen Kilnstlers das 
Spiel mit dem Rausche." Cf. "Die Geburt des tragischen Gedankens," 
ibid., p. 74: "Die dionysische Kunst dagegen beruht auf dem Spiel mit 
dem Rausche, mit der Verzilchung." 
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The four basic senses of play follow from this. The Apollinian artist 
plays with the dream, and the dream itself is a way of playing with 
the real; the Dionysian artist plays with intoxication, but the in-
toxication is nature playing with him. 
Central to this distinction is the idea of the player. In 
both the Apollinian and Dionysian forms of play, the player has more 
control of the game in its artistic form. Moreover, the Apollinian 
player is more clearly in control of the game that he plays than is 
the Dionysian player. Indeed, the difference seems to be fundamental, 
for in the Dionysian experience, "the man is no longer artist, he has 
become the work of art, 1110 for the artistic power of nature itself is 
manifesting itself in the Dionysian artist. "This man, shaped by the 
artist Dionysus, is related to nature as the statue is to the Appol-
linian artist. 11 11 In this sense, it is more accurate to say that the 
Dionysian artist, rather than playing with nature, is played with by 
nature. While both the Apollinian and the Dionysian stem from nature, 
their relation to nature differs: the former being active, the latter 
being passive. However, even this formulation is somewhat misleading 
in regard to the status of the Dionysian artist. Nietzsche likens 
l011Die dionysische Weltanschauung," l; 
III/l, p. 26 =BT, 1, p. 37: "Der Mensch ist 
er ist Kunstwerk geworden." 
III/2, p. 47 = GT, l; 
nicht mehr Kilnstler, 
1111Die dionysische Weltanschauung," l; III/2, p. 47: "Dieser 
vom Kilnstler geformte Mensch verhalt sich zur Natur, wie die Statue 
zum apollinischen Kilnstler." 
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his position to that of a person who is dreaming and yet realizes 
that he is dreaming: " ••• so must the disciple of Dionysus be 
intoxicated and at the same time lurk behind himself as an observer. 1112 
If this description does not entirely clarify the position of the Dio-
nysian artist, it at least shows the ambiguity of his position and 
the need for clarification. This same ambiguity occurs in Nietzsche's 
description of the child playing and in his notion of the self and 
constitutes a fundamental tension at the heart of his category of 
play and his idea of man. 
The ambiguity one encounters in the notion of the Dionysian 
player goes beyond its specifically Dionysian character. It is 
rooted in the very nature of being a player, in the ambivalent role 
the player has. Jiirgen Moltmann has described this well. 
The creative playing of men is always a playing with some-
thing which, in turn, plays with the player. Man plays with the 
waves of the ocean and they play with him. He plays with colors, 
sounds, and words and also becomes their playmate. He speaks and 
responds, is active and passive, giving and receiving at once. 
Playing he is neither master nor servant. This is true not only 
for games in life but also for the game of life. 13 
The difficulties encountered in determining the precise relationship 
between the Apollinian or Dionysian player and that with which he 
plays stem in part from the fundamental ambivalence of the relation 
12Ibid. : "So muB der Dionysosdiener irn Rausche sein und zu-
gleich hinter sich als Beobachter auf der Lauer liegen." 
13Jiirgen M6ltmann, Theology of Play, translated by Reinhard 
Ultich (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 24. 
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which exists between player and plaything: to be a player involves 
being a plaything at the same time. 
The Function of Art 
Before turning to a more detailed consideration of Dionysian 
and Apollinian play, it is necessary to see clearly why they came 
into existence. The background, against which both the Apollinian 
and the Dionysian are set in The Birth of Tragedy, is the folk wisdom 
of Silenus, the companion of Dionysus. Asked by King Midas what 
man's greatest good is, he replied: "What is best of all is utterly 
beyond your reach: not to be born, not to be, to be nothing. But 
the second best for you is--to die soon. 1114 Existence itself is 
characterized by horror and terror, by the primordial pain which 
gives rise to individuation. Silenus's wisdom gives this aspect of 
existence its highest expression. In order to be able to live at 
all, in order to overcome the terror and pain of existence at least 
to a limited degree, the Greeks created their gods and their art. 
Art makes life possible by seducing man to live on through illusion. 
In this sense, art is a game, a form of playing, which makes it 
possible to live on despite the fundamental pain and terror of ex-
istence. 
14 GT, 3; III/l, p. 31 =BT, 3, p. 42: "Das Allerbeste ist 
fiir dich ganzlich unerreichbar: nicht geboren zu sein, nicht zu 
sein, nichts zu sein. Das Zweitbeste aber ist flir dich--bald zu 
sterben." Also see, "Die dionysische Weltanschauung," 2; III/2, 
p. 52. 
There are two fundamentally different ways in which the game 
of art can be played out: the Dionysian and the Apollinian ways. 
Both involve the creation of illusion: the Dionysian illusion is 
that of oneness with all of nature and man, while the Apollinian 
illusion creates individuation, proportion, harmony in measure and 
balance. Apollinian art covers up the primordial pain of existence, 
but that pain remains in the background. Dionysian art covers up 
the individual, but he continues to lurk behind himself. 
The basic premise, upon which Nietzsche's view of existence 
is founded in these writings, is that existence is at its very heart 
contradictory, a primordial pain. The concept of play is presented 
as a way of coming to grips with this primordial contradiction and 
pain. The question which must now be considered is this: in what 
way, and to what degree, does each of these types of play succeed in 
overcoming this primordial pain and contradiction? The meaningful-
ness and validity of the category of play within Nietzsche's early 
philosophy depend upon the degree to which it can effectively deal 
with this challenge. In the following sections, it will be shown 
to what extent both Apollinian and Dionysian play are caparable of 
this and the degree to which it is possible at all within Nietzsche's 
early framework. 
Dionysian Play 
It is necessary, at this point, to make two distinctions in 
relation to the notion of the Dionysian in order to clarify the var-
ious sense in which Nietzsche uses this word. First, the Dionysian 
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may be considered as either a power of nature or as art; in both 
senses it may be called play, but in the latter case in a double 
sense. As a power of nature, the Dionysian is nature playing with 
man in intoxication. Dionysian art is playing with this intoxica-
tion, that is, playing with the game which nature is playing with 
man. Second, the Diony8ian may appear either in its pure form (of 
which the titanic-barbaric may be taken as an example) or in a medi-
ated form, in which case the Dionysian exists in relation to the Apol-
linian (usually in a struggle against it, but in the case of Attic 
tragedy in union with it). Although there is a conunon element which 
unifies these pairs, the differences are significant enough to change 
the understanding of play in each instance. 
The Dionysian as a natural force manifests itself "either 
under the influence of the narcotic draught or with the potent 
coming of spring that penetrates all nature with joy. 11 15 The Bacchic 
choruses of the Greeks and the dancers of St. John and St. Vitus are 
examples of the Dionysian manifesting itself as a natural force. 
They are characterized by the dissolution of everything subjective, 
a total eclipse of the self, an overcoming of the principle of in-
dividuation which leads to a becoming one, not only with one's fellow 
men, but also with nature. In such instances, the Dionysian arises 
15GT, l; III/l, pp. 24-25 =BT, 1, p. 36: "Entweder <lurch 
den Einfluss des narkotischen Getrankes .•. oder bei dem gewaltigen, 
die ganze Natur lustvoll durchdringenden Nahen des Friihlings .•. " 
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out of nature itself without the mediation of the artist. It is a 
"kllnstlerische" force, 16 force, not in the technical sense of an 
"artistic" force, but in the wider sense of a formative force of 
nature. By calling the Dionysian a "natural force" and contrasting 
it to "art," I do not wish to deny the formative character of this 
force, but am rather reserving the term "art" to those instances 
where the mediation of the artist is a significant factor. 
In addition to the feeling of intoxication which leads to 
self-oblivion and a oneness with other men and nature, the Dionysian 
consciousness is also characterized by doubts which arise about the 
rational character of expel'ience, both in regard to its validity 
and in regard to its value. There are two major aspects to this 
doubt. First, the principles of causation and sufficient reason 
appear to admit of exceptions, and one consequently feels a certain 
awe--a mixture of attraction and repulsion--at the unfolding of a 
new world, a world no longer completely bound down by the categories 
of reason. Second, this consciousness involves a feeling of glorious 
transport which stems from the shattering of the principle of indi-
viduation.17 The two are related: the principle of sufficient 
16GT, 2; III/l, p. 26 = BT, 2, p. 38. It should be noted 
that both the Apollinian and the Dionysian are regarded as "kunst-
lerische Machte," but I am concerned here only with the Dionysian. 
17 GT, I; III/l, p. 24 =BT, I, p. 36. Although Nietzsche 
takes Schopenhauer's position as a starting-point here, he is clearly 
presenting his own position as such on the Dionysian. 
29 
allows the world of appearances to be ordered in a causal manner, 
thus establishing individual entities as separate from each other; 
the principle of causation allows the flux of existence to be stab-
ilized in order to create independent entities. Once they begin to 
admit of exceptions, the experienced world is so radically trans-
formed that it is, quite literally, a new world which unfolds in the 
Dionysian consciousness. 
The Dionysian experience has another side to it which has not 
been considered yet. Aspects of this side include horribleness, 
ugliness, pain, cruelty, destructiveness and sensuality. There are 
two ways in which these characteristics can be attributed to the 
Dionysian. First, when one takes a standpoint outside of the Dio-
nysian framework (for example, the Apollinian standpoint), these 
characteristics almost follow by definition.. If the principle of 
individuation is central to one's vision of the world, the shattering 
of that principle will be a cause of suffering. If harmony and bal-
ance are the measure of beauty, then the primordial oneness and flux 
of existence, which the Dionysian seeks to uncover or create, will 
be considered ugly and horrible because they negate that harmony. 
All of these aspects of the Dionysian experience will be considered, 
at least in an implicit sense, to be destructive insofar as one 
looks at them from a non-Dionysian standpoint, since they are the 
negation of such standpoints. 
There is a second way in which these qualities become an 
issue. Nietzsche distinguishes between the barbaric and the Greek 
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forms of the Dionysian. The former is characterized by a complete 
sexual promiscuity which overrides tribal law and by the unleashing 
of "the most savage natural instincts . . • including even that hor-
rible mixture of sensuality and cruelty which has always seemed to 
me to be the real 'witches' brew'. 1118 This kind of sensuality and 
cruelty is overcome in the Greek manifestation of the Dionysian, 
for its exposure to the Apollinian influence transforms and tames 
it. The Greeks created the Apollinian vision in order to survive, 
and for the Dionysian to survive in its struggle with the Apollinian 
it had to transform itself. It changes from intoxication as the game 
that nature plays with man into man's playing with intoxication. 
When this happens, there is a fundamental change in the role of the 
player: while in the barbaric Dionysian the player seems to be com-
pletely the plaything of nature. in the Greek Dionvsian the player 
assumes a more ambiguous role, simultaneously throwing himself into 
the game and yet with a part of himself lurking behind, observing. 
Two factors are at play here in the transformation of the 
Dionysian from its barbaric form into the Hellenic one. First, 
there is the external threat of the Apollinian, which threatens to 
completely overcome the Dionysian. Second, there is an internal 
force which is at work here: the barbaric Dionysian consciousness, 
18GT, 2; III/l, p. 28 =BT, 2, p. 39: " •.• gerade die 
wildesten Bestien der Natur wurden hier entfesselt, bis zu Jener 
abscheulichen Mischung von Wollust und Grausamkeit, die mir immer 
als der eigentliche 'Hexentrank' erschienen ist." 
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left to itself, is completely self-destructive. For it to exist in 
its pure form would lead, eventually, to its own negation; in order 
to maintain itself, it has to go beyond itself. The interplay of 
these two factors, the Greek need to create the Apollinian in order 
to survive and the internal contradiction of the Dionysian that leads 
to its own destruction, leads to the transformation of the barbaric 
Dionysian into its Greek, artistic form. 
This transfigured form of the Dionysian is usually encountered 
in Greek culture in the form of the Dionysian artist, the one who 
plays with intoxication rather than the one who lets it completely 
overcome him. The portrait of Archilochus in The Birth of Tragedy 
gives a clear picture of Nietzsche's conception of the Dionysian 
artist in Pre-Socratic times. 19 The definition of the Dionysian 
genius, given from the notebooks of this period, is parallel to the 
published formulations, but somewhat more precise. The Dionysian 
genius is, " .•• the man who, in complete self-oblivion, has become 
one with the primordial ground of the world, who now creates out of 
the primordial pain the reflection of it for his redemption •.• 11 20 
19cf. GT, 5-6; III/l, pp. 38-48 ~= BT, 5-6, pp. 48-56. 
20This passage is to be found in the posthumously published · 
notebooks from the time of GT in Friedrich Nietzsche, Die Geburt der 
Trag8die. Der griechische Staat, Kroners Taschenausgabe Band 70, 
mit einem Nachwort von Alfred Baeumler (Stuttgart: Alfred Kroner 
Verlag, 1964), pp. 206-07. 
It is in the creation of a reflection of this primordial pain that 
distance is to be achieved and, with that distance, the possibility 
of delivering oneself up from the experience, redeeming oneself. 
The Dionysian artist, in contrast to the Apollinian, is characterized 
by this forgetting of self: he gives himself over completely to 
the fundamental contradictions in existence, in order thereby to 
give expression to them. He himself becomes a mirror. Moreover, the 
nature of that which he is reflecting leads to a preference in regard 
to the way in which he communicates this vision: not in the analytic 
fashion to which language almost inevitably leads, but rather in 
lyric poetry and music. 
Music is an especially appropriate mode of expression for the 
Dionysian artist because it is the language of the will, "an imme-
diate copy of the will .itself. 1121 As such, it gives a meaningful-
ness to comparisons which could not otherwise be achieved. While 
it is certainly the case that music is not in each and every case 
· 1 D. · 22 · · 1 h · · d · · · necessari y ionysian, it remains c ear t at music is a istinctive 
21 GT, 16; III/l, p. 100 = BT, 16, p. 100: " • • unmi ttelbar 
Abbild des Willens selbs t " 
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22Arthur Danto has suggested this in his Nietzsche as Phil-
osopher (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1965), p. 50: " •.• music, 
after all, originally had Apollo as its patron diety; and Nietzsche 
recognized a kind of Apollinian music--'a rhythm of waves beating 
the shore, a plastic art'." (The quotation is from GT, 2; III/l, 
p. 29 = BT, 2, p. 40.) Mozart's description of a musical experience, 
in which he could hear an entire work at one time rather than in a 
succession of moments, seems much closer to an Apollinian experience 
of music than a Dionysian one. Cf. Martin Heidegger, Der Satz vom 
Grund (Pfullingen: Verlag Gunter Neske, 1957), pp. 177 ff., for the 
quotation of Mozart's letter and Heidegger's interpretation of it. 
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mode of expression for Nietzsche. It is not susceptible to categor-
ization and manipulation in the same way that language is. More-
over, in the phenomenon of musical dissonance one encounters the 
best mirror of the ugliness and pain of existence. In discussing 
the way in which existence and the world are justified only as an 
aesthetic phenomenon, as a game which the will plays with itself, 
Nietzsche argues: 
In this sense, it is precisely the tragic myth that has to con-
vince us that even the ugly and disharmonic are part of the ar-
tistic game which the will in the eternal amplitude of its 
pleasure plays with itself. But this primordial phenomenon of 
Dionysian art is difficult to grasp, and there is only one direct 
way to make it intelligible and grasp it immediately: through the 
wonderful significance of musical dissonance. 23 
It is to this experience that the Dionysian artist brings the lis-
tener: the joyful realization that existence in its totality, even 
its ugliness and disharmony, is but a game or a play which the will 
plays with itself. It is through his play that he leads his audi-
ence and fellow participants to the basic play of forces which con-
stitutes existence and through it he justifies this play by his ere-
ative act of joyful affirmation. 
Yet how adequate is this justification? It seems to be prob-
lematic in at least two ways. First, the Dionysian state of this 
23GT, 24; III/l, p. 148 =BT, 24, p. 141: " ... in welchem 
Sinne uns gerade der tragische Mythus zu ilberzeugen hat, dass selbst 
das Hassliche und Disharmonische ein kilnstlerisches Spiel ist, welches 
der Wille, in der ewigen Fillle seiner Lust, mit sich selbst spielt. 
Dieses schwer zu fassende Urphanomen der dionysische unst w1 
aber auf direktem Wege einzig verstandlich und un · t~~!~r1;:~ 
in der wunderbaren Bedeutung der musikaZischen Di s~nz ... " ~ 
lOyol .-p 
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intoxication is almost by definition a transitory state. This trans-
itory quality becomes apparent in Nietzsche's description of Dio-
nysian rapture. 
For the rapture of the Dionysian state with its annihilation of 
the ordinary bounds and limits of existence contains, while it 
lasts, a letha.rgic element in which all personal experiences of 
the past become innnersed. This chasm of oblivion separates the 
worlds of everyday reality and of Dionysian reality. But as 
soon as this everyday reality re-enters consciousness, it is 
experienced as such, with nausea: 2~n ascetic, will-negating 
mood is the fruit of these states. 
Insofar as the Dionysian is necessarily a transitory state, it is im-
possible for Dionysian play to provide an adequate answer to the 
challenge posed by the primordial contradiction of existence. While 
this type of play can offer a few moments of respite, it is in itself 
inadequate. Dionysian play will always be bounded by the world of 
everyday reality; while it is capable of suspending that reality, 
it can never finally eliminate it. 
24GT, 7; III/l, p. 52 = BT, 7, pp. 59-60. "Die Verzlickung 
des dionysischen Zustandes mit seiner Vernichtung der gewohnlichen 
Schranken und Grenzen des Daseins enthalt namlich wahrend seiner 
Dauer ein letha.rgisches Element, in das sich alles personlich in der 
Vergangenheit Erlebte eintaucht. So scheidet sich durch diese Kluft 
der Vergessenheit die Welt der alltaglichen und der dionysischen 
Wirklichkeit von einander ab. Sobald aber jene alltagliche Wirklich-
keit wieder ins Bewusstsein tritt, wird sie mit Ekel als solche 
empfunden; eine asketische, willenverneinde Stimmung ist die Frucht 
jener Zustande." Hans M. Wolff, in his Friedrich Nietzsche. Der 
Weg zwn Nichts (Bern: Franke Verlag, 1956), p. 51, argues on the 
basis of this passage that it is no longer possible to speak of Dio-
nysian life or Dionysian humanity, " •.. denn da sich die Ekstase 
als zeitlich beschrankt erweist, kann nur noch von 'dionysischen 
Zustanden' die Rede sein, denen der Zustand der Ernlichterung als der 
Normalzustand gegenlibersteht." 
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The second problematic aspect of Dionysian play is based on 
this: the truth which it uncovers is unbearable. In the paragraph 
following the one quoted above, Nietzsche develops this theme with 
great power. 
In this sense, the Dionysian man resembles Hamlet: both 
have once looked truly into the essence of things, they have 
gained knowledge, and nausea inhibits action; for their action 
could not change anything in the eternal nature of things; they 
feel it to be ridiculous or humiliating that they should be 
asked to set right a world that is out of joint. Knowledge 
kills action; action requires the veils of illusion ..• true 
knowledge, an insight into the horrible truth, outweighs any 
motive for action, both in Hamlet and in the Dionysian man. 25 
This, then, is the second factor which prevents Dionysian play from 
being an adequate answer in itself to the challenge posed by the pri-
mordial contradiction of existence. Truth is horrible, and the know-
ledge gained through the Dionysian experience kills action. The 
questioning of the value of knowledge is a theme which is found, not 
only in The Birth of Tragedy, but also in Nietzsche's notebooks from 
this period.26 It is quite clear that knowledge of the fundamental 
25GT, 7; III/l, pp. 52-53 = BT, 7, p. 60. "In dies em Sinne 
hat der dionysische Mensch Aehnlichkeit mit Hamlet: beide haben 
einmal einen wahren Blick in das Wesen der Dinge gethan, sie haben 
erkannt, und es ekelt sie zu handeln; denn ihre Handlung kann nichts 
am ewigen Wesen der Dinge andern, sie empfinden es als lacherlich 
oder schmachvoll, class ihnen zugemuthet wird, die Welt, die aus den 
Fugen ist, wieder einzurichten. Die Erkenntniss todtet das Handeln, 
zum Handeln gehort das Umschleiertsein durch die Illusion • • • die 
wahre Erkenntniss, der Einblick in die grauenhafte Wahrheit tiber-
wiegt jedes zum Handeln antreibende Motiv, bei Hamlet sowohl als bei 
dem dionysischen Menschen." 
26cf. Karl Schlechta and Anni Anders, Friedrich Nietzsche. 
Von den vorborgenen Anfangen seines PhiZosophierens (Stuttgart-Bad 
Cannstatt: Friedrich Frommann Verlag, 1962), esp. pp. 99-117. 
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essence of things is unbearable; indeed, the goal of knowledge seems 
to be the destruction of the world. 27 
These two factors, the transitory character of the Dionysian 
state and the unbearable quality of the truth which it uncovers, apply 
clearly to the Dionysian as such, but Nietzsche does not seem to find 
them applicable to Dionysian art in the passages cited above. When 
the Hellene has seen the horrible truth of existence, "art saves him, 
and through art--life. 11 28 Art has a healing function, transforming 
the nauseating thoughts about the horror or absurdity of existence 
into notions that one can live with: 
. • • these are the sublime as the artistic taming of the hor-
rible, and the comic as the artistic discharge of the nausea of 
absurdity. The satyr chorus of the dithyramb is the saving 
deed of Greek art; faced with the intermediary world of these 
Dionysian companions, the feelings described here exhausted 
themselves.29 . 
27This view is developed, for example, in the forward to an 
unwritten book on the pathos of truth, "Filnf Vorreden. Ueber das 
Pathos der Wahrheit," III/2, p. 254: "Die Kunst ist machtiger als 
die ErkenntniB, denn sie will das Leben, und jene erreicht als 
letztes Ziel nur--die Vernichtung.--" Also see Friedrich Nietzsche, 
Nachgelassene Werke aus den Jahren 1869-1872, in Nietzsche's Werke, 
Volume IX (Leipzig: Neumann, 1903), p. 72: "Der Zweck der Wissen-
schaft ist Weltvernichtung." 
28GT. 7; III/l. o. 52 =BT. 7. o. 59: "Ihn rettet die Kunst. 
und durch die Kunst rettet ihn sich--das Leben." 
29GT. 7: III/l. o. 53 =BT. 7. o. 60. " •.. diese sind das 
Erhabene als die kilnstlerische Bandigung des Entsetzlichen und das 
Komische als die kilnstlerische Entladung vom Ekel des Absurden. Der 
Satyrchor des Dithyrambus ist die rettende That der griechischen 
Kunst; an der Mittelwelt dieser dionysischen Begleiter erschopften 
sich jene vorhin beschreiben Anwandlungen." 
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The transitory character of the Dionysian is overcome to some degree 
in Dionysian art in this respect: by exhausting the feelings which 
are aroused in the Dionysian experience, Dionysian art extends its 
effect temporally until that point where those feelings begin to 
build up again. Yet, even given this qualification, it seems that 
Dionysian art remains temporally limited. It can suspend time in 
the everyday world, but it cannot completely overcome it. 
Dionysian art also makes the previously unbearable thoughts 
of the Dionysian experience into something bearable by justifying 
existence as an aesthetic experience, as a game the will plays with 
itself. Here the sense of self-oblivion characteristic of Dionysian 
play seems most important: the joyful affirmation of existence in 
its contradiction and pain is only possible when one completely 
forgets oneself. But this self-oblivion is also bv its very structure 
temporallv limited: it can be extended for a while. but it seems im-
oossible to live for a long period of time in this state. 
The Dionysian is, then, a particular type of play character-
ized by intoxication which leads to self-oblivion, an overcoming of 
the principle of individuation, a denial of the rational character 
of existence, and a creation of unity between man and man as well as 
between man and nature. In its initial form it is characterized by 
cruelty and destructiveness which is transformed into a joyful affir-
mation by Dionysian art. Yet as a type of play the Dionysian re-
tains certain limitations, especially a temporal finitude which 
prevents it from completely overcoming the challenge posed to it 
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by the pain and contradiction of primordial existence. Indeed, it is 
precisely this kind of temporal limitation which is fundamentally 
characteristic of play: it can suspend the time and meaning of the 
world out of which it springs, but it is not its purpose to change 
that world in any but this temporary sense. The Dionysian play, 
whether in its original form or its artistic form, remains funda-
mentally play; insofar as this is the case, it can meet the chal-
lenge posed by the primordial contradiction of existence only in a 
temporary way. 
Apo Z Zinian Play 
If Dionysian play gives itself over to intoxication and self-
oblivion, there remains another way of dealing with the abyss which 
the primordial pain leaves gaping in front of man. This is to create 
another world, a safer, more clearly define~ and predictable one. 
Such a world is necessary if man is to survive. 30 The barbaric form 
of Dionysian play, because it leads eventually to the destruction of 
life, must be overcome. A veil of illusion must be drawn across the 
horrors of existence revealed by the Dionysian experience. For the 
Greeks, it was a veil composed of the Olympian world of the gods, 
the Apollinian sense of beauty, Homeric epic, and later Greek phil-
osophy itself. But even more fundamental than these is the pre-
artistic manifestation of the Apollinian: the dream. 
--·--------
30GT, 3; III/l, p. 32 =BT, 3, p. 42. "Um leben zu konnen, 
mussten die Griechen diese Gotter, aus tiefster Nothigung, schaffen. 
. • • So rechtfertigen die Gotter das Menschenleben, indem sie es 
selbst leben .•. " 
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The dream, and the entire Apollinian world, spring forth from 
the need for illusion, which itself is felt to be rooted in the very 
nature of primordial reality for Nietzsche. 
For the more clearly I perceive in nature those omnipotent art 
impulses, and in them an ardent longing for illusion, the more 
I feel myself impelled to the metaphysical assumption that the 
truly existent primal unity, eternally suffering and contra-
dictory, also needs the rapturous vision, the pleasurable il-
lusion. for its continuous redemption.31 
In this sense. the creation of illusion. the plaving with the real in 
images. which characterizes the Aoollinian consciousness. is felt to 
be rooted in the ground of being itself.32 All existence cries for 
redemption through i.llusion. The dream, a natural manifestation of 
this urge in human existence, is but an aspect of the larger process 
of existence seeking to redeem itself. 
In dreams a certain sense of form and measure comes to the 
31GT, 4; III/l, p. 34 = BT, 4, pp. 44-45. "Je mehr ich nam-
lich in der Natur jene allgewaltigen Kunsttriebe und in ihnen eine 
inbrlinstige Sehnsucht zum Schein, zum Erlostwerden <lurch den Schein 
gewahr werde, um so mehr flihle ich mich zu der metaphysischen An-
nahme gedrangt, dass das Wahrhaft-Seiende und Ur-Eine, als das ewig 
Leidende und Widerspruchsvolle, zugleich die entzilckende Vision, den 
lustvollen Schein, zu seiner steten Erlosung braucht ••• " 
32While Nietzsche mentions here that this is a feeling, it 
should be noted that the entirety of The Birth of Tragedy is char-
acterized by a certain absence of argumentation in regard to its 
basic position. Eugen Fink is fundamentally correct when he main-
tains the following: 
Wie eine ein?.ige. groBartig in sich geschlossene Vision tritt 
uns Nietzsches Kunst-Metaohvsik Qleich zu BeQinn des Buches 
entgegen. in den Grundzligen fertig: es gibt hier keinen Versuch, 
den Weg zu zeigen, wie er zu seinen Thesen kam; nirgends wird 
liberhaupt reflektiert ilber Recht oder Unrecht der tragenden 
ontologischen Konzeption. 
Nietzsches Philosophie(Stuttgart: Kohlhammer Verlag, 1960), p. 24. 
\ 
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fore. In them, "we delight in the immediate understanding of figures; 
all forms speak to us; there is nothing unimportant or superfluous~33 
Indeed, the dream is not a mirror image of the primordial contradic-
tion, but a transfiguration of that contradiction. This is the es-
sence of the Apollinian play with the real on the level of nature: 
the transformative redemption of the primordial contradiction of ex-
istence through the creation of illusion in dreams. 
This transformation is, however, never quite complete, for 
there is always the lingering realization that it is a transforma-
tion, that something else lurks behind it--in short, that it is an 
illusion. Thus, "even when this dream reality is most intense, we 
still have, glinunering through it, the sensation that it is mePe 
appeCU'ance. While it belongs to the very essence of the primordial 
contradiction to create these illusions, the illusions themselves 
have only that reality proper to appearance. They are the attempt 
of existence to redeem itself in the transformative play of images. 
If the Apollinian as a natural force manifesting itself in 
dreams is the game which individual men play with the real by the 
creation of an alternate world of appearance, Apollinian aPt is 
33cT, l; III/l, p. 34. "Wir geniessen im unmittelbaren Ver-
standnisse der Gestalt, alle Formen sprechen zu uns, es giebt nichts 
Gleicngilltiges und Unnothiges." 
34cT, l; III/l, p. 22 =BT, 1, p. 34. "Bei dem hochsten 
Leben dieser Traumwirklichkeit haben wir <loch noch die durchschim-
mernde Empfindung ihres Scheins ..• " 
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playing with these dreams: the creating of illusion becoming con-
scious of itself. With this, certain rules make their appearance: 
harmony, measure, balance and stability beomce most important. These 
arise out of the need to resolve the contradictoriness of primordial 
existence and thereby to redeem it, to justify it. This is not done 
by actually changing the ground of being, but rather by giving it 
its "complement and consunnnation. 11 35 Insofar as being comes to mean 
stability. insofar as it is taken as the opposite of becoming, this 
world of appearance finally is taken to be the world of being, while 
the primordial oneness and its contradictions become the world of 
becoming, of continual change. 
The play of the Apollinian artist is not an arbitrary activity, 
but rather the extension of nature's own drive toward the creation of 
illusion. 
If, for the moment, we do not consider the question of our own 
'reality,' if we con~eive of our empirical existence, and that 
of the world in general, as a continually manifested representa-
tion of the primal unity, we shall then have to look upon the 
dream as an appearance of an appearance, hence as a still higher 
appeasement of the primordial desire for mere appearance. And 
that is why the innermost heart of nature feels that ineffable 
joy in the naive artist and the naive work of art, which is 
likewise only 'mere appearanc~ of mere appearance. r36 
35GT, 3; III/l, p. 32 BT, 3, p. 42. 
36GT, 4; III/l, p. 35 BT, 4, p. 45. "Sehen wir also einmal 
van unsrer eignen 'Realitat' flir einen Augenblick ab, fassen wir 
unser empirisches Dasein, wie das der Welt i.iberhaupt, als eine in 
jedem Moment erzeugte Vorstellung des Ur-Einen, so muss uns jetzt der 
Traum als der Schein des Scheins, somit als eine noch hohere Befrie-
digung der Urbegierde nach dem Schein hin gelten. Aus diesem selben 
Grunde hat der innerste Kern der Natur jene unbeschreibliche Lust an 
dem naiven Klinstler und dem naiven Kunstwerke, das gleichfalls nur 
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In this sense Apollinian art represents the consummation of the drive 
of existence to redeem itself. 
Just as the primitive Dionysian consciousness and Dionysian 
art have their limitations, so do the natural Apollinian experience 
and Apollinian art. Dreaming, as playing with reality by trans-
forming it into images, again does not fundamentally change primor-
dial reality or its contradictoriness and pain. It can create an 
illusion, but it remains just that: an illusion. This is doubly 
true for Apollinian art, which is the appearance of an appearance. 
It is still the case, however, that Apollinian consciousness and 
Apollinian art are not as temporally limited as their Dionysian 
counterparts. The Apollinian, in fact, appears to pervade much of 
what one would call "everyday reality." Its emphasis on harmony. 
measure and proportion contributes to its more permanent character. 
There is, however, a more severe limitation upon the Apol-
linian: the constant threat stemming from the Dionysian. This, 
perhaps more than any other factor, prevents the Apollinian illu-
sion from ultimately being taken as ,all of reality. In a similar 
manner, the Apollinian stands as a constant threat to the Dio-
nvsian, for the Aoollinian appears to be rooted in a fundamental 
longinQ of existence to redeem itself through illusion. 
1 Schein des Scheins' is t." 
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The Contrast Between the Dionusian and the Avollinian 
Both the Anollinian and the D1onysian are types of play 
rooted in the nature of primordial existence. in its contradictory 
character. While they exist in a hostile relationship toward each 
other. it is clear that they need one another.37 Nevertheless. they 
differ radically in a number of respects, the P.lucidation of which 
points to the ambivalent role of the concept of play in Nietzsche's 
thinking about the Greeks. 
Whereas Apollinian art leads to a strengthening of the prin-
ciple of individuation, 38 the Dionysian intoxication brings about a 
reconciliation of man with his fellow man and with nature itself, 
thereby bringing about the neg0tion of the principle of individua-
tion.39 In the first case, existence is a game needing its comple-
tion in illusion in an alternate world. In order to fulfill this 
need, the Apollinian artist must in effect live in two worlds: the 
37rhe basic interdependence of the Dionysian and the Apol-
linian is described quite well by Eugen Fink as follows: 
••• sie [the Apollinian and the Dionysian] konnen nicht ohne 
einander sein; ihr Streit, ihre Zwietracht ist auch eine ge-
wisse Eintracht, sie sind als die Kampfenden verbunden; die 
apollinische Kunstwelt der Griechen, die Entscheidung flir das 
MaB und seine Fligun,g, beruht auf dem innner lebendigen, nur 
unterdrlickten Grunde titanischer MaBlosigkeit; das Dionysische 
ist der Untergrund, auf dem die lichte Welt aufruht ... 
Nietzsches Philosophie. pp. 24-25. 
39GT, 4; III/l, p. 35 = BT, 4, p. 45. "Apollo aber tri tt uns 
wiederum als die Vergottlichung des principii individuationis ent-
gegen, in dem allein das ewig erreichte Ziel des Ur-Einen, seine 
Erlosung <lurch den Schein, sich vollzieht ... " 
4oGT, l; III/l, p. 25 =BT, 1, p. 37; GT, 2; III/l, p. 28 = 
BT, 2, p. 40. 
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one of appearances which he creates and, insofar as he creates this 
world and thus stands outside of it as creator, another, darker world, 
closer to the primordial pain of existence. The Apollinian artist 
alienated himself from this latter world through his creation of il-
lusion. and it is this alienation which allows for the appearance of 
the individual--indeed, necessitates it. In order to complete ex-
istence. he must seperate himself from it. The Dionysian seeks to 
overcome such alienation, to become one with nature and other men, 
but it is for precisely this reason that the Dionysian poses a threat 
to culture; such a reconc1liation would destroy its very foundation. 
A completely unalienated individual becomes a contradiction in terms; 
he would be so completely one with existence that he would cease to 
be an individual. 
A parallel tension arises between the respective media of ex-
pression for the Apollinian and the Dionysian artists. The plastic 
arts, the image, offer the possibility of clear definition, strong 
lines, ba}ance, while music allows one to forget thP. self, to merge 
with the flow of sensation. So. too. the Apollinian play tends to 
be more static than the Dionysian one: a world in which each thing 
has its place (indeed, one in which there are things) and remains 
constant, whereas a world of music can never come to rest. This ten-
sion between rest and motion is complemented by one between space and 
time: the Apollinian world expresses itself primarily in spatial 
terms, while the Dionysian one is basically temporal in character. 
Thus, through the mediation of the artist, existence plays 
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two distinctly different types of games with itself. The one is a 
game of the individual, measure, the image, being as rest in space; 
the other is a game of unity, the shattering of all divisions, mus-
ical, the flux of becoming in time. In this sense, existence is at 
its very heart contradictory, going in two mutually exclusive direc-
tions simultaneously, playing one direction off against the other, 
incapable of achieving any final resolution, at least insofar as 
such a resolution would imply a true transcending and unification of 
these fundamentally contradictory powers of primordial existence. 
The Tragic 
If a final reconciliation of the Apollinian and the Dionysian 
is impossible, if they are doomed to struggle against each other 
endlessly, they remain, as shown above, in need of each other. It 
is here that the final meaning of play emerges in Nietzsche's anal-
ysis of the Greeks: the tragic is the unending interplay of these 
two different types of games which existence plays with itself. 
Each of these worlds is justified on its own terms, but each is in-
compatible with the other. Tragedy arises because they can never 
truly exist only on their own terms, but are continually doomed to 
transgress into each other's world because of their mutual inter-
dependence. 
When these two worldscome together in one individual, one 
encounters one of the purest manifestations of the tragic. 
The misfortune in the nature of things . . • the contradiction 
at the heart of the world reveals itself to him [the Aryan] as 
a clash of different worlds, e.g., of a divine and a human one, 
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in which each, taken as an individual, has right on its side, 
but nevertheless has to suffer for its individuation, being 
merely a single one beside another. In the heroic effort of 
the individual to attain universality, in the attempt to trans-
cend the curse of individuation and to become the one world-
being, he suffers in his own person the primordial contradic-
tion that is concealed in things, which means that he connnits 
sacrilege and suffers.40 
The most basic form of this collision of two worlds is the coming 
together of the Apollinian and the Dionysian. The accompanying ugli-
ness and disharmony can only be justified as an aesthetic phenomenon, 
as "part of an artistic game that the will in the eternal amplitude 
of its pleasure plays with itself. 11 41 
Insofar as the Dionysian and the Apollinian constitute the 
two fundamental directions of existence, the two types of games 
which the primordial one plays with itself, then the Apollinian and 
the Dionysian are also the two basic aspects of human existence.42 
40GT, 9; III/l, pp. 65-66 =BT, 9, p. 71. "Das Unheil im 
Wesen der Dinge ••• der Widerspruch im Herzen der Welt offenbart 
sich ihm als ein Durcheinander verschiedener Welten. z.B. einer 
gottlichen und einer menschlichen, von denen jede als Individuum 
im Recht ist, aber als einzelne neben einer andern flir ihre Individ-
uation zu leiden hat. Bei dem heroischen Drange des Einzelnen ins 
Allgemeine, bei dem Versuche liber den Bann der Individuation hinaus-
zuschreiten und das eine Weltwesen selbst sein zu wollen, erleidet 
er an sich den in den Dingen verborgenen Urwiderspruch d.h. er 
frevelt und leidet." 
41GT, 24; III/l, p. 148 = BT, 24, p. 141. 
leriscbes Spiel . . . , welches der Wille, in der 
Lust, mit sich selbst spielt." 
" ein klinst-
ewigen Flille seiner 
42In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche's argument begins with 
the Apollinian and Dionysian as human artistic drives, moves from 
them to the dream and intoxication as fundamental powers of being, 
and then interprets these original artistic drives in terms of these 
metaphysical principles. Cf. Eugen Fink, Nietzsches PhiZosophie, 
p. 25 on the structure of the argument here. 
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The tragic individual is the place where they come together with full 
force, where they attempt to become reconciled with each other rather 
than simply try to conquer each other. The relationship between the 
two is one of struggle until it is transformed as an aesthetic phen-
omenon, at which point it becomes artistic play. 
On the Adequacy of Play 
Two main themes govern the line of investigation here. The 
first of these is primarily expository and interpretative, showing 
the category of play is in fact fundamental to Nietzsche's thinking 
during this period. The second is critical and involves questioning 
the adequacy of the category of play in this context. In regard to 
the first theme, it has been shown, not only that the category of 
play occupies a central place in Nietzsche's thinking during this 
period, but also that the category of play is corrnnon to the three 
fundamental categorfes in terms of which Nietzsche analyzes exist-
ence: the Apollinian, the Dionysian and the tragic. As such, it 
provides the unifying category in terms of which his overall view of 
existence can be understood. 
Some progress has already been made in regard to the second 
line of investigation. It has been shown that both Dionysian play 
and Apollinian play have certain inadequacies, that they never stand 
alone. It was further shown that these inadequacies existed against 
a background of a primordial contradiction in existence. The nature 
of this contradiction is such that no form of play can adequately 
reconcile the contradictoriness of existence. It can only suspend 
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or conceal one side of the contradiction temporarily; but that 
hidden side continues to exist. Tragedy does not achieve this re-
conciliation because it fails to eliminate the contradiction; it 
does, however, raise that contradiction to the level of an aesthetic 
phenomenon, a game which the will plays with itself. 
What would constitute an adequate category of play, given 
the presence of this primordial contradiction. If a criterion of 
adequacy is the ability to overcome and eliminate this contradic-
tion, then clearly the category of play remains inadequate. In 
fact, any category would be a priori inadequate, since it is impos-
sible to change such a fundamental reality. 
It is important to note, however, that this primordial con-
tradiction is itself an assumption on Nietzsche's part, taken for 
granted throughout his writings here but never justified. Once 
this assumption is made, life is condemned to futility, incapable 
of finally eliminating the contradiction of existence. It is ab-
surd to think of changing the world, of improving the human condi-
tion in any way, because in the end all such changes and improve-
ments dwindle into insignificance when seen within the framework of 
this primordial contradiction. Some notion of play is practically 
the only alternative available, given the framework Nietzsche has 
assumed. 
There is another aspect to this framework which is neglected 
in The Birth of Tragedy. In the forward to an unwritten book on 
the Greek state. Nietzsche discusses the notions of dignity of man 
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and the dignity of work. These remarks offer a valuable insight into 
the background of Nietzsche's idea of the Apollinian and the Dio-
nysian and into the conditions under which the eme~gence of the two 
forces is possible. Nietzsche argues that in order for work to be 
considered dignified, existence itself must have some claim to dig-
nity. The Greeks are clearly to be praised because they had no need 
for such conceptual hallucinations such as the dignity of existence. 
They recognized the true nature of things. 
Work is a dishonor because existence has no value in itself; 
but if even this existence sparkles in the seductive jewels of 
artistic illusion and now really appears to have a value in 
~t~e:£~ the proposition that work is a dishonor is still valid 
Even artistic creation falls under the category of work for the Greeks, 
and the presence of the artistic drive is but evidence that the artist 
is subjected to the necessity of work. 
In this situation man develops a feeling of shame when he 
realizes that he is only the tool of forces much greater than him-
self, that he is the pawn of necessity. These feelings of shame, 
dishonor, and necessity belong to the experience of work and slavery, 
and an examination of them reveals the truth of culture itself. 
In order to provide a broad, deep and rich foundation for the 
development of art, the overwhelming majority must be put 
43"Filnf Vorreden. Der griechische Staat," III/2, p. 259. 
"Die Arbeit ist eine Schmach, weil das Dasein keinen Werth an sich 
hat: wenn aber eben dieses Dasein im verfilhrenden Schmuck kilnstler-
ischer Illusionen erglanzt und jetzt wirklich einen Werth an sich zu 
haben scheint, so gilt auch dann noch jener Satz da8 die Arbeit eine 
Schmach sei . . . " 
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slavishly in the service of a minority, going above the measure 
of their individual neediness. At their expense, through their 
surplus work, that privileged class shall be removed from the 
struggle for existence in order to create a new world of needs 
and satisfy them.44 
This makes it clear for Nietzsche that, "slavery belongs to the es-
sence of culture: a truth which clearly leaves no doubt about the 
absolute value of existence. 11 45 It is nature which is at work in 
all this, "forging the monstrous tool of the state," seeking "through 
society to come to its redemption in appearance, in the mirror of 
genius. 1146 
In the passages in his notebooks which immediately precede 
this preface, Nietzsche makes it clear that the purpose of culture 
is to allow for the appearance of genius--Apollinian, Dionysian, and 
tragic. 47 .This casts a different light on the previous analysis. 
44Ibid., p. 261. "Damit es einen breiten tiefen und ergiebigen 
Erdboden flir eine Kunstentwicklung gebe, muB die ungeheure Mehrzahl 
im Dienste einer Minderzahl, Uber das MaaB ihrer individuellen Be-
dlirftigkeit hinaus, der Lebensnoth sklavisch unterworfen sein. Auf 
ihre Unkosten, durch ihre Mehrarbeit soll jene bevorzugte Klasse dem 
Existenzkampfe entrlickt werden, um nun eine neue Welt des Bedlirf-
nisses zu erzeugen und zu befriedigen." 
45Ibid., p. 261. "DemgemaB mlissen wir uns dazu verstehen, als 
grausam klingende Wahrheit hinzustellen, daB zwn Wesen einer Kultur 
das Sklaventhwn gehore: eine Wahrheit freilich, die Uber den absoluten 
Werth des Daseins keinen Zweifel Uhrig laBt." 
46Ibid., pp. 264-65. "Hier sehen wir wiederum, mit welcher 
mitleidlosen Starrheit die Natur, um zur Gesellschaft zu kommen, sich 
das grausame Werkzeug des Staates schmiedet . • . durch die Gesell-
schaft zu ihrer Erlosung im Scheine, im Spiegel des Genius, zu kommen!' 
47Posthumously published notebooks in Die Geburt der Tragodie. 
Der griechische Staat, p. 205. 
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Whereas in The Birth of Tragedy the background of play was a meta-
physical one, the primordial contradiction and pain of existence, 
this is now made more concrete. The societal correlate of this 
original contradiction is revealed in the dichotomy between slavery 
and the play of genius. Play can take place only within the context 
of slavery for Nietzsche. Such slavery is, however, justified--or, 
more precisely, not in need of justification--because existence in 
itself has no value anyway. 
It is here that I think one encounters one of the true dangers 
of a philosophy of play. As Nietzsche develops the problem in his 
early writings, it is clear that there is an absolute division be-
tween work and play. As a consequence of this, certain restrictions 
are established on both work and play such that both are incapable 
of providing true satisfaction for man. It is clear from this descrip-
tion that work has no dignity for Nietzsche, that it is equivalent to 
slavery, characterized by feelings of shame, dishonor and domination 
by necessity. True human creativity finds its expression in the 
three forms of play developed here. But this expression is fore-
ordained to an ultimate lack of meaning; while it can cover up the 
pain of primordial existence for a time, it cannot ultimately change 
anything. It can only create illusions which momentarily suspend 
that pain and contradiction. Any action in the world is denied to 
it in advance because it involves the creation of an alternate 
world. There is no structure of mediation which can adequately 
bring these two worlds together. As a result of this, one realm of 
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activity deals with the :veryday world and changes it, but it is un-
able to escape the burden· of need, the domination of necessity. The 
other realm of activity is indeed free from such need, although this 
freedom is paid for by the slavery of the majority, but it cannot 
really change anything with the freedom that it receives. 
Nietzsche would, I think, argue at this point as follows. 
First, my criticisms reflect the way I would like things to be, but 
--Nietzsche would argue--he is showing us the way things are, the 
horrible truth of existence, without making a value judgment about 
it. Second, no alternative is possible except the one present by 
him, because the primordial pain and contradiction of existence cannot 
be changed by human activity. Third, such phrases as "cannot really 
change anything" indicate a very specific notion of reality, one in 
which "really" refers to the world of everyday activity. Such a 
narrow definition of reality would be unacceptable to Nietzsche. 
The difficulties with these Nietzschean criticisms lead to the 
most fundamental questions about the nature of reality itself. Not 
only is it impossible to settle such questions here in a definitive 
manner, it is also unnecessary at this point if one considers the 
problem only in relation to Nietzsche. His position, as has been 
pointed out above, is based on an assumption about the nature of 
nrimordial existence as pain and contradiction. Throughout his 
writings during this period, this position is assumed, not proved. 
He certainly never proves that things could not be otherwise, that 
it is impossible to alter the basic character of existence, even 
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presuming that his description of it is adequate. The assumption of 
an irreconciliable contradiction at the heart of existence, expressed 
in the contradiction between the Apollinian and the Dionysian, is 
the basis for denying any value to existence in itself and for <level-
oping a notion of play as a temporary suspension of one side of that 
contradiction. It also provides the foundation for a devaluation of 
work, a denial of the dignity of work, and a justification of the 
slavery of the majority in the service of the play of genius. This 
seems to be rather a lot to base simply on an assumption. 
Conclusion 
This brief consideration of the role of the category of play in 
Nietzsche's analysis of Greek tragedy and culture provides the 
starting point for a systematic approach to the meaning of play in 
Nietzsche's philosophy by delineating the various meanings of the 
category itself. Play can be considered either as a category des-
criptive of primordial existence itself or as referring to artistic 
activity where the mediation of the human artist is a necessary com-
ponent of the process. Alternately, it can be considered as a way of 
becoming one with the flux of existence in intoxication with an 
accompanying shattering of the principle of individuation, or it can 
' refer to the creating of illusions in order to mask both the Dionysian 
threat to the individual and theprimordial pain arising out of the 
contradiction of existence. In the latter case, it involves the 
creation of a world of order and stability, in sharp contrast to 
the Dionysian experience of flux and unity. These divisions cut 
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across one another, yielding the four-fold division of play which 
Nietzsche outlined in "The Dionysian Worldview." The interaction 
of these two basic forces in existence, the Dionysian and the Apol-
linian, gives rise to the final meaning of play: the tragic play of 
existence itself, an overarching category which includes the pre-
vious senses of play. The category of play is the fundamental one 
in terms of which both existence in general and the specific forms 
of existence are understood in Nietzsche's writings during the 
period of The Birth of Tragedy. 
The category of play, however, proves itself to have certain 
inadequacies, two of which have been discussed above. First, the 
category of play is predicated against a background of the primordial 
pain and contradiction of existence, but this background proves it-
self to be only an assumption. Thus the specific character of Nie-
tzsche's category of play is determined by a mere assumption. Second, 
when seen on the level of society, Nietzsche's category of play is 
situated within the context of, and dependent upon, slavery. The 
result is that play is condemned to being ineffectual in the world, 
while work is completely under the domination of necessity, shame 
and dishonor. The categories of work and play are unmediated and, 
indeed, mediation is impossible at this stage. 
Introduction 
CHAPTER III 
PLAY AS THE HIGHEST FORM 
OF HUMAN ACTIVITY 
The category of play, central to Nietzsche's early writings 
about Greek tragedy and culture, reappears in his later writings in 
the form of an ideal. Although the status of ideals is itself a 
problematic point in Nietzsche's philosophy which will have to be 
discussed below, it remains true that play represents for Nietzsche 
the highest form of human activity. This is exceptionally clear in 
the passage in Thus Spoke Za:r>athust:r>a on "The Three Metamorphoses," 
and it is also to be found in Nietzsche's treatment of the free 
spirit and in his doctrine of the order of rank. In each instance, 
it is in play that human activity reaches its highest expression. 
In this chapter I shall approach a demonstration of the 
thesis that play is the highest form of human activity for Nietzsche 
in two ways. First, it will be shown to be true in a positive sense 
by examining the three ideals for human existence mentioned above: 
the image of the child in "The Three Metamorphoses," the free spirit, 
and those who are highest in the order of rank. It will be shown 
in each case that the kind of activity proper to each is playing. 
Second, it will also be shown in a negative sense that play must be 
the highest form of human activity. This will be established by 
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showing that play is the only form of human activity which allows for 
the justification of existence in the face of the experience of 
nihilism. In the post-nihilistic world, play emerges as the form of 
human activity which permits both a full recognition of the chal-
lenge of nihilism and at the same time a complete affirmation of 
human existence in itself. 
By considering only these specific concepts in this chapter, 
I do not want to give the impression that I think these are the only 
models of human existence which Nietzsche considers to be significant. 
This is obviously not the case. Two central notions are conspicuous 
by their absence here: the doctrines of the overman and of the will 
to power. Each of these will be considered in the following chapters. 
Chapter Four will extend the interpretation developed here to the 
notion of the will to power and morality, while Chapter Five will 
consider the doctrine of the overman in relation to Nietzsche's idea 
of the self and the play of affects. 
As in the previous chapter, there is a second major theme 
which runs throughout this chapter. In addition to establishing 
the centrality of the category of play to Nietzsche's view of human 
activity, I have endeavored to critically examine the adequacy of 
this category both within Nietzsche's philosophy and, to a lesser 
extent, in itself. In this regard, I have pointed to certain ten-
sions which develop in a philosophy of human activity as play such 
as ~ietzsche's and have shown the degree to which these can be over-
come within a Nietzschean framework. 
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A. The Ideal of Creative Play 
The Three Metamorphoses 
In the first of Zarathustra's speeches in Part One of Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra, Zarathustra presents a paradigm for the develop-
ment and liberation of the spirit in three stages, symbolized by 
the camel, the lion, and the child.I In this section dealing with 
"The Three Metamorphoses," I shall show that in this model for under-
standing human existence play is clearly the highest form of human 
activity. In addition to this, it will be shown that this stage of 
creative play cannot be achieved without prior preparation. The 
stages of development represented by the camel and the lion must be 
lived through first in order that play in its fullest form can be 
possible. The experiences of the lion and the camel are prior con-
ditions of the possibility of the emergence of creative play on the 
part of the child and give us important insights into the nature and 
foundation of that play. Finally, the adequacy of this category of 
creative play will be discussed; special attention will be paid to 
the question of the relationship between the player and his fellow 
players and those who stand outside of that play--in other words, to 
the social dimension of the category of play as developed in "The 
Three Metamorphoses." 
111von den drei Verwandlungen," AZ.so Sprach Zarathustra, in 
Nietzsche Werke, Kritische Gesamtausgabe, Sechste Abteilung, Erster 
Band (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1968), pp. 25-27 ="On the Three 
Metamorphoses," Thus Spoke Zarathustra, translated by Walter Kauf-
mann (New York: Viking, 1966), pp. 2S-27. Hereafter abbreviated as 
"Z, 11 followed by chapter or speech title, volume and page numbers. 
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Before turning to the text itself, two prefatory comments are 
in order. First, although the passage under consideration does not 
present adequate evidence for concluding that ther can be only three 
stages in this process of liberation, it is clear that these stages 
represent a complete process, in particular in relation to its end-
point. However, if the three metamorphoses culminate with the child 
as the highest stage in the development of the spirit, there is still 
room for other stages before this entire process begins, stages in 
which the spirit has not yet developed the awareness found in the 
stage of the camel. 
Second, attention should be called to the subject of this 
process of transformation: spirit. Although Nietzsche does not define 
precisely what he means by spirit, the speech in Book Two of Thus 
Spoke Zarathustr>a "On the Famous Wise Men". gives an indication of 
the sense in which the term is employed. Spirit is, "the life that 
itself cuts into life: with its agony it increases its own know-
ledge,112 and its happiness is, "to be anointed and through tears to 
be consecrated as a sacrificial animal."3 Spirit is thus that form 
of life which allows itself to be sacrificed in order to lead to 
something beyond itself. In this sense, spirit is a self-transcending 
2z, II, "Von den beri.ihmten Weisen;" VI/l, p. 130 = Z, II, "On 
the Famous Wise Men," p. 104. "Geist ist das Leben, das selber in's 
Leben schneidet: an der eignen Qual mehrt es sich das eigne Wissen 
II 
3Ibid. "Und des Geistes Gli.ick ist diess: gesalbt zu sein 
und durch Thranen geweiht zum Opferthier . " 
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form of life. The three metamorphoses are distinct stages of life 
cutting into life, in particular into the illusions which had pre-
viously been necessary if life was to continue. The spirit's happi-
ness, however, can be something more than that of the sacrificial 
animal, as well be shown below in the discussion of the child. 
Suffice it to say here that spirit is that form of life which cuts 
into itself, goes beyond itself in the ways which will be discussed 
in "The Three Metamorphoses." 
The Camel. The starting point of this process of transforma-
tion is "the spirit who would bear much. 114 He asks for that which 
is most difficult, for this is what his strength demands. It is by 
demanding the most difficult that life cuts into itself in this 
first stage, goes beyond itself. The most difficult is defined in 
this passage through a series of questions, which are implicitly 
given an affirmative answer. It consists of: 
humbling oneself to wound one's haughtiness •.• letting 
one's folly shine to mock one's wisdom .•• parting from our 
cause when it tri~mphs •.• climbing high mountains to tempt 
the tempter • 
What the spirit's strength demands would appear to be the negation of 
4z, "Von den drei Verwandlungen;" VI/l, p. 25 = Z, "On the 
Three Metamorphoses," p.· 25. "Vieles Schwere giebt es dem Geiste, 
dem starken, tragsamen Geiste .•. " 
5Ibid., p. 25 = Ibid., p. 26. " .• sich erniedrigen, um 
seinem Hochmuth wehe zu thun ••• Seine Thorheit leuchten lassen, 
um seiner Weisheit zu spotten ..• von unserer Sache scheiden, wenn 
sie ihren Sieg feiert . . . Auf hohe Berge steigen, um den Versucher 
zu versuchen .•• " Four other examples are mentioned in the text. 
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its strength, but it would be more precise to say that it demands the 
full affirmation of the opposite of one's strength as well as of the 
strength itself. The point Nietzsche is making here is that a 
strength which does not include the recognition and affirmation of 
its own opposite weakness is itself only a limited strength precisely 
because it does not recognize its own limits as strength. Our wisdom, 
for example, must recognize and affirm the presence of our folly in 
order for us to fully know our limits, the true extent of its own 
strength. Not to do so is to fall prey to our own weakness. In 
order to overcome this weakness, to do what one's strength demands, 
one must thus affirm one's weakness along with one's strength, trans-
cending it as a weakness by knowing and willing it. 
Implied in the description of the transformation of the 
spirit from a camel to a lion is that the "~ord and god" of the camel 
l.S the "thou shalt," which represents "values, thousands of years 
old ••. all created value." The totality of these values has 
already been created, leaving no room for the "I will." Does this 
mean that the "thou shalt" is the fundamental character of the 
camel's existence? It is fundamental only in a very specific sense. 
The "thou shalt" is one of the strengths--perhaps the greatest one--
of the spirit's existence at this stage. The camel's task as spirit 
is to assume not only this strength but also its opposite. The 
necessity of assuming the opposite of the strength as well as the 
strength itself introduces the principle of transformation at the 
heart of the camel's strength, presuming that the opposite of the 
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"thou shalt" is the affirmation of the individual's will. The as sump-
tion of the greatest strength and its negation leads the camel to the 
negation of this whole mode of existence and pushes him toward the 
second stage, that of the "I will." Thus the principle of trans-
formation is to be found in the camel as spirit. 
In a fragment from his notebooks entitled, "The Way to Wisdom: 
Pointers on the Overcoming of Morality," Nietzsche develops a three 
stage process that roughly parallels the three metamorphoses found 
in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. It sheds some light on the concrete 
meaning of the camel. 
The first path. Worshipping (and obeying and learning) 
better than anyone else. Assimilating all things that are ven-
erable and letting them struggle with one another. Bearing 
every burden. Asceticism of spirit--bravery. A time of fellow-
ship. 
[The overcoming of evil, petty inclinations. The encom-
passing heart; one conquers only with iove. Fatherland, race, 
everything belongs here. (Richard Wagner prostrated himself 
before a deep, loving heart; Schopenhauer also. This belongs 
to the first stage).]6 
In this description of the first stage, there is a stronger emphasis 
on the implied "thou shalt"; instead of assimilating all things 
6Friedrich Nietzsche, Die Unschuld des Werdens. Der Nachlass, 
selected and ordered by Alfred Baeumler (Stuttgart: Kroner Verlag, 
1956), Volume I, p. 249, §662. "Der erste Gang. Besser verehren 
(und gehorchen und lernen) als irgendeiner. Alles Verehrenswerte 
in sich sammeln und miteinander kampfen lassen. Alles Schwere tragen. 
Asketismus des Geistes--Tapferkeit. Zeit der Gemeinschaft. 
"[Die iiberwindung der bosen, kleinlichen Neigungen. Das um-
fangliche Herz: man erobert nur mit Liebe. Vaterland, Rasse, alles 
gehort hierher. (Richard Wagner warf sich vor einem tiefen, lieb-
vollen Herzen nieder; ebenso Schopenhauer. Dies gehort zur ersten 
Stufe.)]" (Brackets in original.) 
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without qualification, one assimilates all things "that are venerable." 
In a sense, one becomes transparent; one mirrors the struggle of 
those forces one assimilates, becomes their background. 
The descriptions of the camel and this first path present a 
basic way of being in the world which has the following character-
istics: extending one's world to encompass as much as possible, 
especially the difficult, thereby extending one's self; an affirma-
tion of one's existence by binding oneself not only to one's strengths 
but also to one's weaknesses; the discovery of the implicit act of 
will which underlies this affirmation and leads finally to the nega-
tion of the most important part of that which was affirmed: the 
"thou shalt." This conflict with the "thou shalt" is implicit in 
each of the other acts of reverence insofar as they demand the affir-
mation of opposites. The "I will" is already hidden in the camel's 
choice to test his own strength, and the more he affirms opposites, 
the greater the tension between the "thou shalt" and the "I will." 
The Lion. One of the reasons for the emergence of the lion 
has just been discussed: the "I will" is implicit in the camel's 
choice to take on the heaviest burdens. Nietzsche puts the ques-
tion of the necessity of this transformation in Zarathustra's 
words: 
My brothers, why is there a need in the spirit for the 
lion? Why is not the beast of burden, which renounces and is 
reverent, enough?_ 
To create new values--that even the lion cannot do; but 
the creation of freedom for oneself for new creation--that is 
·within the power of the lion. The creation of freedom for 
oneself and a sacred "No" even to duty--for that, my brothers, 
the lion is needed.7 
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The emergence of the lion from the camel is necessary as a condition 
of the possibility of creating new values, of the creative play of 
the child in the next stage. But why is the creation of new values 
necessary? At this juncture two lines of argumentation are possible. 
On the one hand, one can argue the necessity of this trans-
formation on the basis of the internal contradictions in the stage of 
the camel. In addition to the arguments presented above in this 
connection, one could argue that one of the values which one affirms 
at the stage of the camel would be that of freedom, which in the end 
challenges the "thou shalt." This line of argument parallels the 
interpretation of European nihilism found at the beginning of The 
WiZZ to P01.Uer: beginqing with an affirmation of Christian moral 
values (which include truthfulness), one is led in this quest for 
truth to the denial of those original values one affirmed as their 
falsity is uncovered, destroying the entire worldview upon which 
even one's concept of truthfulness (and its value) rested. So too, 
the camel's affirmation of traditional values (including freedom) 
7z, I, "Von den drei Verwandlungen;" VI/l, p. 26 = Z, I, "On 
the Three Metamorphoses," p. 27. "Meine Bruder, wozu bedarf es des 
Lowen im Geiste? Was genilgt nicht das lastbare Thier, das entsagt 
und ehrfilrchtig ist? 
"Neue Werthe schaffen--das vermag auch der Lowe nicht: aber 
Freiheit sich schaffen zu neuem Schaffen--das vermag die Macht des 
Lowen. 
"Freiheit sich schaffen und ein heiliges Nein auch vor der 
Pflicht: dazu, meine Bruder, bedarf es des Lowen." 
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would lead it to challenge that entire set of values and, in the end, 
the very value of values--to question whether it is of value to life 
to live under the domination of the "thou shalt." 
A second possible line of argumentation would deny any real 
necessity to the appearance of the lion except a conditional one: 
if freedom is to appear, then the lion is necessary, but the appear-
ance of freedom is not necessary in itself because it involves a 
free act. On the basis of the text of "The Three Metamorphoses," 
the second interpretation is to be preferred; but the first, even 
if it does go beyond the text, seems to be a valid interpretation if 
one qualification is added. This process is not necessary in itself; 
that is, a given spirit may never be able to go beyond the first 
stage. If, however, he does, the first argument helps us to under-
stand some of the forces at work which made this possible. 
The lion's being in the world is to be found in freedom, in 
the negation of the "thou shalt," in a sacred "no" to everything one 
had previously affirmed. Truthfulness sets him off from other men. 8 
The same phenomenon is described in "The Way to Wisdom" as follows. 
The second path. To break the worshipping heart when one is 
most strongly corronitted. The free spirit. Independence. Time 
of the desert. Critique of everything that has been venerated 
8The element of truthfulness is emphasized in Z, II, "Von den 
beri.ihmten Weisen;" VI/l, pp. 128 ff = Z, II, "On the Famous Wise Men," 
pp. 102 ff. If truthfulness is the principle governing the existence 
of the lion, the lion stage may be considered as the logical conse-
quence of the camel's affirmation of the value of truthfulness, which 
leads eventually to his calling into question all other values. 
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(idealization of all that is not venerated), attempt at reversing 
evaluations. 
[The overcoming also of good inclincations. (Unnoticed 
such natures as Dilhring and Wagner and Schopenhauer have not 
even once set foot on this level!)]9 
The more deeply the spirit is committed in the first stage of the 
camel, the more difficult is this breaking-away; but at the same 
time, its significance also increases. One gains, in effect, the 
right to reject all values only when one is first deeply committed 
to them. Nietzsche is not arguing for an unthinking rejection of the 
past, for it is precisely that which would constitute a profane "no"; 
the sacred "no" takes reverence and commitment as its starting-point. 
The Child. The final stage of this transformation of the 
spirit is the emergence of the child, the symbol of human activity 
as creative play. Asking why the lion must become a child, Zara-
thustra says: 
The child is innocence and forgetting, a new beginning, a game, 
a self-propelling wheel, a first movement, a sacred "yes." For 
the game of creation, my brothers, a sacred "yes" is needed: 
the spirit now wills his own will, and he who had been lost to 
the world now conquers his own world.lo 
9uw, I, §662, p. 250. "Der> zweite Gang. Das verehrende Herz 
zerbrechen, als man am festesten gebunden ist. Der freie Geist. Un-
abhangigkeit. Zeit der Wilste. Kritik alles Verehrten (Idealisierung 
des Unverehrten), Versuch umgekehrter Schatzungen. 
"[Die tiberwindung auch der guten Neigungen. (Unvermerkt 
solche Naturen wie Diihring und Wagner und Schopenhauer als noah nicht 
einmaZ auf dieser Stufe stehend!)]" Brackets in original. 
10z, I, "Von den drei Verwandlungen;" VI/l, p. 27 = Z, I, 
"On the Three Metamorphoses," p. 27. "Unschuld ist das Kind und Ver-
gessen, ein Neubeginn, ein Spiel, ein aus sich rollendes Rad, eine 
erste Bewegung, ein heiliges Ja-sagen. 
"Ja, zum Spiele des Schaffens, meine Bruder, bedarf es eines 
heiligen Ja-sagens: seinen Willen will nun der Geist, seine Welt 
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The innocence of the child arises out of the destruction of the "thou 
shalt," an act which puts him beyond good and evil to such an extent 
that the very distinction is forgotten; in this sense, his appear-
ance marks a new beginning. 
What does this child do? He plays creatively. In playing, 
he creates his own world freely; thus he is a first movement. He 
lives out, plays out, the game he has begun of his own initiative: 
a self-pFopelled wheel, returning again and again to its starting-
point to begin another game. The conditions of the possibility of 
this creative play include not only the appropriation of the world 
accomplished by the camel and the freedom won by the lion, but also 
the sacred "yes" of the child. The child wills his own will because 
there is nothing else in itself to will; everything else has become 
the child's plaything, possessing no value or meaning in itself. 
The sacred "yes" is then an affirmation, not of any thing in itself 
in the world, but of the child's own will as the absolute source of 
meaning and value in the world as his game or play. In this sense, 
the child not only conquers his own owrld, he creates that world 
without being bound in any previous one. 
The necessity of the transition from the stage of the lion 
to that of the child appears to be completely conditional: if one 
is to become creative. then one must go beyond the lion. But, as is 
gewinnt sich der Weltverlorene." 
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clear in the fragment on "The Way to Wisdom, 11 11 many are unable to 
make this transition. The creative play of the child is freely 
undertaken, hence it is not necessary in itself. Yet one can argue 
that there is an implicit affirmation of creativity in the lion's 
negativity which prepares the way for the child's play. In the lion's 
"no"-saying, he is already taking hold of existence, going beyond 
it in affirming his right to deny it. When he realizes that this 
negation arises out of the strength of his own will, he lays the 
foundation for the child's affirmation of his own will as measure 
of the world. 
While it can be said that playing involven the creation of 
a world in most cases, the world that is usually created in ordinary 
play is bounded. Its definition depends upon its juxtaposition to 
a "real" world. Johan Huizinga, for example, has suggested that, 
"play is not 'ordinary' or 'real' life. It is rather a stepping out 
of 'real' life into a temporary sphere of activity with a disposi-
tion all of its own. ul2 In this passage on the creative play of 
the child, the play world becomes the world itself, absolved from 
any dependence on an ordinary or real world through the liberating 
transformation of the spirit from a camel through the stage of the 
lion to that of the child. Here Nietzsche's category of play differs 
lluw, I, §662, p. 250. 
12Johan Huizinga, Homo Ludens. A Study of the Play Element 
in Culture, p. 8. 
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from many other such theories by attributing to the world of play an 
autonomy which it does not usually possess. If the commitment of 
the camel were to encompass all of existence, and if the lion were 
able to overcome all that to which the camel was committed, then 
there would be no limits at all to the creative play of the child. 
It is questionable here whether the stage of the child as 
described in "The Three Metamorphoses" is attainable and, if attained, 
whether one can remain there for an extended period of time. The 
questions being raised here parallel those raised about the stability 
arid adequacy of the Dionysian and Apollinian forms of play in the 
previous chapter. The issue is a crucial one in understanding Nie-
tzsche's category of play and in evaluating its adequacy. The ques-
tion may be posed this way: is it possible for the creative play of 
the child to take upon itself an autonomous.existence which is inde-
pendent of the two preceding stages of the camel and the lion? Two 
possible interpretations present themselves. First, it is possible 
in the creative play of the child to create a completelv autonomous, 
self-sufficient world. Second, the creative play of the child is 
one moment in human activity which in itself comprises all three 
moments of the camel, the lion and the child. 
Nietzsche presents the three metamorphoses as three succes-
sive states which, having hapened once to a spirit, do not repeat 
themselves again under ideal circumstances. To interpret them chron-
ologically as successive stages which clearly be in accord with the 
text, and such an interpretation would be consistent with Jaspers's 
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interpretation of "The Way to Wisdom" as autobiographicai. 13 Yet 
this interpretation raises certain problems. Such autonomy is only 
possible, as has been suggested above, under the conditions that the 
camel has been able to encompass all of existence and that the lion 
has been able to negate it and thus free the spirit for his creative 
play. It is possible to object to the feasibility of such a state 
on the grounds that such a total encompassing and negating of exis-
tence would be practically impossible to achieve. Such an objection 
would constitute no real objection in Nietzsche's eyes, for he would 
readily admit that only the very few attain such heights. A second 
objection carries more weight. In order for such a complete encom-
passing of, and negating of existence to occur once and for all, it 
is necessary to assume that existence is static, that the world 
which it encompassed and then negated does not change. If the world 
were to change, if something new were to emerge, then that additional 
"sometli.ing" would not have been appropriated and negated by the 
spirit. It would remain outside the spirit's world. However, by 
means of the camel and the lion, the world itself is transformed into 
the child's world, from the world to his world. If the play of the 
child is to be complete, it is necessary either to assume that the 
world possesses a static character which allows it to be completely 
13For Jaspers's view on this, see Karl Jaspers, Nietzsche. An 
Introduction to the Unde1?standing of His Philosophical Activity 
(Tuscon: University of Arizona Press, 1965), pp. 44 ff. 
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surpassed or else to view the three metamorphoses as three stages 
which the spirit continually undergoes. Since Nietzsche's world 
clearly is not a static one, the latter alternative is more clearly 
in accord with the general framework of Nietzsche's thought. 
One can object to this interpretation by raising the following 
question: why should the creative play of the child not be possible 
in itself as a continuous creation and destruction of stability, of 
static worlds? If the creative play of the child is interpreted in 
this manner, then what I would consider one of the major strong 
points of Nietzsche's category of play is negated: the connection 
between the creative play of the child and the everyday world, a 
connection which is based in the process of transformation which 
the spirit undergoes in the stages of the camel and the lion, is 
destroyed. Instead of being the creative t~ansformation of the 
world through play, the child's play becomes a creatio ex nihilo. 
While such an interpretation is indeed possible, while it can account 
for the static appearance of the world by treating it as an Apol-
linian illusion which itself could be the result of creative play, 
it has two disadvantages in my opinion. First, as already men-
tioned, it severs any mediating link between the creative play of 
the child and the world. Second, it appears to me to be an inad-
equate description of the actual relationship between play and the 
world if one presumes that the world exists in some sense in it-
self outside of the child's creative play. In this regard, it has 
been argued that the three metamorphoses, rather than being stages 
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which are temporally successive, are actually interpenetrating meta-
morphoses .14 
To raise this second objection is to go beyond the questions 
of what Nietzsche said and of the internal consistency of his state-
ments. It should be clearly indicated as such: it is inquiring 
into the adequacy of his category of play itself. However, that in-
quiry reflects back upon the interpretation insofar as one, when con-
fronted with two possible interpretations, tends to choose the one 
which is more adequate on its own merits. If the creative play of 
the child is interpreted as a completely autonomous activity which 
is no longer bound to the world from which it has sprung, then the 
mediating link between creative play and the world is broken and 
play loses its connection with the world--presuming the existence of 
a world in need of mediation. To view the three metamorphoses as 
continually recurring transformations yields a model which more ade-
quately reflects my own experience. What is significant to me about 
play is that it is a way of transforming the world; if, on the 
other hand, it leads merely to creating a private world, then play 
becomes insignificant. If it is not in some meaningful sense in 
the world--and the camel and the lion symbolize the ways in which 
it may be in the world--then it poses its transformative power. It 
14Ryogi Okochi, "Nietzsches Amor fati," Nietzsche-Studien, 
edited by Mazzino Montinari, Wolfgang Muller-Lauter and Heinz Wenzel 
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1972), Vol. I, p. 89 argues in favor of 
this view as reflecting the nature of artistic activity in both East 
and West. 
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appears to be mere fooling around (SpieZerei), rather than true play 
(SpieZ). It is possible to develop and defend Nietzsche's position 
without presuming the existence of a world outside of the world of 
play; but my criticism here is not directed toward the internal 
consistency of Nietzsche's position, but rather relates simply to a 
different experience of the relationship of play to the everyday 
world. 
It is not insignificant in this regard that the child's 
play, as presented in "The Three Metamorphoses," is solitary. He 
has no fellow players. Whether he is alone at the seashore building 
sand castles or alone ori the top of a mountain, he is nevertheless 
always alone; his unlimited freedom is purchased at the price of 
isolation. But isolation is almost too weak a word here: he is 
not only isolated from other men, he must deny their very existence 
outside his world of play and the change they bring about in that 
outside world. One can object to this by ·asking: can he not, like 
Prometheus, in his creative play create fellow players, a whole world 
of things, without having to accept anything given which did not 
emerge from his creative play? Without his creative play he would 
be isolated, true, but why should he be isolated in his play from 
which good neighbors, friends and enemies, etc., emerge? However, 
the question is, as I see it, how he can create these fellow players 
if they are not at least present as potential players outside his 
world of play and if he is not able to draw them into his world in 
order to actually play together with them and thus constitute them 
--
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as fellow players. He cannot create such players out of nothing al-
though he may be able to radically transform the "something"--the 
potential players--available to him. The world of play must have a 
point of insertion into the world out of which it springs, a con-
tinuing contact with that world. The symbols of the camel and the 
lion offer a conceptual framework in terms of which that continuing 
contact with the world may be understood. 
Interpreting the three metamorphoses as continually recurring 
ways of existing is also consistent with the general structure of 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra itself. In Zarathustra's "Prologue," the 
beginning of his descent is described as follows: 
When Zarathustra was thirty years old he left his home and 
the lake of his home and went into the mountains. Here he en-
joyed his spirit and his solitude, and for ten years did not 
tire of it. But -at last a change came over his heart •.• 5 
At what stage was Zarathustra during his ten years in the mountains? 
He says, "I am weary of my wisdom. • I need hands outstretched to 
receive it. 1116 The three-stage path considered in conjunction with 
the three metamorphoses was called "The Way to Wisdom." Did Zara-
.thustra reach wisdom, this third stage? Did he reach the highest 
15z, "Zarathustra's Vorrede;" VI/l, p. 5 = Z, "Prologue, p. 
9. "Als Zarathustra dreissig Jahr alt war, verliess er seine Heimat 
und den See seiner Heimat und gieng in das Gebirge. Hier genoss er 
seines Geistes und seiner Einsamkeit und wurde dessen zehn Jahre 
nicht mlide. Endlich aber verwandelte sich sein Herz,--" 
l6Ibid., p. 5 =Ibid, p. 10. "Ich bin meiner Weisheit liber-
drlissig ••• ich bedarf der Winde, die sich ausstrecken." 
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point, the third metamorphosis, and then eventually have to "descend 
to the depths •.• go under11 ?17 If Zarathustra fits into the frame-
work of the three metamorphoses at all in this opening passage, it 
is as the child who enjoys his spirit and solitude for years, but 
eventually wearies of it, needing others to receive it. 
But if Zarathustra is the child playing during his sojourn in 
the mountains, what is he when he goes under? He presents himself as 
the teacher of the overman and the eternal recurrence, and he refers 
to the desire to go to his work, his day. 18 Here it depends on 
whether one interprets play as a completely autonomous activity 
existing in its own world or as intimately bound up with the other 
two stages of appropriation and negation which the camel and the 
lion symbolize. If one follows the second interpretation, then the 
descent of Zarathustra into the depths is difficult to explain 
without maintaining that he ceases to play. If, however, one follows 
the first line of interpretation, one may argue as follows. Play, 
in order to continue to be meaningful creative activity, must at 
least periodically descend into the depths, into the world, in order 
to gather into its own play world new material which it can trans-
form, which it can play with. Zarathustra's world is no longer 
17Ibid., pp. 5-6 Ibid.' p. 10. II in die Tiefe steigen 
untergehen 11 
18z, IV, "Das Zeichen;" VI/l, p. 401 = Z, IV, "The Sign," 
p. 325. "Zu meinem Werke will ich, zu meinent Tage ..• " 
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entirely self-sufficient; he grows weary of it. His activity differs 
from the child's creative play in "The Three Metamorphoses" in this 
respect: it seeks others to receive it. There is an implicit recog-
nition here of two shortcomings in the image of the child's play, 
both of which relate to the social dimension of play. In recog-
nizing that contact with the world must be periodically renewed, it 
is implied that the world of play is not completely self-sufficient. 
In searching for fellow players, it is recognized that this periodi-
cally renewed contact with the world involves some element of inter-
personal relationships. An adequate development of Nietzsche's 
category of play must take these two problems into account, supple-
menting the category of the creative play of the child with a medi-
ating structure by means of which it can remain in contact with the 
non-play world if one assumes the existence of such a world. 
The FT'ee SpiPit 
The second major text to be considered here is the Preface 
to Hwnan, AZZ-too-hwnan, which was written in the spring of 1886 for 
a new edition of that work. Thus it comes about three years after 
the section on "The Three Metamorphoses" in Thus Spoke ZaT'athustT'a. 
It is to be grouped together with several other new prefaces (for 
The BiT'th of TT'agedy, Hwnan, AZZ-too-hwnan II, The Dawn, and The 
Joyful Wisdom), Book Five of The Jou.fut Wisdom, Beuond Good and 
Evil, and On the GeneaZogu of Morals. In these writings, the section 
which adds the most to our understanding of the free spirit is 
Section Two of Be~ond Good and Evil. Although I am not taking this 
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text as the explicit point of reference in this section, I shall 
draw upon it freely to expand upon the idea of the development of 
the free spirit found in the 1886 Preface to Human, AZZ-too-human, 
I. Taken together, these writings provide another model for under-
standing the development of the spirit, "in which the type 'free 
spirit' will sometime become ripe and sweet to perfection. 1119 
In this section, I shall first show that there are six sep-
arable moments in the development of the free spirit: (1) the fettered 
spirit, which forms the starting-point; (2) the great breaking-
loose; (3) the bird's £reedom; (4) the great health; (5) the emer-
gence of self-awareness; and (6) the generalization of the free 
spirit's self-awareness into the problem of the order of rank. It 
will be shown that the highest form of activity in this process of 
development is an activity which corresponds to the category of 
play developed in the preceding analysis of "The Three Metamorph-
oses." Finally, it will be shown that this type of playing involves 
the doctrine of the order of rank, suggesting that the creative play 
which is Nietzsche's highest activity is not a completely arbitrary 
play, that rules of this play may be understood in relation to the 
order of rank--a hypothesis whose validity will be tested in the 
section which follows. 
19Menschliches, AZZzwnenschZiches, I, "Vorrede," 3, in Nie-
tzsche Werke, Vierte Abteilung, Zweiter Band (Berlin: Walter de 
Gruyter, 1967), p. 9. " . in dem der Typus 'freier Geist' einmal 
bis zur Vollkornrnenheit reif und siiss werden soll ••. " Hereafter 
abbreviated as MA, I. 
--
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The fettered spirit is the starting-point: a man of a high 
and select type, but who is chained down by duties, a spirit whose 
"highest moments themselves will bind them the most strongly, obli-
gate them the longest. 1120 The element of duty calls attention to 
the similarities between the fettered spirit and the camex:both are 
out of the ordinary (spirits, not mere members of the herd), both 
are still under the influence of the "thou shalt," both contain 
within themselves the possibility of self-overcoming. This is the 
attitude of youth, with its wrathful and reverent attitudes that 
themselves contain an element of forgery and deception.21 
The ~reat breakin~-Zoose is the decisive event which marks 
the start of the spirit's journey toward liberation. It "comes •.• 
suddenly, like an earthquake, 11 22 and the person "doesn't understand 
what is happening. 11 23 Here the spirit has much less control over 
the situation than the lion does in Zarathustra. This reflects a 
shift of emphasis in the description from an ideal viewpoint in the 
20MA, I, "Vorrede, 11 3; IV/2, p. 10. " ..• ihre hochsten 
Augenblicke selbst werden sie am festesten binden, am dauerndsten 
verphlichten. 11 
21cf. Jenseits von Gut und B8se, II, in Nietzsche Werke, 
Sechste Abteilung, Zweiter Band (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1968), 
p. 45 = Beyond Good and Evil, translated by Walter Kaufmann (New 
York: Random House, 1966), p. 43. Hereafter abbreviated as JGB and 
BGE respectively. 
22MA, I, "Vorrede, 11 3; IV/2, p. 10. 
komrnt • • • plotzlich, wie ein Erdstoss • 
23Ibid. 11 • • • die junge Seele 
was sich begiebt. 11 
"Die grosse Loslosung 
II 
• selbst versteht nicht, 
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three metamorphoses to a more concrete standpoint here. The great 
breaking-loose is characterized by a desire to go away, anywhere, a 
contempt for what has been called duty, accompanied by "a turbulent, 
willful, erupting longing for wandering, strangeness, alienation, 
cold, disenchantment, congelation .•• 11 24 What unites these char-
acteristics is that they all represent a great breakin~-loose from 
all previous bonds and a willful going beyond oneself to what had 
previously been forbidden or revolting. 
This second stage is both a victorv and a sickness from which 
the soirit will eventuallv recover. It is a victorv because of what 
makes its first appearance here: "this first outbreak of force and 
the will to self-determination. setting one's own values. this will 
to the free will. 1125 This freedom and breaking-loose closely parallel 
the stage of the lion in "The Three Metamorphoses," the free spirit 
being seduced further and further away from the familiar and toward 
the great loneliness. A fragment from Nietzsche's notebooks indicates 
that he considered himself to be passing through this stage while 
he was writing Human, AU-too-human--"a strange and evil game. 1126 
24Ibid. " ein aufri.ihrerisches, willki.irliches, vulkanisch 
stossendes Verlangen nach Wanderschaft, Fremde, Entfremdung, Erkaltung, 
Erniichterung, Vereisung •.. " 
25Ibid., pp. 10-ll. " .•• dieser erste Ausbruch von Kraft 
und Willen zur Selbstbestimmung, Selbst-Werthsetzung, dieser Wille 
zum freien Willen." 
26uw, r, §1298, P· 405. " ein unheimliches und hoses 
Spiel • II 
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The bird's freedom is a middle state between the great break-
ing-loose and the great health, a long period of convalescence char-
acterized by a tough Will to Health, which disguises itself at times 
as health itself. It is in this period of convalescence that the 
bird's freedom appears: "a feeling of the freedom of the bird, its 
vision, its high spirits, a third something in which curiosity and 
tender contempt are bound together. 112 7 The free spirit emerges, 
and his existence is characterized by a peculiar detachment, living 
without "yes," without "no." This state is one step closer to the 
child, to the great health, but still lacking the creative affirma-
tion of the child's play. Irideed, it is clear that the highest form 
of human activity for Nietzsche is not an arbitrary, capricious play 
--it might be possible to interpret the bird's freedom in this manner 
--but something more, since the development.of the spirit does not 
end with this stage. 
The great health comes only gradually, in small doses, and 
allows the free spirit to draw nearer to life. The very image of the 
flying bird suggests the instability of the previous state: it must 
eventually descend and land. In so doing, he discovers for the first 
time what is near; at the same time he is able to see himself for 
the first time. Seeing himself became possible only after he had 
27MA, I, "Vorrede," 4; IV/2, p. 12. " 
Vogel-Freiheit, Vogel-Umblick, Vogel-Uebermuth, etwas 
sich Neugierde und zarte Verachtung gebunden haben." 
ein Gefiihl von 
Drittes, in dem 
gone beyond himself, had literally been outside of himself. He must 
become alienated from himself in order to come to know himself, and 
it is sickness which brings about this alienation. The sickness that 
the free spirit undergoes is then the door through which it must pass 
in order to reach health, "that monstrous, overflowing safety and 
health, which itself cannot dispense with sickness as a means and a 
fishhook. 1128 
This great health is characterized by overflowing, super-
abundance, various and opposite ways of thinking, and "the right to 
live experimentally. 1129 It is in living experimentally that one 
reaches the state comparable to that of the child in Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra. In Beyond Good and Evil those who reach this state 
are called "Versuaher," which could be translated variously as 
"attempters," "tempters·," or "experimenters. 1130 It is important to 
note that living experimentally comes after the spirit has come back 
down to earth, drawn nearer to life. The activity of the free spirit 
who has achieved the great health is one which takes place in the 
world. 
28Ibid., p. 11. " jener ungeheuren ilberstromenden 
Sicherheit und Gesundheit, welche der Krankheit selbst nicht ent-
rathen mag, als eines Mittels und Angelhakens der Erkenntniss 
29Ibid.' p. 12. II • auf den Versuah hin leben." 
II 
30JGB, II, §42; VI/2, p. 55 = BGE, II, §42, p. 52. As Nie-
tzsche sees it, "mochten diese Philosophen der Zukunft ein Recht, 
vielleicht auch ein Unrecht darauf haben, als Versuaher bezeichnet zu 
werden. Dieser Name selbst ist zuletzt nur ein Versuch, und, wenn 
man will, eine Versuchung." 
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The play character of the great health is emphasized in Book 
Five of The Joyful Wisdom, written at about the same time as the Pre-
face to Human, All-too-human. In a section entitled "The Great 
Health," Nietzsche describes the ideal of human activity as play. 
Another ideal runs on before us, a strange, tempting ideal, full 
of danger, to which we should not like to persuade any one, be-
cause we do not so readily acknowledge any one's right thereto: 
the ideal of a spirit who plays naively (that is to say invol-
untarily and from overflowing abundance and power) with every-
thing that has hitherto been called holy, good, inviolable, 
divine • • • 31 
Play is the proper activity of the free spirit when he has achieved 
the great health, and this play takes place after the descent of the 
free spirit from the heights of the bird's freedom. 
Self-ai.Jareness develops as the free spirit begins to realize 
what has happened to him; this is when "the puzzle of that great 
breaking-loose ••• may begin to unveil itself. 11 32 Here his con-
sciousness of himself as a master develops: a master for whom all of 
existence--not only things, but also values and reasons--become tools 
at his service, toys that he can play with. True perspectivism, not 
31Friedrich Nietzsche, Die fr8hliche Wissenschaft, mit einem 
Nachwort von Alfred Baeumler (Stuttgart: Alfred Kroner, 1965), Fifth 
Book, §382, p. 302 = TheTJoyful Wisdom, translated by Thomas Common 
(New York: Frederick Ungar, 1960), p. 352. "Ein anderes Ideal lauft 
vor uns her, ein wunderliches, versucherisches, gefahrenreiches Ideal, 
zu dem wir niemanden ilberreden mochten, weil wir niemandem so leicht 
das Recht darauf zugestehen: das Ideal eines Geistes, der naiv, das 
heiBt ungewollt und aus ilberstromender Fillle und Machtigkeit mit allem 
spielt, was bisher heilig, gut, unberilhrbar, gottlich hies- •.. " 
Hereafter these works are abbreviated as FW and JW respectively. 
32MA, I, "Vorrede," 6: IV/2, p. 14. " • sich das Ratsel 
jener grossen Loslosung zu entschleiern beginnt." 
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only in thought but also in action (for this involves living experi-
mentally, not just thinking freely33) comes to fruition here. The 
free spirit gains power over all his "for's" and "against's," learns 
to play with them and use them to his own higher purposes. He sees 
the necessary injustice in every "for" and "against," sees "injustice 
as inseparable from life, life itself as conditioned through the per-
spectival and its injustice. 11 34 Injustice is to be found in partic-
ular there where life is least developed, most narrow, where it none-
theless cannot refrain from tak1ng itself as the purpose and measure 
of things.35 Although the free spirit also lives perspectivally, his 
perspectivism differs from that which is normally encountered, for he 
realizes that it is a perspective, assumed for the sake of the experi-
ment of life, nothing more. 
The category of play lies at the heart of this notion of per-
spectivism and this idea of life as an experiment. In gaining power 
over one's "for's" and "against's," one realizes that there is no 
essential opposition between "true" and "false," that it is rather a 
question of degrees of appearance, that it is a moral prejudice to 
33The emphasis on action is suggested in Nietzsche's distinc-
tion between the "free thinkers" and the "free spirits;" see JGB, II, 
§44; VI/2, p. 58 = BGE, II, §44. p. 55. It is made explicit in FW, V, 
§372, p. 288 = JW, V, §372, p. 336. 
34MA, I, "Vorrede," 6; IV/2, p. 14. " ••. die Ungerechtig-
keit als unablosbar vom Leben, das Leben selbst als bedingt <lurch das 
Perspektivische und seine Ungerechtigkeit." 
35Ibid. 
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assume that truth is worth more than mere appearance.36 When this 
line of thinking is carried to its final conclusion, one realizes 
that there are only interpretations.37 The doctrine of perspectivism 
implies that everything is really nothing more than a plaything, 
lacking any nature in itself which would give it a "true" meaning. 
To live experimentally is, then, "to dance even on the verge of the 
abysses, 1138 to play creatively when one is on the verge of realizing 
that there is only play. This is the activity of the free spirit 
par exce Uence. 
The doctPine of the oPdeP of Pank is the highest expression 
of .the growing self-awareness of the free spirit; it grows out of 
the insight that "power and right and the scope of perspective grow 
higher with one another. 11 39 In this final step he g€]nePaZizes his 
case. "'The way it works out for me,' he tells himself, 'is the 
way it must work out for everyone in whom a task becomes incarnate 
and will "come into the world".' 1140 The ·problem of the order of 
36JGB, II, §34; VI/2, p. 49 = BGE, II, §34, p. 46. 
37JGB, I, §22; VI/2, p. 31 = BGE, I, §22, p. 30 
38Fw, v, §347, p. 245 = JW, V, §347, p. 287. " •• selbst 
an Abgriinden noch zu tanzen. Ein solcher Geist ware der fr>eie Ge1>st 
par excellence." 
39MA, I, "Vorrede," 6; IV/2, pp. 14-15. " Macht und 
Recht und Umfiinglichkeit der Perspektive mit einander in die Hohe 
wachsen." 
40MA, I, "Vorrede," 7; IV /2, p. 15. "Wie es mir ergieng, 
sagt er sich, muss es Jedem ergehn, in dem eine Aufgabe leibhaft 
werden und 'zur Welt korrnnen' will." 
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rank defines the free spirits and their task, and it is this problem 
which has guided their development, even when they did not know it.41 
Although a detailed discussion of the doctrine of the order of rank 
is given- in the next section of this chapter, a preliminary inter-
pretation can be set forth here in regard to this question: how is 
the order of rank a task for the free spirit? Insofar as the free 
spirit realizes that all of existence is perspectival, insofar as he 
realizes that it is the result of creative activity which is funda-
mentally play. he sees the order of rank as a task in this sense: he 
must gain power over his "for's" and "against's," over his purposes, 
over his perspectives. In other words, he must create the order of 
rank--that is the task of the free spirit. Realizing that this is 
his task, he knows that the meaning and order of his world are the 
result of his creative play. That there must be some order of rank 
is a recognition of the necessity of rules and structure in play. The 
free spirit's realization that the creation of the order of rank is 
his task implies his awareness of himself as a creative player whose 
activity results in the appearance of new worlds. 
This preliminary interpretation of the doctrine of the order 
of rank in relation to the creative play of the free spirit provides 
the foundation for a refinement of the distinction between the play 
world and the non-play worlds. The realization that everything is 
interpretation and the awareness of the order of rank as his task 
41Ibid. 
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gives the free spirit the basis for concluding that his play world 
is but one such world among many--that there are only play worlds, 
no "real world." They define themselves in relation to each other, 
and there is no need to assume the opposite of a play world. Rather 
than saying that the child's play must return to the world, it would 
be more precise to say that this creative play must continually seek 
to enlarge its boundaries, to extend its influence. The need for 
creative play to extend its influence is equivalent to the free 
spirit's realization that the order of rank is its proper task and 
is consistent, as will be shown later, with the general tendency of 
the will to power to extend its boundaries, maximize its effects. 
This investigation of the category of play in relation to 
the free spirit and his development again underscores the fact that 
this kind of creative play is possible only for the few. Only a 
high and select type enter upon the process of the liberation of 
the spirit, and even these few have no guarantee of final success. 
Moreover, the free spirit himself is not consciously directing this 
process. Reaching the stage where one can play creatively is itself 
an achievement. It has also been shown that the proper task of the 
free spirit is playing, creating the order of rank and thereby_ im-
pressing on the other play worlds the character of the free spirit's 
play. This play is not an arbitrary activity. For the free spirit, 
it is related to a very specific task: the creation of a new order 
of rank. This is the creative play of the Versucher, who realize 
that the world itself is but a multiplicity of play worlds, none of 
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which have any claim to being absolutely true. 
Given this preliminary analysis, we now have to turn to a 
more detailed consideration of the order of rank, seeking to discover 
what specific bounds it imposes upon the creative play of the free 
spirits. 
The Order of Rank 
It is the order of rank which gives content to Nietzsche's 
idea of the free spirit, and its importance for an understanding of 
his notion of human activity as play is clear. Nietzsche identifies 
his own philosophy with teaching the order of rank, 42 arguing that 
this must be re-established to counteract the growing emphasis on 
equality43 and to prevent the extension of the values of the herd to 
those who are outside the herd.44 
In this section dealing with the doctrine of the order of 
rank, it will be shown that previous explanations of the orderliness 
and purposefulness of human existence can be understood as examples 
of the order of rank. In the past these have often been taken to be 
something more than, or other than the order of rank. They have, for 
example, been taken to be expressions of an absolute order and purpose 
42uw, II, §1411, p. 508. 
43Friedrich Nietzsche, Der Wille zur Macht (Stuttgart: Alfred 
Kroner Verlag, 1964), §854, p. 581 =The Will to Power, translated by 
Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Random House, 1967), 
p. 457. Hereafter abbreviated as WM and WP respectively. 
44WM, §287, p. 203 = WP, §287, p. 162. 
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in nature itself, rather than being seen as an expression of man's 
creative play. The various orders of rank are not, however, absolute, 
but rather on-going, developing, as indeed existence itself is. They 
are, like all games, finite expressions of man's creativity, limited 
and changing. 
It will be shown, furthermore, that the doctrine of the order 
of rank has a two-fold meaning. It is both an analytical tool in 
terms of which past orders of rank may be analyzed and also, as has 
already been seen, a task for the free spirits. These two notions 
come together in the idea of interpretation as creative play, the 
first being play with the past, the second being play with the future. 
Finally, an analysis of the criteria for determining the 
order of rank will be shown to give an insight into the specific 
character of play, the way in which play is power, the will to power 
created by the overman. This gives us an insight into the essential 
unity of Nietzsche's thought and suggests a possible way of over-
coming the traditional opposition between freedom and necessity in 
the category of creative play. Thus it will be shown that the doctrine 
od the order of rank is an expression of the orderliness proper to 
the creative play of the free spirits. 
The primary function of the doctrine of the order of rank as 
an analytical tool is that it allows one to confront and deal with 
traditional moral problems and divisions on a non-moral basis. The 
conflict between the "true world" uncovered by pessimism and "a world 
possible for life" must be seen as a struggle of one kind of life 
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("sickly, despairing life that cleaves to a beyond") with another 
kind ("healthier, more stupid and mendacious, richer, less degenerate 
life"), not as a struggle between "truth" and life. This problem 
can only be resolved in terms of an order of rank: "Here one must 
demonstrate the need for an order of rank--that the first problem 1s 
the order of rank of different kinds of life. 1145 By rejecting an 
interpretation of this conflict as one between "truth" and life, 
Nietzsche is following his own suggestion in Beyond Good and Evil to 
forgo interpretati,ons in terms of "true" and "false" and to deal 
instead with "degrees of apparentness. 1146 One of the essential 
characteristics of the order of rank is that it overcomes one of the 
traditional prejudices of philosophers, the faith in opposite values. 
It does this by realizing that there are many created worlds, play 
worlds, some of which are more powerful than others, but all of 
which still remain as created worlds. 
This demonstration of the necessity of an order of rank is 
possible if one can show (1) the insufficiency of all previous divi-
sions, especially the moral one, and (2) the way in which the order 
of rank is grounded in life itself. The first part of this task 
45WM, §592, p. 411 = WP, §592, p. 324. "Hier muB die Beweis-
filhrung einsetzen, daB eine Rangordnung not tut,--daB das erste 
Problem das der Rangordnung der Arten Leben ist." 
46JGB, II, §34; VI/2, p. 49 = BGE, II, §34, p. 46. "Ja, 
was zwingt uns ilberhaupt zur Annahme, dass es einen wesenhaften 
Gegensatz von 'wahr' und 'falsch' giebt? Genilgt es nicht, Stufen 
der Scheinbarkeit anzunehmen .•• ?" 
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is accomplished primarily by means of a reduction of previous divi-
sions of the order of rank. First, and most important, morality must 
be shown to be only another version of the order of rank in disguise. 
Morality is the doctrine of the order of rank of men, and con-
sequently also of the meaningfulness of their actions and works 
for this order of rank: thus the doctrine of human value judg-
ments in relation to everything human. Most moral philosophers 
present only the contemporary ruling order of rank; on the one 
hand, a lack of historical sense,--on the other, they themselves 
are ruled by the morality, which the present teaches as eternally-
valid.47 
Thus the order of rank has an historical dimension not usually found 
in morality, and one can infer from the description above that the 
one who holds the order of rank would be able to go beyond the dis-
tortions of morality which mistakes the present for the eternally-
valid. Thus moralities are reducible to "the expression of locally 
limited orders of rank. 1148 
Insofar as one is concerned with morality instead of the 
order of rank, one would be--in Nietzsche's order of rank--in a rank 
below that of the free spirit. One's perspectives would be narrowed, 
confined by the limits of a particular morality. One would not have 
47uw, II, §675, p. 213. "Moral ist die Lehre von der Rang-
ordnung der Menschen, und folglich auch von der Bedeutsamkeit ihrer 
Handlungen und Werke flir diese Rangordnung: also die Lehre von den 
menschlichen Wertschatzungen in betref f alles Menschlichen. Die 
meisten Moralphilosophen stellen nur die gegenwartige herrschende 
Rangordnung dar; Mangel an historischem Sinn einerseits,--anderseits 
sie werden selber von der Moral beherrscht, welche das Gegenwartige 
als das Ewig-Gill tige lehrt." 
48WM, §966, p. 644 = WP, §966, p. 507. "Moralen sind der 
Ausdruck lokal beschrankter Rangordnungen in dieser vielfachen Welt 
der Triebe." 
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realized that morality is also a human creation. One would be lacking 
in the instinct for privilege, distance, the feeling of creative na-
tures which characterize the higher reaches of the order of rank.49 
The superiority of the doctrine of the order of rank as a source of 
meaning and order in the world in contrast to morality consists in 
the fact that it allows all this: the widening of perspectives, the 
realization of the role of human creativity in the development of 
this meaning and order, the instinct for privilege, distance, and 
the other qualities of the free spirit. 
Other phenomena can also be understood more adequately in 
terms of the order of rank. It will suffice to call attention to 
just one here: religion. It is "essentially a doctrine of the order 
of rank, even an attempt at a cosmic order of rank and of power. 1150 
Approaching religion as a manifestation of the order of rank allows 
Nietzsche to make sense of its appearance without giving to it the 
validity it would claim for itself. The existence of religion is 
not denied, but its own interpretation of its significance is ques-
tioned. 
49WM, §879, p. 598 = WP, §879, p. 470 = Nachgelassene Frag-
mente. Herbst 1887 bis Marz 1888 in Nietzsche Werke, Achte Ab-
teilung, Zweiter Band (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1970), 9(152), p. 
88. Hereafter the Nachgelassene Fragmente will be abbreviated as 
NF, followed by the part and volume numbers, then the notebook number, 
and finally the page number. Thus: NF, VIII/2, 9(152), p. 88. 
50 UW, II, §846, p. 291. "Religion--wesentlich Lehre der 
Rangordnung, sogar Versuch einer kosmischen Rang- und Machtordnung." 
The task of creating one's own order of rank, the principle 
which dominates the creative play of the free spirit, is clearly 
not to be understood as a moral imperative, as a fragment from Nie-
tzsche's notebooks shows. 
An imperative, "conduct yourself in accord with the order of 
rank that you belong to," is senseless: because we would have 
to know (1) ourselves and (2) that order, neither of which is 
the case,--and (3) because it is superfluous to order something 
which would occur anyway.51 
It is questionable how much weight should be put on this fragment, 
since Nietzsche did not include it in any of the works he published. 
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While it would be possible to interpret it in such a way as to suggest 
that ·the order of rank is something beyond our control, a necessity 
imposed upon us, it is more in line with Nietzsche's thinking to 
read this fragment in conjunction with his three-stage history of 
morals in Beyond Good Oftd Evil. In pre-historical times the value of 
an action was judged on the basis of its consequences. In the last 
ten thousand years, the origin of the action became the decisive 
factor. In the third stage, represented by the innnoralists, 
• the decisive value of an action lies precisely in what is 
unintentional in it, while everything about it that is ·inten-
tional, everything about it that can be seen2 known, "conscious," still belongs to its surface and skin .•• 5 
51uw, II, §757, p. 246. "Ein Imperativ, 'beninnn dich der 
Rangordnung gemaB, zu der du gehorst, ist unsinnig, weil wir 1. uns, 
2. jene Ordnung kennen mi.i.ssten, was beides nicht der Fall ist,--und 
3. weil es liberfllissig ist, etwas zu befehlen, das ohnedies geschieht." 
52JGB, II, §32; VI/2, p. 47 = BGE, II, §32, p. 44. II 
gerade in dem, was nicht-absichtlich an einer Handlung ist, ihr ent-
scheidener Werth belegen sei, und dass alle ihre Absichtlichkeit, 
was von ihr gesehn, gewusst, 'bewusst' werden kann, noch zu ihrer 
Oberflache und Haut gehore .•• " 
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While a thorough treatment of this theme must await the material pre-
sented in the next two chapters, it can be indicated in a preliminary 
way that the order of rank is not an imperative, nor is it an ab-
stract idea, but rather an expression of the totality of one's being. 
One cannot be corrnnanded to act according to it, for no other alter-
native is possible. It is what we make it to be. It is for this 
reason that we cannot know the order of rank: as our creation, much 
of it is intentional, but perhaps the most significant part of it 
remains unintentional. There is implied in this position a notion 
of human action as stemming from the entire self, not just thought, 
which will be considered in detail in Chapter Five. 
There are numerous other formulations of the order of rank, 
a number of which are to be found in Nietzsche's notebooks. It is 
possible here to call attention to only a few of these, but they 
will serve to point out the two-fold sense in which the idea of the 
order of rank is used. In the face of skepticism growing out of the 
nineteenth-century historical sense, Nietzsche asserts the existence 
of an order of rank of both men and problems. 53 Elsewhere he writes 
of posing the question of the order of rank of artists in a new way, 
distinguishing between artists who are dominated by major intellectual 
movements and those where the artist is only a part of the man, as in 
the case of Plato, Goethe, and Giordano Bruno. 54 A short fragment 
53uw, I, §563, p. 214. 
54uw, I, §538, p. 202. 
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refers to a new order of rank for spirits in which the tragic natures 
are no longer dominant.55 The crisis precipitated by nihilism re-
sults in a process of purification, promoting "an order of rank of 
strengths [forces] from the viewpoint of health. 1156 An order of rank 
of goods according to the degree of egoism is presented in Human, 
All-too-human, and Nietzsche acknowledges that this order of rank can 
change. 57 Although after each such change specific actions become 
designated as moral or immoral, the principle of change is not mor-
ality itself. 58 The order of rank is prior to, and more fundamental 
than morality. 
Two different usages of the notion of the order of rank can 
be distinguished in these and other passages. First, it is used as 
a descriptive term in relation to past and present phenomena which 
lays bare their true structure. Thus morality, religion and art are 
to be understood first and foremost in terms of the way in which they 
express the dominant order of rank. Second, the idea is used to 
point the way toward the creation of a new order of rank. In addi-
tion to the passages cited above, one can call attention to a frag-
ment in the notebooks where Nietzsche asserts that, with the trans-
valuation of all values, the principle of the order of rank of all 
55WM, §992, p. 655 =WP, §992, p. 517. 
56WM, §55, p. 48 = WP, §55, p. 38. " einer Rangordnung 
der Krafte, vom Gesichtspunkt der Gesundheit •.. " 
57MA, I, 2, §42; IV/2, p. 63. 
58Ibid. 
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values is inverted.59 So, too, the innnoralists are engaged in the 
task of creating a new order of rank insofar as they are reversing 
the traditional relation between, on the one hand, priests and other 
teachers of a beyond and, on the other hand, the blasphemers and 
other innnoralists.60 These two diverging notions of the order of 
rank begin to merge when Nietzsche takes this second usage and 
applies it to historical instances, creating a new order of rank 
in the past. By interpreting history, one creates new orders of 
rank. Thus what might have appeared at first to have been a fixed 
order of rank in the past is changing in two senses. First, the 
order of rank itself changes in the course of history through the 
creative actions of men, especially of the powerful ones. Second, 
in interpreting this past development, new orders of rank are created 
through the power of the interpretation as an exercise of the will 
to power. Both of these are play activity. In the past, the ere-
ative play of the powerful creates orders of rank, transforms old 
ones. In the present, one plays with the past, creating out of the 
manifold possibilities it offers new orders of rank, which in turn 
creates an openness for the future. 
The principle governing the order of rank is clearly power: 
II what detennines rank, sets off rank, is only quanta of power; 
59WM, §1006, p. 661 WP, §1006, p. 521 NF, VIII/2, 9(66), 
p. 173. 
60 § = WM, 116, p. 84 WP, §116, p. 71 =NF, VIII/2, 15(44), 
p. 232. 
---
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and nothing else. 1161 It is on this basis that the two fundamental 
types of life can be distinguished: 
I distinguish between a type of ascending life and another 
type of decay, disintegration, weakness. 
Is it credible that the question of the relative rank of 
these two types still needs to be posed.62 
Clearly there is no question in Nietzsche's mind: ascending life is 
superior to decaying, disintegrating life. Since ascending life is 
basically life that is increasingits own power and extending its 
boundaries, it is also clear that this ascending life is fundamentally 
the will to power which is increasing. It is not ascending toward 
some goal which exists outside of itself, but rather ascending toward 
more and more power, greater and greater dominance. As it reaches 
its highest point, we encounter "here and there, a completely Epi-
curean god, the overman, the redeemer of existence."63 The order of 
rank is the highest expression of the creative play of man, the most 
powerful expression of created order and purpose. The notion of 
ascending life indicates that this creative play is seeking contin-
ually to extend the boundaries of its play world. 
61WM, §854, p. 581 = WP, §854, p. 482. "Rangbestimmend, Rang 
abhebend sind allein Macht-Quantitaten: und sonst nichts." 
62WM, §857, p. 581 =WP, §857, p. 457 =NF, VIII/3, 15(120), 
p. 275. "Ich unterscheide einen Typus des aufsteigenden Lebens und 
einen anderen des Verfalls, der Zersetzung, der Schwache. 
"Sollte man glauben, daB die Rangfrage zwischen beiden Typen 
iiberhaupt noch zu stellen ist? • " 
63uw, II, §1408, p. 507. " • hier und da • . . ganz 
epikurischer Gott, der Ubermensch, der Verklarer des Daseins." 
---
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Thus the order of rank is the result of the creative play of 
the powerful who, in the fullness of their power, give a new order to 
the world--indeed, create a new world in both thought and action. 
They reinterpret the past, creating new orders of rank through their 
playful thinking, through the power of their thinking. They create 
a new order of rank in the present by means of all their actions, 
preparing the way for a future in which the overman can emerge. 
Their play is founded in their will to power and, at the same time, 
gives full expression to that will to power by establishing the 
order of rank--which is based in power--as the order of the world. 
They do this by extending the boundaries of their own play world, 
by taking over and transforming other worlds which themselves were 
the result of previous instances of such creative play. 
There remains one final qualification which should be noted 
in this description. Throughout this analysis, the free spirit and 
the overman have been referred to in such a way as to suggest that 
they are isolated individuals. In a fragment in his notebooks, Nie-
tasche seeks to refine this view by extending his notion of the 
multiplicity of forces in such a way as to call into question the 
concept of an "i ndi vi dua 1." 
That man is a multiplicity of forces, which stand in an 
order of rank: so that there are those who give the orders, but 
they must also create everything that is necessary for the sur-
vival of those who obey; thus they are conditioned through the 
existence of those who obey. All these living beings must be of 
a related type, otherwise they could not serve and obey each 
other so: the servants must, in some sense, be those who obey 
also, and in finer cases the role must change between them; the 
one who otherwise orders must obey. The concept "individual" 
is wrong. These beings are not present in an isolated manner; 
the main point of importance is something changeable; the 
continual creation of cells, etc. yields a continual change 
in the number of these beings.64 
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Although this is a problem which will be discussed in depth in Chapter 
Five, it is important to point out here that this creative play that 
brings about a new order of rank is itself founded in a more funda-
mental type of play: the interplay of this multiplicity of forces 
which is constitutive of the will to power. 
Concluding Remarks on the Ideal of Creative Play 
In the three preceding sections of this chapter the founda-
tion for a Nietzschean philosophy of play has been laid. It has been 
established, first of all, that the category of play is one in terms 
of which the creative activity of the child in "The Three Metamor-
phases" and that of the free spirit is to be understood. It has 
been further established that the doctrine of the order of rank is 
the expression of the order which such play creates: riot an ab-
solute, unchanging order, but rather an order of becoming. Sugges-
tions were made that the will to power is itself this creative play 
64uw, II, §734, p. 237. "DaB der Mensch eine Vielheit von 
Kraften ist, welche in einer Rangordnung stehen: so, daB es Befehlende 
gibt, aber daB auch der Befehlende den Gehorchenden alles schaffen 
muB, was zu ihrer Erhaltung dient, somit selber <lurch deren Existenz 
bedingt ist. Alle diese lebendigen Wesen milssen verwandter Art sein, 
sonst konnten sie nicht so einander dienen und gehorchen: die Dien-
enden rnilssen, in irgend einern Sinne, auch Gehorchende sein, und in 
feineren Fallen muB die Rolle zwischen ihnen vorilbergehend wechseln, 
und der, welcher sonst befiehlt, einmal gehorchen. Der Begriff 'in-
dividuum' ist falsch. Diese Wesen sind isoliert gar nicht vorhanden: 
das zentrale Schwergewicht is t etwas Wandel bares·; das fortwahrende 
Erzeugen von Zellen usw. gibt einen fortwahrenden Wandel der Zahl 
dieser Wesen. 11 
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and these will be developed in Chapter Four. It has at least been 
established that the foundation of this creative play is power, and 
that the extension of this power--the attempt to maximize it--in-
volves the expansion of the play world of the free spirit. 
By thinking through the problem of the order of rank in 
tenns of creative play, it is possible to follow Nietzsche's sug-
gestion that we think in tenns of degrees of appearance rather than 
in opposites. Reality becomes a multiplicity of play worlds, the 
more powerful ones dominating the less powerful. The creation of 
an order of rank by the free spirit imprints the play character of 
existence on the world in both a specific and a general sense. In 
the specific sense, the free spirit makes his particular play real 
through his creative activity. In the general sense, all creations 
of orders of rank reaffirm the basic quality of human activity as 
play and of existence as the plaything of the powerful. 
To what extent is this creative play arbitrary? It is not 
arbitrary in two senses. First, its appearance is not something 
that just happens, but rather the culmination of a long process of 
development of the person's entire being. In this sense, to begin 
to play creatively is not an arbitrary occurrence. Second, play is 
not mere capricious activity--it necessarily involves the creation of 
order. The question is whether there is a third sense in which the 
specific order that one creates is something other than arbitrarv. 
In other words. granting that play must create order, is it com-
pletely free to create any order? 
99 
I would maintain that Nietzsche thought that there were 
limits, that creative play did know some boundaries. Perhaps the 
best example of what those limits would be is the series of "thou 
shalt's" which Nietzsche addresses to the free spirit in the 1886 
Preface to Hwnan, AZZ-too-hwnan. 
Thou shalt become master over thyself, master also over your 
own virtues .•• Thou shalt gain control over your "for" and 
"against" .•• Thou shalt learn to comprehend the perspectival 
in every evaluation . • • Thou shalt learn to comprehend the 
necessary injustice in every "for" and "against," injustice in-
separable from life, life itself as conditioned through the per-
spectival and its injustice. Thou shalt above all clearly see 
where the injustice is always greatest: namely there, where life 
is smallest, narrowest, neediest, most recently developed and 
yet cannot refrain from taking itself as the purpose and measure 
of things ••• Thou shalt see the problem of the order of rank 
clearly and see how power and right and scope of perspective 
grow higher with one another.65 
It 1s clear from this passage, which could be supplemented by num-
erous other exhortatory passages throughout. Nietzsche's writings, 
that this creative play is not completely arbitrary, but rather 
stands under very definite rules. However, these rules spring, not 
65MA, I, "Vorrede," 6; IV/2, pp. 14-15. "Du solltest Herr ilber 
dich werden, Herr auch ilber die eigenen Tugenden ••.• Du solltest 
Gewalt iiber dein Fiir und Wider bekornmen ..• Du solltest die noth-
wendige Ungerechtigkeit in jedem Filr und Wider begreifen lernen, die 
Ungerechtigkeit als unablosbar vom Leben, das Leben selbst als be-
dingt durch das Perspektivische und seine Ungerechtigkeit. Du 
solltest vor Allem mit Augen sehn, wo die Ungerechtigkeit irnmer am 
grossten ist: dart namlich, WO das Leben am kleinsten, engsten, 
dilrftigsten, anfanglichsten entwickelt ist und dennoch nicht umhin 
kann, sich als Zweck und Maass der Dinge zu nehmen ..• du solltest 
das Problem der Rangordnung mit Augen sehn und wie Macht und Recht 
und Umfanglichkeit der Perspektive mit einander in die Rohe wachsen." 
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from any external source, but from the free spirit himself. 
II 
. Thou 
which "thou 
what he for 
shalt"--enough, the free spirit knows 
shalt's" he has obeyed, and also what 
the first time--may do .•. 66 
by this time 
he now can do, 
The foundation of these "thou shalt's" is in the activity of the free 
spirit. In order to play freely and creatively, one must have con-
trol over the game, over the "for's" and "against's." One must realize 
the self-delusion on the part of those who mistake their own narrow 
perspectives for the purpose and measure of things, as if their play 
were equival'ent to reality its elf. Finally, one must realize that 
one's own creative play brings about an order of rank which seeks 
continually to extend its power and scope to more and more of exis-
tence. The consummation of this creative play is to be found in 
making all the other play worlds into your play world. 
B. Nihilism and the Necessity of Play 
Introduction 
The first part of this chapter has been concerned with showing 
that the highest form of human activity for Nietzsche was play. That 
part of the analysis was concerned with Nietzsche's ideas about the 
creative play of the child, the free spirit, and the order of rank. 
These may all be classed as positive descriptions of ideal forms of 
human activity. 
66Ibid., p. 15. '" •. Du solltest'--genug, der freie Geist 
Weiss nunmehr, welchem 'du sollst' er gehorcht hat, und auch, was er 
jetzt kann, was er jetzt erst--darf •.. " 
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There remains a second way in which play emerges as the highest 
form of human activity, and this can be termed a negative one. It is 
rooted in Nietzsche's analysis of nihilism. In this chapter I shall 
conclude the analysis of play as a form of human activity by showing 
that the only type of meaningful human activity possible after the 
experience of nihilism is play. It is in play that man becomes able 
to overcome nihilism. Insofar as nihilism is the necessary starting-
point of contemporary man, play becomes the only way in which man can 
achieve self-overcoming. 
The Necessity of Nihilism 
The experience of nihilism functions as a gateway into the 
contemporary world for Nietzsche--indeed, more than a gateway: a cor-
ridor two centuries long through which mankind must pass, 67 one which 
we still find ourselves in today.68 Histori~ally considered, nihilism 
is the culminating moment of the breakdown of the Christian moral 
interpretation of the world which characterized the nineteenth cen-
tury. 69 It is a necessary experience for contemporary man precisely 
67WM, "Vorrede, 11 2, p. 3 = WP, Preface, 2, p. 3 
11 (411), p. 431. 
NF, VIII/2, 
68on the contemporary dimensions of the problem of nihilism, 
see Helmuth Thielicke, Nihilism, with an Introduction by Michael Novak 
(New York: Schocken Books, 1969); Stanley Rosen, Nihilism. A Phil-
osophical Essay (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969); Michael 
Novak, The Experience of Nothingness (New York: Harper and Row, 1970). 
69cf. Karl Lowith, "The Historical Background of European 
Nihilism," in Nature, History and Existentialism, edited with a Critical 
Introduction by Arnold Levison (Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press, 1966), pp. 3-16. 
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because he is contemporary man, because he belongs to an era char-
acterized by nihilism. 
Beginning one's philosophical reflection with a confrontation 
with nihilism holds a promise similar to that offered by Descartes's 
methodological doubt: it purifies the starting-point by calling every-
thing possible into question. It differs, however, from Cartesian 
doubt in this essential aspect: it is a Zived experience, not simply 
a methodological postulate. The description of this experience given 
by Michael Novak is worth quoting at this point. I know of none 
better, and it will serve well as an introduction to the reflections 
which follow. 
The experience of nothingness defined: that experience in 
which a man perceives that his former perceptions were structured 
in a way they did not have to be, in an arbitrary and unnecessary 
way. There is no obligatory way to perceive things. A kind of 
giddiness and dizziness arise. One's former goals, aims, purposes 
now seem suspended in air. The unity of· one's life slips from 
one's grasp, dissolves. Raw, tumultuous experience is over-
whelming: how can one shape it, manage it, reduce it to form? 
Action is problematical because no goal at all seems more valu-
able, more useful, or more attractive than any other. It is as 
though at the heart of the human animal there were a love of dis-
solution, a longing to split into a million measureless particles 
and fly apart in scattered mist. The experience of nothingness 
is an experience of the formlessness at the heart of human con-
sciousness. We exist only through form; the experience of our 
formlessness is terrifying. We know our kinship to nothingness. 
We dread being reminded of it.70 
To anticipate what will follow, we can say here that this experience of 
nothingness, of formlessness, of the arbitrary and unnecessary char-
acter of our perceptions, is the experience of the play character of 
7~ichael Novak, "Introduction," in Helmuth Thielicke, Nihilism, 
p. 3. 
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the world--the realization that we have created this world, given form 
and meaning to it, and that this is all that the world is. Insofar as 
we have been led to expect it to be something more, this experience is 
a threat to our existence, calling into question that which had pre-
viously been unquestionable. As such, play initially stands as a 
threat to man because of his long-held belief that there is something 
more to existence. 
The Meaning of Nihilism 
The most important fragments on nihilism, most of which are to 
be found at the beginning of The Will to Power, were written in the 
autumn of 1887. In Nietzsche's notebooks they begin with the following 
description. 
1. Nihilism [as] a normal condition. 
Nihilism: the goal is lacking: the answer to the question of "why?" 
is lacking. What does nihilism mean?--that the highest values de-
valuate themselves. 71 
Nietzsche then goes on to distinguish between active nihilism as a 
sign of increased strength and passive nihilism as a sign of the de-
cline and regression of the spirit's power--a distinction that reminds 
one of the difference between ascending and decaying types of life 
discussed above. Active nihilism can arise when the spirit outgrows 
its old beliefs, frees itself from their authority, and consequently 
71NF, VIII/2, 9(35), p. 14. "Der Nihilism ein normaler Zustand. 
Nihilism: es fehlt das Ziel; es fehlt die Antwort auf das 'Warum?' 
was bedeutet Nihilism?--dass die obersten Werthe sich entwerthen." All 
but the first line of this passage is to be found in WM, §2, p. 10 = 
WP, §2, p. 9. 
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turns destructive. As such, it has fundamental similarities to the 
image of the lion in "The Three Metamorphoses" and to the great break-
ing-loose discussed above in the section on the free spirit. Again, 
there are limits on this process. If the spirit stops here, the 
result is pure destruction. However, for Nietzsche this is not a 
final state, but rather a pathological, transitional state in which 
sufficient strength is still lacking "in order to posit for oneself 
once again a goal, a 'why?', a belief." 72 If the spirit is to in-
crease its strength, it must go beyond this state of destructive 
nihilism. 
The question of the presuppositions of nihilism is then raised 
in this fragment, and Nietzsche lists them as these: "that there is 
no truth; that there is no absolute character to things, no 'thing 
1n itself' . 1173 Commenting on these presuppositions, he states: 
--this is itself nihilism of the most extreme kind. It places 
the value of things precisely in the lack of any reality corre-
sponding to these values and in their being merely a symptom of 
strength on the part of the value-positers, a simplification for 
the sake of life. 74 
72NF, VIII/2, 9(35), p. 14. " .•• urn produktiv sich nun auch 
wieder ein Ziel, ein Warum? einen Glauben zu setzen." 
73Ibid, p. 15. "DaB es keine Wahrheit giebt; daB es keine ab-
solute Beschaffenheit der Dinge, kein 'Ding an sich' giebt." 
74Ibid., pp. 15-16. "--dies ist selbst ein Nihilism, und zwar der 
extremste. Er legt den Werth der Dinge gerade dahinein. daB diesern 
Werthe keine Realitat entsoricht und entsorach. sondern nur ein Symptom 
von Kraft auf Seiten der Werth-Ansetzer, eine Simplification zum Zweck 
des Lebens." 
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There is a dispute over the question of whether Nietzsche's philosophy 
is a form of nihilism, and passages such as this one would seem to 
suggest that his philosophy is nihilistic. Arthur Danto has argued 
that, "Nietzsche's is a philosophy of Nihilism, insisting that there 
is no order and a fortiori no moral order in the world. 1175 Arguing 
against Danto and others, Richard Schacht has maintained that, "care-
ful analysis of his [Nietzsche's] writings shows that he neither con-
sidered himself to be a nihilist, nor deserves to be considered one, 
either metaphysically or axiologically. 1176 The question is partially 
one of definition--in regard to the meaning of the term "nihilism"--
but goes well beyond that to the more fundamental question of whether 
Nietzsche's philosophy goes beyond nihilism or not. Schacht maintains 
that he indeed does go beyond nihilism, quite far beyond it: 
~ar from holding that there are no truths about reality which may 
be discovered and stated, because there is no actual nature of 
things to discover and describe, he [Nietzsche] in fact holds the 
contrary, and has a good deal to say of a substantive nature in 
this connection. And far from denying objective validity to all 
value-judgments as such, he in fact maintains that a certain 
standard of value has an objective basis in the very nature of 
things.77 
Danto, on the other hand, sees Nietzsche's claims for going beyond 
nihilism to be far more modest: "There is a crucial tension throughout 
75Arthur C. Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1965), p. 80; cf. pp. 19-35. 
76Richard Schacht, "Nietzsche and Nihilism," in Nietzsche. A 
Collection of Critical Essays, edited by Robert C. Solomon (New York: 
Doubleday, 1973), pp. 81-82. 
77Ibid, p. 82. 
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Nietzsche, between a free-wheeling critic, always prepared to shift 
ground in attacking metaphysics, and a metaphysical philosopher seeking 
to provide a basis for his repudiation of any such enterprise as he is 
practicing. 1178 This would suggest that Nietzsche is not actually 
going beyond nihilism; rather, he is simultaneously going in another 
direction in addition to his nihilistic one. 
Although I would not agree with either of them completely, 
Danto is far closer to being right in this controversy: there is a 
crucial tension in Nietzsche's thought. This tension, however, can be 
resolved in terms of an elaboration of the Nietzschean category of 
play. The claims that Schacht makes about Nietzsche's adherence to 
notions of objective truth and value simply ignore too much of what 
Nietzsche has said in his critique of values and the notion of truth. 
Since I have treated these matters at other places in the disserta-
tion, it is not necessary to go into these issues in depth here; a 
brief indication of the argument will suffice. There are more than 
two possibilities here; it is not an either/or choice between nihilism, 
on the one hand, and objective values and truth on the other. It is 
precisely this middle ground which the category of play is able to 
express. The creative play of the free spirit goes beyond the exper-
ience of nihilism while recognizing the validity of its insights. The 
world is a human creation, but that does not make it meaningless. In 
creative play one affirms the created character of existence--thus its 
78
nanto, Nietzsche as Philosopher, p. 80. 
107 
hwnan character--and adds to it by creating new meaning and order. In 
reaching this stage, nihilism has a liberating effect. It is a "path-
ological transitional stage, 11 19 but it is very definitely a stage that 
most contemporary men must go through. This is one of the factors 
that Schacht's analysis leaves out: the necessity of nihilism. In 
order to become free enough to play creatively, contemporary man--
insofar as he holds to any absolute interpretation of the world--needs 
to undergo the experience of nihilism. It is comparable to that of 
the lion or the great breaking-loose discussed above. Nihilism frees 
man to play; and as long as man remains unfree, nihilism remains the 
pathway to creative play. In this sense, Nietzsche's philosophy is 
not a nihilistic one, but rather a philosophy of the overcoming of 
nihilism through creative play. 
Nihilism accomplishes this task of liberating man by showing 
that the world is nothing in itself, but only what man has made of it. 
Passive nihilism becomes resigned in the face of this realization, 
while active nihilism becomes destructive. In the destructiveness of 
the active nihilism is hidden the possibility of overcoming nihilism; 
this possibility emerges into the light when the nihilist realizes 
that, even in his destruction, he has control over that reality. This 
is then coupled with a second insight: the nihilist realizes that he 
79WM, §13, p. 16 =WP, §13, p. 14 =NF, VIII/2, 9(35), p. 15. 
"Der Nihilismus stellt einen pathologischen Zwischenzustand dar (--
pathologisch ist die ungeheure Verallgemeinerung, der SchluB auf gar 
k . s· ) " e~nen ~nn-- . . . 
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is really existing in two worlds simultaneously. His expectations are 
still rooted in a previous world, a world characterized by faith in 
the categories of reason. 80 His experience, on the other hand, is of 
a world in which there is no necessary order or form, no meaning to 
things in themselves, in which the categories of reason have no va-
lidity. The nihilist's problem is this: he still expects the world 
to be governed by absolute categories. It is from this unjustified 
expectation that his nihilism arises; and when this expectation is 
overcome, then he can affirm existence through creative play. 
Play and the Overcoming of Nihilism 
Although Nietzsche riever worked out the relationship between 
play and nihilism in explicit terms, the basic outline of a philosophy 
of play as the overcoming of nihilism is to be found in his writings. 
The outline is like a sketch. some lines of which are auite boldly 
drawn. others only faintly suggested. The preceding remarks have 
elaborated some aspects of this picture; it now remains to be seen 
if the picture can be completed. 
Play meets the nihilist's experience of meaninglessness and 
purposelessness on its own terms and yet is able to go beyond those 
80cf. WM, §12, p. 13 = WP, §12, p. 13 = NF, VIII/2, 11(99), 
p. 291: "Resultat: der GZaube an die Vernunft-Kategorien ist die Ur-
sache des Nihilismus,--wir haben den Werth der Welt an Kategorien 
gemessen, we Zehe sich auf eine rein fingirte Welt beziehen." Schacht 
("Nietzsche and Nihilism," p. 62) implies that it is only the falsity 
of the Christian moral interpretation of the world that is at stake 
here, but Nietzsche presents nihilism "als die nothwendige Folge von 
Christenthum, Moral und Wahrheitsbegriff der Philosophie." NF, VIII/3, 
22(24), p. 402. 
109 
tenns. It grants that nothing in the world has meaning or purpose--
but it affirms the world as a created world, as man's creative play. 
This the nihilist does not do because he still tries to measure the 
world in terms of the categories of his previous, absolutist world-
view. The absence of an absolute order and value in things does not 
imply the impossibility of crny order or value. What is possible is 
the order and value which emerges from man's creative play. 
There is a tendency to suggest that this kind of order, that 
which arises out of creative play, is no order at all. Stanley Rosen's 
criticisms of Nietzsche exemplify this position. 
Traditionally, as for example in Plato and Aristotle, power is 
defined in terms of an actuality--an activity, goal, or end. 
According to Nietzsche, these are values, or themselves manifes-
tations of the will to power. The world (represented by the earth 
or body) is altogether the will to power; as a consequence, power 
cannot be said to manifest itself for an end outside of itself. 
The temporary and perspectival nature of values reduces them to 
the status of facts, with respect to the world-process as a whole. 
The values are devalued; the world is what it is--purposeless 
play.81 
The first obvious problem with this criticism centers around Rosen's 
idea of play. Play is not purposeless, but rather characterized by 
created purposefulness. So, too, the "temporary and perspectival nature 
of values" does not reduce them to the status of facts. It makes them 
temporary and perspectival values--nothing more, nothing less. Again, 
they are created values; to say that these are consequently only 
facts is to maintain the absolutist position which is the cause of 
nihilism: either there are absolute values or none at all. 
81Rosen, Nihilism, p. 97. 
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For the nihilist, the categories of "aim," "unity," and "being," 
in terms of which value had previously been projected into the world, 
are pulled out of the world, with the result that the world looks 
82 
valueless. Play reintroduces these categories into existence, but 
in a finite sense. As already mentioned, there is a purposefulness 
in play, an aim, but this is a posited aim or purpose--a human crea-
tion. Play creates a unified world, and the unity of the world is 
expressed in its presuppositions and rules; but again, this is a 
limited unity. There are a multiplicity of such unities, and the 
creation of the order of rank is concerned with bringing these into 
relation with each other. So, too, play creates "being," but this 
"being" is not absolute. It is the degree of apparentness which a 
given play world can create and express. This involves a creative 
positing of images, of ·order, which is the essence of philosophy; 
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again, it does not presuppose any absolute truth. 
To consider existence as a game would open up a number of pos-
sibilities that the individual might otherwise, after the experience 
of nihilism, reject. In his notebooks from 1878, Nietzsche had already 
posed the questions: "Why not consider metaphysics and religion as 
84 
adults' play?" "Why shouldn't one be allowed to play metaphysicaUy? 
P• 23. 
82WM, §12, p. 15 =WP, §15, p. 13 =NF, VIII/2, 11(99), p. 290. 
83WM, §605, pp. 414-15 =WP, §605, p. 327 =NF, VIII/2, 9(48), 
84NF in Menschliches, Allzwnenschliches II. Nachgelassene Frag-
mente 1878-18?9, in Nietzsche Werke, Vierte Abteilung, Dritter Band 
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1967), 29(49), p. 378. "Warum !asst man 
Metaphysik und Religion nicht als Spiel der Erwachsenen gelten?" 
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and apply the enormous force of creating to this? 11 85 Two years later 
he would write of himself as, "playing a game with the belief of the 
whole world. 1186 A year after that, one of his outlines contained a 
chapter on "The Game of Life. 1187 In the notebooks from the time of 
The Joyful Wisdom, Nietzsche refers to Zarathustra's new form of 
superiority: "playing with the holy. 1188 This appears to open up the 
possibility of thinking, in its widest sense, as a type of playing. 
Metaphysics, rejected insofar as it claims to make statements about 
the real, is transformed into playful thinking which creates its own 
world and recognizes it to be such. As will be shown later, it is 
possibl~ to understand some of Nietzsche's central ideas, especially 
that of the eternal recurrence of the same, as this kind of activity: 
playful thinking. So, too, the very idea of a "gay science" allows 
85NF, IV/3, 29(45), p. 377. "Warum sollte man nicht meta-
physisch spielen dilrfen? und ganz enorme Kraft des Schaffens darauf 
ve~enden?'! 
86NF in MorgenrBthe. Nachgelassene Fragmente. Anfang 1880 
bis FrWijahr 1881, in Nietzsche Werke, Filnfte Abteilung, Erster Band 
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1971), 8(109), p. 735. "Meine geheirnen 
Neigungen, apres tout die der Natur, gewisser Affektation von GroBe 
entgegengesetzt, rnit der ich mich dekoriren muB, geben mir unendliche 
Hlilfsquellen, um mi t dem Glauben aller Welt ein Spiel zu treiben." 
87Quoted by Alfred Baeumler in the "Vorwort"to UW, I, p. xvi. 
"Das Spiel des Lebens." 
88uw, r, §1311, p. 418. 
1s1eren von heute. Vorbereitung 
Stellung zu allen heiligen Dinge 
Spiel mit dem Heiligen)." 
"Allgemeiner Spott ilber alles Moral-
zu Zarathustras naiv-ironischer 
(neue Form der Uberlegenheit: das 
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itself to be understood as play.89 
That such playing is not limited to trivial matters is already 
clear from some of the preceding statements, and other texts from Nie-
tzsche confirm this, showing not only that play is serious,"but that 
it can even be a matter of life and death. In Beyond Good and Evil it 
is maintained that a man's maturity, "consists in having found again 
the seriousness one had as a child, at play. 1190 Ten years earlier 
Nietzsche had considered this same theme in his notebooks when com-
menting on Eugen Dlihring's Der Werth des Lebens. 91 Noting that Dlihring 
considered the idea of life as play to be insipid, Nietzsche points 
out that this idea goes back to Plato and argues against Dlihring's 
92 
contention that true pain cannot be contained in play. Although 
Nietzsche's own position on the nature of play is not clear from this 
passage, he does not appear to agree with Dlihring that the idea is 
"insipid. 1193 In a later entry in the same notebook, however, Nie-
tzsche discusses chance in relation to death, arguing that the greatest 
attraction is to be found in testing out the element of change in 
existence, even to the point of playing for life and death. In saying 
89 UW, II, §659, p. 211. 
90JGB, IV, §94; VI/2, p. 90 = BGE, IV, §94, p. 83. "Reife 
eines Mannes: das heisst den Ernst wiedergefunden haben, den man als 
Kind hatte, beim Spiel." 
91Published' in Breslau, 1865. 
92NF, IV/l, 9(1), pp. 224-5. 
93Ibid. , p. 230. 
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that "existence is not the playing out of a game where we only have to 
look on, 1194 Nietzsche suggests that it is a game--or play--in which we 
participate to the fullest, even at the risk of death. This is where 
the highest energy of life unfolds itself, "where the play of suc-
ceeding and failing transforms itself into a test of life and death."95 
In this sense, life itself can be considered a game--quite 
serious, even a matter of life and death, but still fundamentally a 
game. By so doing, even death is made an act of living, for the in-
dividual creates the conditions under which he wills his test with 
death. This is, in part, a battle with time, for it is the untime-
liness of death which gives it such a bitter flavor, and this untime-
liness results from chance. By playing for life and death, one is 
able to set the terms for chance, thereby escaping the plight of being 
merely the passive victim of chance. 
By considering life as a game, by equating living with playing, 
the nihilist is thus able to go beyond his nihilism, both on the level 
of thinking (playing metaphysically) and on the level of acting (by 
playing for life and death). It is in this insight that nihilism is 
fully overcome: we are playing, even when it is a question of life 
or death. By viewing life in terms of play, the nihilist is able to 
give full meaning to the experience of nihilism, but nonetheless able 
94Ibid, pp. 239-40. "Der Mensch liebt es unter gewissen Um-
standen geradezu um Leben und Tod zu spielen. . Das Dasein ist nicht 
die Abspielung eines Schauspiels, bei dem wir nur das Zusehn batten." 
95Ibid., p. 242. " ..• wo das Spiel van Gelingen und MiB-
lingen sich in eine Erporbung vom Leben und Tod wandelt." 
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to recognize that there is more to existence: it can be affirmed as 
play. Indeed, he first devalues existence because he expects it to 
be something more than this. Nihilism is the expression of man's un-
willingness to recognize that existence is play and only play; but 
as the nihilist discovers that his expectations that existencelbe 
something other than play are unjustified, he moves toward affirming 
what the experience of nihilism uncovers and from which he draws back: 
existence is play, life a game, nothing more. 
Conclusion 
Play has been shown to be the highest form of human activity 
for Nietzsche in two ways. First, it has been shown that play is the 
proper activity of the child in "The Three Metamorphoses" and of the 
free spirit. The doctrine of the order of rank emerged as the ex-
pression of the order that such creative play imposes on the world, 
an order whose foundation is power. This leaves the way open for a 
consideration of the will to power as play, a topic to be considered 
in the next chapter. Second, it was shown in a negative sense that 
play must be the highest form of human activity, since play is the 
only type of activity which is possible in a meaningful sense after 
the experience of nihilism--an experience which Nietzsche designated 
as the characteristic one of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
The relationship between the play world and the everyday world 
has been clarified. There are a multiplicity of worlds, none of which 
has any claim to absolute being. The task of creative play is to 
extend one's play world to its farthest limits, and this task is that 
of the creation of a new order of rank. Such creative play serves 
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to reintroduce purposefulness, unity and being back into the particular 
world under consideration--the play world of the individual player--
but these qualities are now seen to be finite and created, not ab-
solute. The world--more precisely, the multiplicity of worlds--is no 
longer to be understood in terms of opposites (purpose versus purpose-
lessness, unity versus chaos, etc.), but rather in terms of the degree 
of purposefulness, unity, and being which it possesses as a result of 
creative human play. Finally, it becomes clear that there is no ques-
tion of play being outside "the world." It creates its own world. 
When we say that a given play is outside the world, it is clear that 
for Nietzsche this would mean that someone else's play world has not 
been able to extend its boundaries to include our play world. 
Certain problems still remain. If play is the highest form 
of human activity, what categories are we to use to understand what, 
for the moment, can be called "lower" forms of activity? Is not all 
activity play? Moreover, to what degree is the individual in control 
of his play? It has been suggested that the individual is a multi-
plicity of forces, an interplay of forces. What role does the will 
play in this regard? Is man really a player or a plaything? Does 
thinking direct our playing, or is it also the result of an interplay 
of forces? 
These and other related problems lead us into the subject 
matter of the next two chapters, in which the relationship between 
morality, the will to power and the category of play will be con-
sidered and in which Nietzsche's idea of the self in relation to the 
interplay of forces as affects will be considered in an attempt to 
clarify and complete this consideration of play as human activity. 
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CHAPTER IV 
MORALITY AND THE WILL TO POWER 
Introduction 
Morality, like everything else in existence, is a game for 
Nietzsche, but it is distinguished from the creative play of the free 
spirits in several ways. First, it is not open to newness in exis-
tence: it must judge everything in terms of moral values. This leads 
necessarily to a narrowing of perspectives. Second, it is not crea-
tive. Morality is given to us to be followed, rather than created 
by us. Third, morality represents the values of the herd--the medi-
ocre--and for this reason is in fundamental opposition to the crea-
tivity of the free spirits. Fourth, it does not realize that it is 
an illusion, but rather thinks that it is founded in some ultimate 
reality. Fifth, morality condemns existence--or at least the greatest 
part of it--while the free spirits affirm it. Finally, morality is 
a sign of weakness, while the creative play of the free spirits is 
characterized by strength. 
In this chapter, the critique of morality just outlined in 
the preceding paragraph will be developed. After this, it will be 
shown that Nietzsche's doctrine of the will to power represents the 
overcoming of morality through creative play. On the basis of this 
analysis, two fundamentally different types of play can then be 
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distinguished: creative play organized and controlled by the powerful 
expressing their will to power, and the play of the weak in which they 
are dominated by their own game. Morality then emerges as a game of 
self-delusion that is played by the powerless and which dominates 
them, and the will to power is to be understood as the creative play 
of the powerful. 
A. Morality as a Game of Self-Deception 
Morality as Interpretation 
Morality is, first of all, an interpretation. There are, Nie-
tzsche argues in Beyond Good and Evil, "no moral phenomena at all, 
but only a moral interpretation of phenomena. 111 While the moral char-
acter of phenomena stems, not from the phenomena themselves, but 
rather from our interpretation of them, we must realize that this is 
not an arbitrary interpretation, but rather one which possesses an 
inner logic. Nietzsche understands morality as, "a system of evalua-
tions which is connected with the conditions of life of a being. 112 
How is it connected with them? In his notebooks from 1887, Nietzsche 
argues that morality may be the only schema of interpretation by means 
of which man is able to endure himself.3 Morality is in this sense 
lJGB, IV, §108; VI/2, p. 92 = BGE, IV, §108, p. 85. "Es giebt 
gar keine moralischen Phanomene, sondern nur eine moralische Ausdeutung 
von Phanomenen .... " 
2WM, §256, p. 185 = WP, §256, p. 148. " ein System von 
Wertschatzungen, welches mit den Lebensbedingungen eines Wesens sich 
beriihrt." 
3WM, §270, p. 192 =WP, §270, p. 154 =NF, VIII/2, 10(121), 
p. 154. 
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is always an interpretation, the purpose of which may be to make life 
endurable--especially for the weak. 
The Instinctual Foundations of Morality 
Morality does not, hpwever, always achieve this goal--and when 
it does, it does so only at a price to the believer in morality. This 
price is the denial of life, especially the higher forms of life. 
This is evident in those cases where morality is considered as the 
will to power of the herd. This particular will to power, according 
to a fragment written in 1887, has three "powers" behind it: 
1. the instinct of the herd against the strong and independent; 
2. the instinct of the suffering and unfortunate against the 
happy ones; 
the exceptions. 4 3. the instinct of the mediocre against 
Morality as the will to power of the herd is reducible to particular 
instincts, which themselves bring about a restriction of power--ex-
emplified in the herd, the suffering and the mediocre--rather than an 
extension of that feeling--which the strong and independent, the happy 
ones, and the exceptions represent. Thus Nietzsche criticizes morality 
because, as a manifestation of the herd instinct, it allows the indi-
vidual to have value only as a function of the herd. 5 If "the highest 
power and splendor actu~lly possible to the type man116 were not 
4WM, §274, p. 195 =WP, §274, p. 156 =NF, VIII/2, p. 93. "l) 
der Instinkt der Heerde gegen die Starken Unabhangigen 2) der Instinkt 
der Leidenden und Schlechtweggekommenen gegen die Glilcklichen 3) der 
Instinkt der MitteZmassigen gegen die Ausnahmen." 
5FW, III, §116, p. 134 = JW, III, §116, p. 161. 
6zur GeneaZogie der Moral, "Vorrede," 6 in Nietzsche Werke, 
Sechste Abteilung, Zweiter Band (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1968), p. 
265 = On the Genealogy of Morals. Ecce Homo, edited by Walter Kaufmann 
120 
achieved, morality would probably be responsible for this. Moral norms 
are directed against the individual.7 Morality has become a sign of 
weakness,8 of decadence, 9 of complete psychological corruption.lo 
Morality, in short, is the game of the weak--a dangerous one because 
it threatens the powerful. 
Morality is also a "sign language" of our affects, a symptom 
of physiological occurrences. Moral evaluations are in the end depen-
dent upon our affects. 
Moral evaluation is an interpretation, a way of interpreting. The 
interpretation itself is a symptom of certain physiological condi-
tions, likewise of a particular spiritual level of prevalent judg-
ments: Who interprets?--Our affects.11 
This is the basis of an extra-moral interpretation of morality: it 
(New York: Random House, 1967)' p. 20. II eine an sich mogliche 
h8chste Machtigkeit und Pracht des Typus Mensch . " Hereafter 
abbreviated as GM and GM, referring to the German and English edi-
tions respectively. 
7 M, II, §108, p. 93. 
8 UW, II, §1289, p. 459. 
9Ecce Homo, in Nietzsche Werke, Sechste Abteilung, Dritter Band 
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1969), p. 309 = Ecce Homo, in The Portable 
Nietzsche, translated by Walter Kaufmann (New York: The Viking Press, 
1968), p. 272. Hereafter abbreviated as EH and EH, referring to the 
German and English editions respectively. 
l011Disposition und Entwlirfe zum Dritten Buch der Umwertung 
aller Werthe, 11 in Gotzendammerung, Der Antichrist, Ecce Homo, Gedichte, 
edited by Alfred Baeumler (Stuttgart: Kroner Verlag, 1964), p. 290. 
11WM, §254, p. 184 = WP, §284, p. 148. 11 • das moralische 
Wertschatzen ist eine Auslegung, eine Art zu interpretieren. Die Aus-
legung selbst ist ein Symptom bestimmter physiologischer Zustande, 
ebenso eines bestinnnten geistigen Niveaus von herrschenden Urteilen: 
Wer legt aus?--Unsre Affekte." 
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is the manifestation of certain instincts or affects which in them-
selves are neither moral nor immoral. While these at one time were 
in the service of self-preservation, they gradually became ingrained 
and remained even after they had lost their survival value. Or, Nie-
tzsche also suggests, they arose among the slaves in order to gain 
control over existence through its partial negation; this was the 
moment when ressentiment became creative.12 As long as it is the 
affects which do the interpreting, the moral man is their plaything 
or tool--morality is not his game, but under the control of the af-
fects. If the moral man were, however, to recognize the role that 
the affects play in the formation of his moral judgments--and this 
includes the role which the herd plays--, he would cease to be moral 
man, for he would have recognized the extra-moral foundation of his 
morality. 
Morality as Negation 
A common characteristic of moral interpretations of the world 
is the negation of some or all of existence. Morality passes judg-
ment on existence: doing this allows it then to assert its control 
over existence. A basic means employed here in the service of morality 
is the theory of cause and effect. Interpretation of existence in 
terms of cause and effect provides man with a way of grasping exis-
tence (if only an imaginary, created one), allowing him at least to 
think that he is controlling the flux bf existence. What distinguishes 
12GM, I, §10; VI/2, pp. 284-88 = GM, I, §10, pp. 36-39. 
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the moral from the extra-moral period in the history of man is the re-
jection of the traditional framework of causality, and thus a rejec-
tion of intentionality. 13 What is important in a given action for 
those who have gone beyond the moral framework is precisely that which 
is not intentional. By going beyond the framework of causality and 
intentionality, the imm.oralist can discover the fullness of human 
activity, the perception of which is denied the moralist when he sees 
human actions within the narrow framework of causality. Morality is 
necessarily an interpretation of the world which denies much of exis-
tence because it is bound to an understanding of the world and human 
action in terms of cause and effect--a mode of understanding which 
only touches on the surface, concealing more than it reveals. 
The point of contrast to the moral interpretation of the world 
is that offered by the imm.oralists. They affirm existence in all its 
aspects, rather than deny it. 14 They are the antithesis of those who 
believe in the Christian or decadence morality. 15 They are the 
strongest power--they constitute the world in their own image, 16 
13JGB, II, §32; VI/2, pp. 46-47 = BGE, II, §32, pp. 43-45. 
14c8tzendllmmerung, in Nietzsche Werke, Sechste Abteilungt 
Dritter Band (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1969), p. 81 =Twilight of 
the Idols, in The Portable Nietzsche, pp. 491-92. Hereafter abbre-
viated as GD and TW respectively. 
15EH, "Warurn ich ein Schicksal bin," 4; VI/3, pp. 365-67 = 
EH, "Why I am a Destiny," 4, pp. 328-30. 
16WM, §116, p. 84 =WP, §116, p. 71 = NF, VIII/3, 15(44), 
p. 232. 
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whereas the moralists accept the givenness of morality. 
The contrast here is between the moralists and the immoral-
ists, the weak and the powerful, the negators of life and its affirmers. 
For the moralists the game of existence is something which dominates 
them. For the immoralists, their power allows them to affirm and 
creatively transform this game through their creative play--the will 
to power. 
Morality, Free WiZZ and Purpose 
The conceptual difficulties surrounding the moral interpreta-
tion have their foundation in this: schemas of interpretation are 
mistaken for reality itself. The doctrine of free will provides an 
example of this. Nietzsche speculates that this probably arose out 
of the feeling of freedom of the ruling caste. However, it was even-
tually falsely transferred from the socio-political realm into the 
metaphysical sphere. 17 The end result of this process was the postu-
lation of something called a "free will" which was presumed to have 
a distinct existence. Such a free will, according to Nietzsche, simply 
does not exist--it is an invention which does not correspond to any-
thing "in itself," a fiction. Nietzsche's arguments in this regard 
are not directed primarily against the possibility of becoming free, 
but rather against the notion of a "free will" which would serve as 
the foundation of such freedom. Freedom does not come from a faculty, 
but is created by the will to power in its creative play. 
17MA II, II, §9; IV/3, p. 183. 
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Not only does such a thing as the "free will" not exist, but 
to assume its existence results in a distorted view of human activity. 
Instead of seeing an action as the expression of the entire person--
including what we call affects, sensation, evaluations, thoughts and 
the will--we see the action as the result of the person's will. This 
is a distortion which results in a man composed of parts--the will, 
cognitive faculty, sensory apparatus--rather than a totality-in-be-
coming. 
A similar distortion takes place when we interpret actions in 
terms of purposes. If I consider the significance of an action only 
in terms of that which it was intended to accomplish, I see only a 
small part of the fullness of that act. 18 The notion of purpose is a 
distortion in another sense: I often form a clear notion of my pur-
poses only after I act--or at least when I have a reasonably good idea 
of how successful my action will be. 19 Finally, it is often impos-
sible to foresee the consequences of an act. To understand them fully, 
or as fully as possible, it is necessary to view them as experiments, 
the results of which can be only dimly anticipated. 
The point of the arguments which Nietzsche advances is this: the 
moral interpretation of the world (1) is a fiction, (2) is a narrow 
18 UW, II, §37, p. 17. 
l9Arthur Danto has described well the psychological process in-
volved when we deceive ourselves into thinking that we have such know-
ledge of our actions; see Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher, pp. 113-14. 
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fiction which prevents us from understanding the complexity and the 
full possibilities of our actions, and (3) is a narrow fiction which 
mistakes itself to be a statement about reality. 
As a narrow and mistaken fictional interpretation of exis-
tence, morality judges existence in terms of two categories: good and 
evil. Not only is there no foundation for these categories in them-
selves, there is al.so no basis for saying that existence is to be under-
stood only--or even prirnarily--in terms of them. The distinction 
between good and evil creates a univocal world--all things have their 
value determined in relation to this pair of opposites. But while 
these categories do not refer to the world itself, they do have a 
foundation: in the instincts, especially the herd instinct. The 
foundation in the herd instinct means not only that morality is a 
game of self-deception, but also that in this game the moralists are 
really the pawns or playthings of forces beyond their control. More-
over, they cannot recognize this fact and cannot admit that their 
respective moral systems are only interpretations founded in their 
respective herd instincts, for that would be tantamount to admitting 
that the foundation of their morality was an extra-moral one. Morality 
is the game of the herd and, as such, dominates the members of the 
herd, making them the playthings in the game rather than allowing them 
to be true, creative players. 
Conclusion 
Morality, then, is a game of interprP-tation with certain rules 
which have their foundation, not in things themselves or a higher moral 
law, but in our affects and instincts, especially the herd instinct. 
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Belief in causality, intentionality and a free will are among the rules 
of the game. Nietzsche says that the world can be interpreted in 
this way (since it obviously has been), but it is a mistaken inter-
pretation insofar as it takes itself to be something more than an in-
terpretation, insofar as its narrowness prevents the appearance of 
the exceptional ones (the creative ones, the innnoralists, the free 
spirits and the overman), and insofar as it is a negation of existence 
rather than its affirmation. For morality to recognize that it is 
only an interpretation founded in the instincts of the herd is im-
possible--unless morality is to become innnorality, the moralist the 
innnoralis t. 
B. The Will to Power 
Willing and Creating 
Nietzsche's critique of morality must be juxtaposed to his 
positive notion of willing and creating which is found in Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra and his notebooks. In Zarathustra there is clearly no 
denial of the will or its importance. For Zarathustra himself, it is 
the will which frees him, 20 which is his destiny, to which he sings 
h f . 21 ymns o praise. To will is to create; the will is a creator. 22 
"On 
PP· 
20z, II, "Auf den Glliclseligen Inseln;"VI/l, pp. 105-08 
the Blessed Isles," pp. 85-88; Z, II, "Von der Erlosung," 
173-78 = Z, II, "On Redemption," pp. 137-42. 
= Z, II, 
VI/l, 
21z, III, "Von alten und neuen Tafeln;" VI/l, pp. 264-65 = Z, 
III, "On the Old and New Tablets," pp. 214-15. 
22z, II, "Von der ErlOsung;" VI/l, pp. 173-78 = Z, II, "On 
Redemption," pp. 137-42; Z, IV, "AuBer Dienst;" VI/l, pp. 317-42 = 
Z, IV, "Retired," pp. 258-63. 
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The purest will is to be found in the one who wills beyond himself. 23 
Zarathustra incarnates this image of the creator, the one who dares 
to will. 
The notion of willing that Zarathustra presents here is not to 
be equated with the concept of a free will which Nietzsche criticizes. 
Willing for Zarathustra is, first and foremost, a creative activity. 
As such, it is not the confirmation of a given order of things or the 
following of a moral law, but a creation--not only of order, but of 
things themselves, and even of one's self. Second, it is an act of 
one's entire being. Zarathustra's "will" is not in any way an entity 
separate from him, although his poetic language can be misleading on 
this point. Third, his will seeks to affirm all of existence--but 
this is not an indiscriminate affirmation of existence as given, but 
a creative affirmation·in sharp contrast to the destructive negation 
characteristic of morality. 
Arthur Danto remarked that it seemed to be one of Nietzsche's 
methodological directives "to abolish distinctions wherever found. 1124 
This remark gives us some insight into the basic character of Nie-
tzsche's critique of the will. Traditionally, the will has functioned 
as a bridge between the mind and the physical world, between thought 
and action. Nietzsche does not destroy this bridge through a critique 
23z, II, "Von der unbefleckten Erkenntnis;" VI/l, pp. 152-56 = 
Z, II, "On Immaculate Perception," pp. 121-24. 
24Arthur Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher, p. 105. 
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of the notion of free will in order to sever the two realms, but rather 
to bring about the collapse of the two into each other. His purpose 
is to destroy the need for a bridge. The notion of the creative will 
in Thus Spoke Zarathustra is a formulation of the will to power--a 
notion which is meant to express the coming together of thought and 
action in one world as the result of creative play. 
The WiU to Power 
The broad outlines of the doctrine of the will to power as 
creative play have already been presented in a preliminary fashion. 
Now they must be synthesized into a unified category. 
In his notebooks, Nietzsche poses the question: "Is the 'will 
to power' a kind of 'will' or identical with the concept of 'will'?1125 
After asking whether the will to power is the same as desiring, as 
commanding, as Schopenhauer's will as the "in itself of things," Nie-
tzsche puts forth his position. 
My proposition is: that the will of previous psychology is an 
unjustified generalization, that this will does not exist at 
all, that instead of grasping the idea of the development of one 
definite will into many forms, one has eliminated the character 
of the will by subtracting from its content, its 'whither 1 ?26 
25 WM, §692, p. 468 =WP, §692, p. 369 =NF, VIII/3, 14(21), p. 
93. " ist 'Wille zur Macht' eine Art 'Wille' oder identisch mit 
dem Begriff 'Wille'?" 
26Ibid. ": mein Satz ist: daf3 WiUe der bisherigen Psychologie, 
eine ungerechtfertigte Verallgemeinerung ist, daf3 es diesen Willen gar 
nicht giebt, daf3 statt die Ausgestaltung Eines bestimmten Willens in 
viele Formen zu £assen, man den Charakter des Willens weggestrichen 
hat, indem man den Inhalt, das Wohin? heraus subtrahirt hat." (The 
italics are given in the Colli and Montinati edition and followed in 
the translation above, which differs in regard to the italics from 
Kaufmann's translation.) 
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Criticizing Schopenhauer's notion of will as being "a mere empty 
word," Nietzsche continues by arguing that even the "will to live" is 
but a special case of the will to power. From this one may conclude 
that the "whither?" which must be included in the notion of a definite 
will is "power. 1127 The will to power is then one definite will, de-
finable in terms of the "whither" of power, which develops into many 
forms. In the same passage, Nietzsche argues further that this will 
to power is the primitive affect form, 28 and that all other affects 
are only developments of it, giving some idea of some of the "forms" 
this might take. 
The "whither" of the will to power is power itself: especially 
the increase of power: 
.•. not merely conservation of energy, but maximal economy of 
use, so the only reality is the will to grow stronger of every 
center of force--not self-preservation, but the will to appro-
priate, dominate, increase, grow stronger.29 
The will to power then divides itself into many specific centers of 
27This formulation should not be taken to imply the existence 
of power outside of the will. Heidegger's formulation of the rela-
tionship between will and power_ is quite accurate: "Das Wesen der 
Macht ist Wille zur Macht, und das Wesen des Willens ist Wille zur 
Macht." Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche (Pfullingen: Neske, 1961), Vol. 
II, p. 265. 
28WM, §688, p. 465 =WP, §688, p. 366 =NF, VIII/3, 14(121), p. 
92. "DaB der Wille zur Macht die primitive Affekt-Form ist, daB alle 
anderen Affekte nur eine Ausgestaltungen sind . " 
29wM, §689, p. 466 =WP, §689, p. 367 NF, VIII/3, 14(81), p. 
53. ". · .. nicht bloB Contanz der Energie: sondern Maximal-Okonomie 
des Verbrauchs: so daB das Starker-werden-woZZen von jedem Kraftcentrum 
aus die einzige Realitat ist,--nicht Selbstbewahrung, sondern Aneignung, 
Herr-werden-, Mehr-werden-, Starker-werden-wollen." 
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force, and on this basis plurality is introduced into a world which is 
"the will to power and nothing more. 1130 The interaction of these 
specific centers of force, each of which seeks to expand and increase 
its power, is the basic interplay of the universe. This process takes 
place on every level from the cosmic to the human. Here we are con-
cerned with the specifically human instances of this will to power, 
for it is here that it finds its most complex and most powerful man-
ifestation. Here the play of forces in the universe is transformed 
into the creative play of the will to power reaching its highest ex-
press ion. 
The Opposite of the Will to POlJer 
How is difference introduced into the Nietzschean universe? 
Is there another operative principle, in addition to--or within--the 
will to power, a counter principle, to account for the possibility of 
opposition? 
Four possibilities present themselves. First, Nietzsche him-
self writes of the principle of laisser-aller as a counter principle 
31 to the will to power, and he implies a connection between that and 
the instincts of decadence. Yet is it not possible to see these very 
instincts as a weaker manifestation of the will to power itself? The 
The instinct of decadence is indeed referred to as an instance of the 
30wM, §1067, p. 697 =WP, §1067, p. 550. " ••• dieser Wille 
zur Macht--und nichts auBerdem!" 
31 WM, §122, p. 89 = WP, §122, p. 75. 
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·11 32 w1 to power. Our drives themselves are reducible to the will to 
power. 33 If so, then all conflicts appear to be cases of a conflict 
of the will to power with itself. But what separates it into these 
various centers of force which conflict with each other? The prin-
ciple of Zaisser aZZer is in the end reducible to the will to power, 
but it can function as a counter-principle in this way: it consists 
of weakness, "letting go," the decline of power. Morality, decadence, 
Zaisser aZZer as signs of weakness are counter-instances of a strong 
will to power. They are still the will to power, but a declining one. 
They provide an opposition to the increasing will to power: strength 
versus weakness, increase in power versus decrease in it. This cor-
responds to Heidegger's position that, since the essence of power is 
to increase itself, to over-power itself, the opposite of the will to 
. h 1 34 power is t e power essness to power. 
A second possibility is that the will to power provides its 
own internal opposition by splitting into various parts. Where the 
attempt at appropriation and assimilation fails and a unity is not 
achieved, a duality arises as the result of the will to power, with 
the consequence that, 11 in order not to let go what has been conquered, 
the will to power divides itself into two wills (in some cases without 
32WM, §461, p. 323 =WP, §461, p. 254 =NF, VIII/3, 14(135), 
p. 112. 
33uw, II, §838, p. 287. 
34cf. Heidegger, Nietzsche, II, p. 266. 
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35 
completely surrendering the connection between its two parts)." What 
I think Nietzsche means here is this: one instance of the will to 
power, when threatened with the possibility of disintegrating com-
pletely because it is trying to control too much, makes a strategic 
retreat and splits into two instances. If we look at this in terms 
of the idea of creative play, it would mean that when the tension of 
keeping one play world together becomes so great as to threaten the 
destruction of that entire world, two smaller, more manageable worlds 
are created. But this explanation does not account for the original 
opposition which gives rise to the tension. 
A third way of approaching the problem would be to argue that 
the principle of opposition is nothingness. The close relation between 
the will to power and nihilism suggests this avenue of approach as 
consonant with Nietzsche's thinking. The will to power and the trans-
valuation of all values represent a movement that, "in some future will 
take the place of this perfect nihilism--but presupposes it, logically 
and psychologically, and certainly can come only after and out of it. 1136 
Furthermore, if nihilism is taken as formlessness, then the will to 
35 WM, §656, p. 438 =WP, §656, p. 346 =NF, VIII/2, 9(151), p. 
88. " •• um nicht fahren zu lassen, was erobert ist, tritt der Wille 
zur Macht in zwei Willen auseinander (unter Umstanden ohne seine Ver-
bindung unter einander vi::illig aufzugeben) ••• " 
36WM, "Vorrede," 4, p. 4 = WP, "Preface," 4, pp. 3-4. " 
eine Bewegung, welche in irgend einer Zukunft jenen vollkommenen Nihil-
ismus abli::isen wird; welche ihn aber voraussetzt, logisch und psycho-
logisch, welche schlechterdings nur auf ihn und aus ihn kommen kann." 
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f . h . d h . 37 f 0 d . . . 1 power as arming, s aping, an res aping in s its counter-princip e 
in formlessness. This interpretation allows room for the first alter-
native considered above, for the instincts of decadence stand in an 
inverse relationship to the will to power: "wherever the will to 
power declines in any form, there in invariably also a physiological 
decline, decadence. 11 38 Nothingness, formlessness, decadence, Zaisser 
aZZer all indicate a decreasing power. Nothingness as formlessness 
presents the best formulation of such a principle. Insofar as Nie-
tzsche considers nihilism as a historical movement rather than as an 
ever-present nossibilitv. nihilism must be taken as a particular in-
stance of a decrease in vower. This interpretation does no injustice 
to the nihilist's experience, for it is characterized precisely by 
the lack of power to hold his world together. 
There is a fourth way of approaching this problem, again 
beginning with the idea that the will to power can only express itself 
in opposition. The highest will to power, Nietzsche argues in a frag-
ment from 1883-85, is "to impose upon becoming the character of being. 11 39 
It is in the notion of the eternal recurrence, the idea that "every-
thing recurs," that one encounters "the closest annroximation of a 
37WM, §656, p. 438 =WP. §656. o. 346 =NF. VIII/2. 9(151). 
p. 88. 
38 A. 17: VI/3. n. 181 =A. 17. n. 583. "Wo in irgend welcher 
Form der Wille zur Macht niedergeht. giebt es jedes Mal auch einen 
phvsiologischen Ri.ickgang. eine decadence." 
39 WM, §617, p. 418 = WP, §617, p. 330. "Dem Werden den Char-
akter des Seins aufzupragen--das ist der hochste Wille zur Macht." 
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world of becoming to the world of being. 1140 Here, in the imposition 
of the character of being upon becoming, the greatest opposition is 
encountered. But is this not the same dichotomy as that between form 
and formlessness, the will to power and nothingness? The highest form 
of the will to power is the willing of the eternal recurrence, the 
imposition of the character of being upon becoming, for it is here 
that one encounters the highest degree of resistance, the greatest 
opposition. 
The above remarks provide us with the foundation for the 
formulation of a counter-principle for the will to power, a principle 
which manifests itself in powerlessness, becoming, formlessness, 
nothingness and nihilism. Moreover, it reveals the fundamental meaning 
of the will to power as the imposition of order and form on chaos 
and formlessness, and ~t is here that the meaning of the will to power 
as creative play becomes apparent. Moreover, it allows us to under-
stand the apparently pointless repetition in the end of the last 
fragment of The WiZZ to Power, where Nietzsche describes his vision 
of the universe as a monstrous play of forces. 
This world is the wiZZ to power--and nothing besides! And you 
yourselves are also this will to power--and nothing besides!41 
40Ibid. "DaB aUes wiederkehrt, ist die extremste Annaheru.ng 
einer Weit des Werdens an die des Seins:--GipfeZ der Betrachtung." 
41WM, §1067, p. 697 =WP, §1067, p. 550. "Diese Weit ist 
der WiZZe zur Macht--und nichts auf3erdem! Und auch ihr selber seid 
dieser Wille zur Macht--und nichts auBerdem!" 
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Everything is the will to power, but on its lowest levels it is least 
organized--formless, chaotic, dispersed. On its highest levels it is 
most ordered, giving form, imposing the character of being on becoming. 
In both senses, the will to power is play. On its lowest levels, it 
is the chaotic play of forces; on its highest levels, the creative 
play of the powerful. The world is the will to power, and we are the 
will to power; but insofar as our will to power does not give order 
and meaning to the world, it remains a random play of forces. As 
one moves up the order of rank of power, one sees the way in which 
play transforms itself: at its lowest reaches, it is a random, 
chaotic activity; at its highest points, a creative activity which 
builds entire worlds. The Nietzschean category which holds this view 
of play together throughout its many forms is the will to power. 
Thus the decline or absence of power represents the counter-
principle against which all creative play struggles. In order to 
create order, form, meaning and beauty in the world, the specific 
wills to power must continually seek to extend the boundaries of 
their created worlds. The specific ways in which this is done will 
I 
be considered in the next chapter, where Nietzsche's notions of the 
overman and self-overcoming are considered. 
Conclusion 
It is now possible to distinguish between two fundamentally 
different types of play in Nietzsche's philosophy: the creative play 
of the will to power in its higher manifestations and the declining 
play of morality and other forms of existence which are characterized 
by the decrease in power. Whereas the play of the creative will to 
power affirms existence in its creative activity, the moralist's 
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game denies it by judging it only in terms of moral value. Whereas 
the creative play of the will to power affirms the totality of man's 
existence, the game that the moralists play divides man into parts--
will, cognition, sensation--and affirms one or two of these at the 
expense of the remainder. The creative play of the will to power 
seeks to expand itself, moral games seek to fortify themselves against 
intrusion. Whereas the person who is his will to power most fully 
is most in control of his play, the moralists--because of their power-
lessness, because of their herd instinct, and because they do not 
recognize the forces at work on them--are but pawns in a game outside 
of their control. 
CHAPTER V 
ON THE SELF, SELF-OVERCOMING AND THE OVERMAN 
IntPoduction 
The self is not a static entity for Nietzsche, but rather an 
interplay of affects. This interplay can be such that thinking and 
willing are dominated by the play of affects, in which case willing 
and thinking are made into the playthings of the affects. There is, 
however, a second sense in which the self is play--the self as the 
will to power whose creative play organizes and directs the forces 
under its connnand. The self as play in this sense is the overcoming 
of the traditional concept of the self. The symbol of the highest 
degree of such self-overcoming for Nietzsche is the overman. 
In this chapter this two-fold notion of the self as play will 
be developed in relation to the ego, willing, thinking, evaluations, 
sensations and the affects in order to show that the fundamental 
meaning of self-overcoming on each of these levels resides in creative 
play. This category of creative play is the key to Nietzsche's doc-
trine of the overman. 
In dealing with the problem of the "ego," Nietzsche directs 
his remarks toward three main themes: (1) the way in which the ego 
brings about an overcoming of the herd instinct, (2) the linguistic 
basis of the concept of the ego, and (3) the relationship between 
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the concept of the ego and the belief in causality, being, and things. 
He also discusses the possibility of overcoming the "ego-feeling," 
and this notion of overcoming is directly related to the will to power 
as creative play. It will be shown here that his criticisms are 
directed against those conceptions of the ego which would reduce the 
ego to an independent entity, and that he argues in favor of a notion 
of the ego as will to power. The concept of the ego as an independent 
entity results in its becoming a plaything of the affects, while the 
ego as the will to power emerges as the creative player in existence. 
The Ego as the OVeraoming of the Herd 
Zarathustra's argument in favor of the ego is based in part 
on his conception of the ego as the negation of the herd instinct. 
The clever and self-seeking ego marks the decline of the herd. 1 Thus 
Zarathustra exhorts us to pronounce the ego wholesome and whole, 2 a 
position which would seem to entail the rehabilitation of man's 
drives.3 In his speech, "On the Afterworldly," Zarathustra puts the 
matter even more forcefully. 
Indeed, this ego and the ego's contradiction and confusion still 
speak most honestly of its being--this creating, willing, valuing 
ego, which is the measure and value of all things. And this most 
honest being, the ego, speaks of the body and still wants the 
body, even when it poetizes and raves and flutters with broken 
lz, I, "Von rausend und Einem Ziele;" VI/l, p. 72 = Z, I, "On the 
Thousand and One Goals," p. 60. 
2z, III, "Von den drei Bosen;" VI/l, p. 236 = Z, III, "On the 
Three Evils," p. 191. 
3uw, II, §§376-77, PP· 495-97. 
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wings. It learns to speak ever more honestly, this ego: and the 
more it learns, the more words and honors it finds for body and 
earth.4 
It is the ego which creates, wills and values, which is the measure and 
value of things. Clearly, this is not an ego which exists only on 
the conceptual level, but rather one that wants to make itself in-
carnate in the world through the body. It is this experience of the 
ego which leads to a new sense of pride, the will to create "a meaning 
for the earth ••• to will this way which man has walked blindly, 
and to affirm it and no longer to sneak away from it like the sick 
and decaying. 115 The appearance of the ego--as presented in this 
passage--indicates that man is beginning to take hold of his exis-
tence. Instead of walking blindly, he wills and thereby affirms his 
path. The appearance of the ego indicates the first stirrings of the 
wi 11 to power. 
The Linguistic Basis of the Concept of the Ego 
Nietzsche's arguments against the concept of the ego begin 
4z, I, "Von den Hinterweltern;" VI/l, p. 32 = Z, I, "On the 
Afterworldly," p. 32. "Ja, diess Ich und des Ich's Widerspruch und 
Wirrsal redet noch am redlichsten von seinem Sein, dieses schaffende, 
wollende, werthende !ch, welches das Maass und der Werth der Dinge 
ist. 
"Und diess redlichste Sein, das Ich--das redet vom Leibe, und 
es will noch den Leib, selbst wenn es dichtet und schwarmt und mit 
zerbrochnen Flilgeln flattert. 
"Innner redlicher lernt es reden, das Ich: und je mehr es 
lernt, um so mehr findet es Worte und Ehren filr Leib und Erde." 
5Ibid., p. 33 =ibid., p. 32. " • der Erde Sinn .•• 
diesen Weg wollen, den blindlings der Mensch gegangen, und gut ihn 
heissen und nicht mehr von ihm bei Seite schleichen, gleich den Kranken 
und Absterbenden!" 
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with his critique in The Daum, although there is clearly an implied 
critique of the self already to be found in his notion of the Dio-
nysian overcoming of the self. In the section on, "The So-Called 
'Ego'," Nietzsche argues that our concept of the ego is limited by 
our language and misshapen through its prejudices. 6 To presume that 
we are limited in our being to that of which we are conscious and 
that for which we have words is to open the door to misunderstanding 
ourselves. In a similar way, the reflexive pronoun represents a self 
quite different from the subject. 7 The false opinion which arises 
out of this linguistic confusion is, however, significant in that it 
shapes our character and destiny. In the Preface to Beyond Good and 
Evil, Nietzsche points out the way in which the ego superstition is 
but an up-dated version of the "soul superstition. 118 
The belief in the ego is, then, an unjustified generalization 
insofar as the content of that belief is not coextensive with the 
ego itself. This unjustified generalization is perhaps inescapable, 
given the nature of language. 9 The ego is a complex reality, not a 
a thing--but language destroys this complexity, substituting a single 
word for it. Nietzsche's arguments here are not directed against that 
complex reality to which the concept of the ego refers, but against 
6M, II, §115; V/l, p. 105. 
7uw, II, §§163-64, p. 62. 
8JGB, "Vorrede;" VI/2, p. 3 = BGE, "Preface," p. 2. 
9WM, §552, p. 358 = WP, §522, p. 283; UW, II, §33, p. 16. 
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the over-simplification involved in our concept of the ego. 
The Concept of the Ego and the Belief in Causality, Being and Things 
Nietzsche adds to these criticisms in his discussion of "The 
Four Great Errors," and in his notebooks. In The Twilight of the 
Idols the belief in the ego is seen as a consequence of the belief in 
the will as a cause (the ego as "subject," the cause of thoughts). 
Arguing against mental causes, for which the will is the paradigm, 
Nietzsche maintains that the ego has become, "a fable, a fiction, a 
play on words: it has altogether ceased to think, feel, or will!"lO 
It is only a piece in a conceptual game philosophers play--a fiction 
which they mistake for a reality. As such, it is incapable of being 
the cause of anything. 
In addition to this, the belief in the ego is the foundation 
of our belief in the concepts of "being" and "thing." Man" ••• even 
took the concept of being from the concept of the ego; he posited 
'things' as 'being' in his image, in accordance with his concept of 
the ego as a cause. 1111 Thus it comes as no surprise when man finds 
being and thingness in the world, for he himself put them there. Nie-
tzsche implies that practicallv the entire framework of Western thought 
has developed out of the belief in the ego. 
lOGD, "Die vier groBen Irrtiimer," 3; VI/3, p. 85 =TI, "The 
Four Great Errors," 3, p. 495. "Das ist zur Fabel geworden, zur Fik-
tion, zum Wortspiel: das hat ganz und gar aufgehort, zu denken, zu 
fiihlen und zu wollen!" 
11Ibid. " er nahm erst den Begriff Sein aus dem Begriff 
Ich heraus, er hat die 'Dinge' als seiend gesetzt nach seinem Bilde, 
nach seinem Begriff des Ichs als Ursache." 
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The origins of this belief are two-fold. First, as already 
mentioned, the concept of the ego can be traced back to the super-
stition of the soul; A second source of this belief is the necessity 
of dealing with the world, although out very survival is not con-
tingent on this necessity. 12 We need unities in order to be able to 
reckon, and the concept of the ego is the paradigm for the concept of 
unity. 13 Insofar as the concept of the ego is the foundation of 
"being," and insofar as knowledge is only possible on the basis of a 
belief in being, then the concept of the ego is the condition of the 
14 possibility of knowledge. But within this context, being is some-
thing which is imposed upon the world of becoming, a falsification, 
"a perspective illusion--an apparent unity that encloses everything 
like a horizon. 1115 This statement can be developed in two different 
ways. If the ego is the paradigm of all being, and if the ego is in 
fact not being but becoming.16 then the world of being is an illusion. 
The task for the future would then be a rethinking of the nature of 
existence in such a way that the traditional categories of reason, 
grounded in a concept of being, are replaced by categories of becoming. 
12uw, II, §115, P· 53. 
13WM, §635, p. 428 =WP, §635, p. 338 =NF, VIII/3, 14(79), 
p. 50. 
14WM, §518, p. 355 = WP, §518, p. 281. 
15Ibid. " ... eine perspektivische Illusion .•. die schein-
bare Einheit, in der wie in einer Horizontlinie alles sich zusammen-
schlieBt." 
16WM, §519, p. 355 WP, §519, p. 281. 
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But there is another way of developing the implications of this state-
ment. If the highest form of the will to power is the imposition of 
the characteristics of being on the world of becoming, 17 then the 
concept of the ego would appear as the highest expression of the will 
to power. In one sense this does not appear to be the direction that 
Nietzsche wants to go in at all, since it would appear to give a jus-
tification for the metaphysical concept of the self which he wants to 
reject. However, this line of thinking is in harmony with his own 
concept of the self as presented in Thus Spoke Zarathustra: a created 
self which gives stability, order, and being to the world of becoming. 
However, this apparent contradiction can be resolved. The creation 
of the self through the will to power does not involve a metaphysical 
notion of a self existing "in itself." It is clearly a created self 
that is at issue here. The fullest expression of the will to power 
involves the creation of the most powerful self; it does not imply 
that that self has any independent existence as a metaphysical· entity 
apart from the will to power. This self, as created by the will to 
power, is not a thing but an on-going process. It gives--creates--
order, stability, and being to the world of becoming through its 
creative play and thereby creates itself. 
'The main thrust of Nietzsche's criticisms of the ego directs 
itself against the concept of the ego as an independent entity ex-
isting in the world of things, of being. The ego is a simplification 
17WM, §617, p. 418 WP, §617, p. 330. 
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necessarily- leading to a division of the self. It can never encompass 
or be identical with "the central government of our nature" because 
it is only a conceptual synthesis, 18 nor can it be one with the totality 
f b . b . · d I d · · · 19 o eing ecause it intro uces an ego non-ego istinction. Thus 
the concept of an independent ego leaves us with a bifurcated world. 
Furthermore, once this dichotomy between ego and non-ego is estab-
lished, there is a tendency on the part of the ego to feel overpowered 
by the immensity of the non-ego. 20 This results in the denial of the 
ego, the triumph of the herd instinct, and the prohibition of the 
strongest, most natural and only real drives. Finally, perceiving 
things within the ego/non-ego framework clouds our vision of the 
world by forcing our perception into one particular framework, reifying 
what would otherwise b~ a multiplicity of processes and relationships 
into a limited set of "things. 1121 
Overcoming the "Ego-Feeling" 
Thus the possible benefits connected with overcoming the "ego-
feeling" (das IchgefUhl) would include an expanded perception of the 
world. 
18 WM, §371, p. 251 =WP, §371, p. 200. "Das 'Ich'--welches 
mit der einheitlichen Verwaltung unsres Wesens nicht eins ist!--ist ja 
nur eine begriffliche Synthesis." 
19WM, §786, p. 525 = WP, §786, pp. 413-14 NF, VIII/2, 10(57), 
p. 152. 
20Ibid. 
2luw, II, §447 180 ' p. . 
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If we eliminate these additions, no things remain but only dynamic 
quanta, in a relation of tension to all other dynamic quanta: 
their essence lies in their relation to all other quanta, in their 
"effect" upon the same. The will to power is not a being, but a 
pathos--the most elemental fact from which a becoming and effecting 
first emerge. 22 
The world for Nietzsche then becomes a collection of dynamic quanta of 
the will to power, each one of which is related to all others, but 
which are not to be understood under the category of causality. 
Yet one would want to ask at this point: what is left of the 
self? Have we in the process of achieving liberation simultaneously 
destroyed that which was to be liberated? Here I think that Nietzsche 
would argue that the self has not been destroyed, but rather our 
traditional interpretation of the self has been shown to be a falsi-
fication. The self is no longer an isolated entity, but rather is 
the creative play of the will to power. The degree to which it is 
will to power determines its strength, determines the degree to which 
it can create itself through its creative play. 
The framework for the following interpretation is to be found 
in a fragment in Nietzsche's notebooks in which he sketches the rela-
tionship among a number of his key categories. 
Our intellect, our will, even our sensations are dependent upon 
our value judgments: these correspond to our drives and the 
22w11, §635, p. 429 =WP, §635, p. 339 =NF, VIII/3, 14(79), p. 
51. "Eliminiren wir diese Zuthaten: so bleiben keine Dinge i.ibrig, 
sondern dynamische Quanta, in einem SpannungsverhaltniB zu allen anderen 
dynamischen Quanten: deren Wesen in ihrem VerhaltniB zu allen anderen 
Quanten besteht, in ihrem 'Wirken' auf dieselben--der Wille zur Macht 
nicht ein Sein, nicht ein Werden, sondern ein Pathos ist die elemen-
tars te Thatsache, aus der sich erst ein Werden, ein Wirken ergiebt 
II 
conditions of their existence. Our drives are reducible to the 
will to power. 23 
I shall attempt to show the ways in which our intellect, will and 
sensations are dependent upon our evaluations, and why these must 
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correspond to our drives. Finally, the relationship among the various 
drives will be shown to be that of either a free play of forces, in 
which case the self becomes the plaything of those forces, or a crea-
tive play organized by the individual's will to power, in which case 
the self becomes the player. 
There are two senses in which thinking is play for Nietzsche. 
First, it rltilts from the interplay of affect. As such, thinking is 
really the plaything of the affects. Second, when the person realizes 
the true nature of thinking and its relation to the affects, it be-
comes possible for him to affirm this relationship and to organize 
it. This is the second way in which thinking can be play; thinking 
as the will to power organizes the play of affects into a creative 
play. In this case, thinking is an expression of the creative will 
to power of the thinker. 
The Dependence of Intellect, Will and Sensation on Evaluations24 
23uw, II, §838, p. 287. "Unser Intellekt, unser Wille, ebenso 
andere Empfindungen sind abhangig von unseren Wertschatzungen: diese 
entsprechen unseren Trieben und deren Existenzbedingungen. Unsre 
Trieben sind reduzierbar auf den Willen zur Macht." 
24Throughout this section there are references to thinking, 
willing, sensation, etc. which give the impression that these exist 
in themselves apart from each other and the multiplicity of forces 
whose activity constitutes the self. This misleading impression is 
unavoidable, given the misleading character of language. 
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The InteZZect and Ihinking. The intellect appears as the place 
where the various affects compete with one another for dominance. There 
is no drive for knowledge, rather the intellect is "in the service of 
various drives. 1125 In the notebooks from the period of The Dawn, 
Nietzsche pictures the intellect in the following terms. 
The intellect is the tool of our drives and nothing more; it will 
never be free. It sharpens itself in the struggle of the various 
drives, and refines the activity of each individual drive thereby. 
The will to power, to the infallibility of our person is in our 
greatest justice and honesty: skepticism arises only in relation 
to all authority. We do not want to be duped, not even by our 
drives! But then what does not want that? Certainly a drive! 26 
Nietzsche attempts to substantiate the thesis that the intellect is 
the 'tool of our drives through consideration of specific ideals and 
moral judgments, in each case reducing the ideal to the emotions that 
gave rise to it and arguing that its expression in language is but 
. . d . . 27 
another way in which ~he rive seeks dominance. 
Thinking is then a sign language, pointing to the competing 
drives, each of which seeks to gain dominance over the others. 28 In 
25uw, I, §639, p. 243. "Kein 'Erkenntnistrieb': der Intellekt 
im Dienst der verschiedenen Triebe." 
26 UW, II, §348, p. 132. "Der Intellekt ist das Werkzeug un-
serer Triebe und nichts mehr, er wird nie frei. Er scharft sich im 
Kampf der verschiedenen Triebe, und verfeinert die Tatigkeit jedes 
einzelnen Triebes dadurch. In unserer groBten Gerechtigkeit und Red-
lichkeit ist der Wille nach Macht, nach Unfehlbarkeit unserer Person: 
Skepsis ist nur in Hinsicht auf alle Autoritat, wir wollen nicht 
dilpiert sein, auch nicht von unseren Trieben! Aber was eigentlich 
will denn da nich t? Ein Trieb gewiB ! " 
27
uw, II, §352, p. 134. 
28 UW, II, §253, p. 97. "Das Denken ist •.. nur eine Zeichen-
sprache filr den Machtausgleich van Affekten." 
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his explanations, Nietzsche uses several images. When speaking of the 
intellect as a "tool" of drives or affects,29 he implies a purposeful 
activity on the part of the affects since the notion of a tool implies 
a purpose. The intellect is a tool insofar as the various drives and 
affects seek to gain more power by means of it. The term "tool" im-
plies purpose only in this sense. Insofar as these affects are related 
to each other in an interplay of affects, thinking could also be called 
their "plaything." Insofar as Nietzsche employs the image of a strug-
gle among the affects, the term "tool" is more appropiate. The notion 
of a struggle is often the dominant one, and in this image it is the 
struggle itself which seeks to maintain itself, 30 not the being in 
which the struggle takes place. An alternate view is the suggestion 
that it is the affects which bring about the struggle. In either view 
it is the activity, the interaction among the various affects, which 
constitutes the primary reality. The intellect and thinking are, in 
this view, simply the by-products of this process; they in no way 
cause it. 
Nietzsche does not seem to differentiate clearly between play 
and struggle. He suggests that thoughts are, "signs of a play and 
struggle of the affects: they always hang together with their hidden 
31 
roots." This leads to the rejection of a unified subject and the 
29uw, II, §§340, 874, PP· 124, 301. 30Ibid., §255, p. 97. 
31 UW, II, §248, p. 95. "Die Gedanken sind Zeichen von einem 
Spiel und Kampf der Affekte: sie hangen immer mit ihren verborgenen 
Wurzeln zusammen." 
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substitution of Nietzsche's hypothesis about the subject as a multi-
plicity of forces, "whose interplay and struggle constitutes the 
foundation of our thinking and even our consciousness. 11 32 Thinking 
then appears as something which happens in the subject, an interplay 
of sensations. 
Our thinking is really nothing but a very refined interwoven play 
of seeing, hearing, feeling, the logical forms are physiological 
laws of sensory perception. Our senses are developed centers of 
sensation with strong resonances and mirrors.33 
Viewed in this manner, thinking appears to be equivalent to ,fantasy, 
as is suggested in a fragment from this same period. Thinking, our 
fundamental intellectual life, is the "playful pondering of material 
• • • This spontaneous play of fantasizing force is our fundamental 
intellectual life. 1134 We seldom become conscious of this process, 
but rather engage in the grossest of oversimplifications. Although 
Nietzsche suggests in this fragment that precise hearing and seeing, 
in contrast to the fantasy which we mistake for true perception, is 
possible, it is seldom achieved. 
32WM, §490, p. 341 =WP, §490, p. 270. " •.. deren Zusarrnnen-
spiel und Kampf unserem Denken und ilberhaupt unserem BewuBtsein zu-
grunde liegt . • • " 
33NF, V/l, 6(433), p. 639. "Unser Denken ist wirklich nichts 
als ein sehr verfeinertes zusarmnengeflochtenes Spiel des Behen H8rens 
F'Uhlens, die logischen Formen sind physiologische Gesetze der Sinnes-
wahrnehmungen. Unsere Sinne sind entwickelte Empfindungscentra mit 
starken Resonanzen und Spiegeln." 
34Ibid., 10(D79), p. 760. 
Materials . . . . Dieses spontane 
unser geistiges Grundleben." 
" . spielende Verarbeiten des 
Spiel von phantasirender Kraft ist 
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The necessity for the oversimplification characteristic of 
most thinking is to be found in our need to perceive things as wholes. 
For example, we think we see the movement of a bird as movement, when 
we actually interpret the data of our perception and infer the move-
ment from that. 35 We put in more than is there at times. In another 
fragment Nietzsche uses the same premise, that perception imposes a 
unity not otherwise present, but this time argues that this imposi-
tion of unity involves a leaving out of a multiplicity of factors. 
"Between two thoughts aU possible affects play their game: but the 
movements are too quick, then we misunderstand them, we conceal them 
The need to understand things in terms of causality (and 
thus to understand them as things, not as processes) is in part the 
source of this deception, and causality itself could presumably be 
traced back to the dominance of a particular drive. 
Thinking, then, is basically play in two senses: the play of 
affects and the playing together with affects. First, in a descriptive 
sense, Nietzsche argues that thinking, which had mistakenly been mis-
takenly understood as something dealing with a real world, is reducible 
to the interplay of our affects; it is hardly distinguishable from 
fantasy. This fantasy which we call thinking has ,one thing in its 
favor: it works. By reducing processes and events to conceptual 
35Ibid. 
36WM, §477, p. 332 =WP, §477, p. 264 =NF, VIII/2, pp. 295-96. 
"Zwischen zwei Gedanken spielen noch aUe moglichen Affekte ihr Spiel: 
aber die Bewegungen sind zu rasch, deshalb verkennen wir sie, leugnen 
• • II wir sie .•. 
unities--"things," "causes," "effects," etc.--it can create a world 
that it can r:ianage. However, in doing so it denies its own nature 
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by thinking of itself as independent of emotion, affects, etc. This 
denial of its own nature may well serve the needs of life up to a 
point, but it also contains a weakenss. The thinking subject, by re-
fusing to acknowledge the way in which it is related to the affects, 
becomes their "tool." Insofar as the person identifies himself with 
his thinking self, he becomes only the tool of his affects. This 
brings us to the second notion of play here. By recognizing that 
thinking is the result of the interplay and struggle of affects, the 
person is able to see that he is this play. Insofar as this happens, 
the person is then in a better position to creatively organize this 
interplay of forces, to engage himself activtty in this creative play 
which is fundamentally the will to power. The way in which this is 
so will now be discussed in relation to Nietzsche's notion of willing. 
Willing 
The Critique of the Will. The analysis of the self in terms 
of play can now be extended to the notion of the will. The Nietzschean 
critique of the will reveals it also to be the plaything of the af-
fects. His affirmation of willing, on the other hand, is of willing 
as playing together with--and creatively organizing--the play of af-
fects. 
The main lines of Nietzsche's critique of willing have already 
been presented in the previous chapter. Insofar as willing is depen-
dent upon thinking, it is already clear that willing, even if it does 
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take place, lacks the foundation in thinking that the will presumes it 
has. It is only a by-product, the "accompanying appearance of all 
outpourings of force."37 The belief in willing, a belief in miracles, 38 
is founded on the belief 1n causality, a false extension of the scien-
tific view of the world. 39 
The AffiT'lTlation of the WiZZ. Willing does, however, retain 
meaning for Nietzsche, a meaning which is similar to his notion of 
thinking as play. In a fragment from 1880, he relates the feeling of 
freedom to an excess of strength, which leads one to act for a pur-
pose, "but the purpose does not completely rule us; it only gives an 
opportunity for our strength to play with itself ."40 Knowing that 
there will be many other such opportunities, we do not feel ourselves 
to be enslaved to that particular purpose. What one might call authen-
tic willing, then, lies 1n giving free play to the forces within one, 
in which case a purpose is but the occasion for the playing out of 
these events. It is not the subject as a unity which wills, but 
rather the plurality of forces doing the "willing." This is in harmony 
with the idea that the will to power is in general willing to become 
37 UW, II, §720, p. 231. ". . • Beglei terscheinung all es Aus-
stromens von Kraft." 
38WM, §670, p. 449 = WP, §670, p. 354. 
39Ibid. 
40NF, V /1, 3 (48), p. 390. ". . . aber der Zweck beherrsch t 
uns nicht ganz, er giebt nur eine Gelegenheit, damit unsere Kraft 
mit sich spiele, wir wissen, es giebt noch viele andere Gelegenheiten 
dazu . . . " 
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stronger, 41 but it is not the subject as such which does the willing, 
but rather the forces which converge in that space and time which we 
identify in everyday language as the subject. Such willing is an ex-
periment. In a fragment from the time of The DOhJn, Nietzsche argues 
that actually willing something is "to make an experiment in order to 
experience what we can do; success or failure alone will teach us about 
this. 1142 This involves a feeling of connnanding or ordering: "A man 
who wiUs connnands something within himself that renders obedience. 1143 
This is a complex relationship in which the one who connnands is also 
the one who obeys in certain circumstances. 44 
In evaluating Nietzsche's position on the will, Arthur Danto 
has argued that, "There is, I think, very little of the sort of thing 
Nietzsche here identifies as feelings of connnanding and obeying, not 
at least in connection with voluntary actions, so called. 1145 On one 
level Danto is correct--on the surface of things, this element of 
connnanding does not seem to be a prominent characteristic of voluntary 
acts. But if the will is viewed in relation to the play of affects, as 
another way of ordering this play creatively, then the elements of 
41WM, §675, p. 451 =WP, §675, p. 356 =NF, VIII/2, 11(96), 
p. 286. 
42 WM, II, §36, p. 16. " 
fahren, was wir konnen; daruber kann 
erfolg belehren." 
ein Experiment machen, urn zu er-
uns allein der Erfolg oder MiB-
43JGB, I, §19; VI/2, p. 26 = BGE, I, §19, p. 26. 
der will--, befiehlt einem Etwas in sich, das gehorcht . 
45nanto, Nietzsche as Philosopher, p. 113. 
"Ein Mensch, 
II 
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connnanding and obeying become more meaningful. Willing and thinking 
both represent ways in which the play of affects may be organized. 
Again, there are two distinguishable categories of play involved 
here. Nietzsche's critique of the will is directed against those who, 
denying the relationship between the will and the affects, prevent the 
will from becoming free. By affirming the relationship between the will 
and the affects, one again opens the way for the will to become the 
creative force organizing these affects in its creative play. The 
ambiguity of the commanding-obeying relationship reflects the more 
fundamental ambiguity inherent in the role of the player, who is both 
player and plaything.46 
Evaluations 
A middle term binds thinking and willing to sensation and the 
affects: evaluations. The argument relating willing to evaluations 
centers around the notion of purpose. To will involves willing some-
thing, a purpose, and this purpose contains an evaluation;47 thus 
willing is always dependent upon evaluations. 48 Thinking, insofar as 
it is necessarily a process of selection and interpretation, exhibits 
46see above, Chapter Two, pp. 24-25. 
47WM, §260, p. 186 =WP, §260, p. 150. 
48These purposes may be fully constituted by the affects with 
minimal participation on the part of thinking or willing. In this case, 
the purpose is created by the affects--as the result of their inter-
play. For the free spirits, their will to power creatively transforms 
these in play and thus brings them under their control. 
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a parallel structure: both thinking and evaluating are necessarily 
. 1 49 perspectiva . What today is regarded as knowledge can presumably be 
traced back to older evaluations. 50 So, too, even our sense impres-
sions are shaped by our evaluations.51 
These evaluations are themselves interpretations, "a symptoip 
of particular physiological conditions. 1152 But they are not inter-
pretations which we make; rather, it is the affects which do the in-
terpreting.53 This is a process which takes place in, and changes, 
the body. It is an experiment; valuations and consciousness, pleasure 
and displeasure are but signs of it. The person in which this process 
happens is of significance insofar as he is able to control this process. 
The degree to which he can do that is the degree to which he is the 
will to power. 
These valuations themselves have their foundation in the con-
ditions of existence of particular beings, but they do not always re-
main perfectly in accord with them, as the case of morality shows.54 
49WM, §259, p. 186 = WP, §259' p. 149. 
50WM, §678, p. 456 = WP, §678, p. 359. 
51WM, §260, p. 187 = WP, §260, p. 150. 
52WM, §254, p. 184 = WP, §254, p. 148. "Die Auslegung ist 
ein Symptom bestimmter physiologischer Zustande." 
53Ibid. 
54WM, §256, p. 185 = WP, §256, pp. 148-49. 
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55 Thus we retain evaluations which are no longer precise or true, which 
have outlived their function, and these can eventually cause man's down-
fan.56 Nietzsche criticizes contemporary morality precisely on this 
basis, because creative force and the conditions of existence are 
missing in it.57 In such moralities one encounters what was originally 
a game. Now it has become fixed, static, and has lost its creative 
character. The game now dominates the players, imprisons them in its 
rules. The alternative to a regression to some previous morality, 
which in any case would appear impossible, is the development of a new 
kind of morality, one in which man gives himself his own goal: an ex-
perimental morality.SB But this kind of morality is only possible if 
the notion of goal is defined in terms of the interplay of affects as 
an organic multiplicity, an interplay of forces, seeking to increase 
its power. In this sense, purposes arise when one lets the forces in 
oneself have a free play, and through the creative play of the will 
to power purposes are created. In this case, our evaluations are to 
be understood as the creative coming-to-expression of the will to 
power which is operative in us. 
55uw, II, §266, p. 101. 
56uw, I, §650, p. 246. 
57WM, §260, p. 187 = WP, §260, p. 150. 
58cf. Ingeborg Heidemann, "Nietzsches Kritik der Moral," Nie-
zsche Studien, I, pp. 135 f. for a discussion of some of the problems 
in the idea of an experimental morality. 
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On the Affects and the Will to Power 
This analysis of Nietzsche's idea of the self has led us from 
the phenomena of thinking and willing through the intermediate stage of 
evaluations down to the fundamental level of life activity: the af-
fects or passions. 
It has been shown that the relationship among these different 
activities may be understood as play in either of two senses. It may 
be play in which the affects dominate thinking and willing, making them 
into their playthings or it may be a creative play in which thinking 
and willing play together with its affects, organizing them and maxi-
mizing their power. In the latter case, the full person emerges as a 
player, ,while in the former case the person is dominated by a play 
which he cannot control. 
In this section it will be shown that the play of affects is a 
structured interplay founded in an order of rank. This order of rank 
is a created one, the result of the creative play of the will to power. 
Insofar as the person is powerful, insofar as he is the will to power, 
he becomes the creative player who shapes his own world in his play and 
seeks to extend the boun~aries of that play world to encompass as much 
as possible. The highest manifestation of this tendency, as will be 
shown in the following section, is the overman. 
Nietzsche's analysis of the self is rooted in the body as an 
organic process, a multiplicity of forces which struggle with one 
another and generally exist in some sort of relation of dominance-
subjection, and which in the affirmation of their individual existence 
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also affirm the whole. 59 In rooting the self in the body in this 
manner, Nietzsche avoids reducing the self to a thing, for the body 
itself is for him not a thing but a process--and Nietzsche's name for 
this process is the will to power.60 
But what is the nature of the relationship among the affects? 
There is an order of rank among them, a hierarchy. In his notebooks, 
Nietzsche calls for substituting a perspectival doctrine of affects 
to replace epistemology, adding that "a hierarchy of affects" belongs 
to this view: "the affects transfigured; their superior order, their 
'spirituality' •1161 During this same period he describes man as a 
plurality of forces which stand in an order of rank, some commanding 
and others obeying. 62 So, too, there is a division of labor of the 
affects or passions within society itself which breeds a more useful 
type of sou1. 63 Elsewhere the affects are treated as a regency rather 
than as a necessary unity. 64 
59uw, II, §733, p. 236. 
60rhis notion of even the organic as the will to power is devel-
oped as a hypothesis in JGB, II, §36; VI/2, p. 48 = BGE, §36, p. 48. 
61 WM, §462, p. 323 =WP, §462, p. 255 =NF, VIII/2, 9(8), p. 6. 
"An Stelle der 'ErkenntniBtheorie' eine Perspektiven-Lehre der Affekte 
(wozu eine Hierarchie der Affekte gehort). 
" •.. die transfigurirten Affekte; deren hohere Ordnung, deren 
'Geistigkeit'." 
62uw, II, §734, p. 237. 
63WM, §719, p. 486 = WP, §719, p. 383 NF, VIII/2, 10(8), p. 
124. 
64 UW, II, §340, p. 124. 
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There is a unity or order among the affects and, insofar as 
Nietzsche prestnnes to speak of this order, it would appear to be know-
able to some extent. But even this must be qualified. Affects are not 
to be considered as causes, for in this case they are but a construction 
of the intellect, 65 as indeed are all causes for Nietzsche. We mistake, 
for example, the occasion of affects for their causes. 66 The only type 
of order which would seem admissible for Nietzsche is one according to 
the degree of power each affect manifests. A causal ordering of the 
affects is a construct. If they are taken to be anything more than 
this, affects become errors of the intellect. 
In seeming contradiction to this view of the affects, Nietzsche 
urges us at times to control our affects. Greatness of character con-
sists 1n having powerful affects, but keeping them in line. 67 The 
affects are not to be overcome, but rather made to serve us. 
PP· 
Overcoming of the affects? No, if what is implied is their weak-
ening and extirpation. But putting them in service: which may 
mean subjecting them to a protracted tyranny ...• At last they 
are confidently granted freedom again: they love us as good ser-
vants and go voluntarily wherever our best interests lie. 68 
65WM, §670, p. 448 = WP, §670, p. 354. 
66uw, I, §733, p. 270. 
67WM, §928, p. 624 = WP, §928, p. 490 NF, VIII/2, 11(353), 
395-96. 
68WM, §384, p. 261 =WP, §384, p. 207. "Uberwindung der Af-
fekte? Nein, wenn es Schwache und Vernichtung derselben bedeuten soll. 
Sondern in Dienst nehmen: wozu gehoren mag, sie lange zu tyrannisieren 
••• Endlich gibt man ihnen eine vertrauensvolle Freiheit wieder: sie 
lieben uns wie gute Diener und gehen freiwillig dorthin, wo unser Bestes 
hin will." 
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In passages like this one, one encounters an affirmation of the indi-
vidual as master of his own drives which, presumably, arises out of 
Nietzsche's rejection of those positions which advocate a negation of 
the affects. 69 It seems that Nietzsche here goes beyond the limits he 
has established for himself. He argues in Beyond Good and Evil against 
the possibility of overcoming an affect insofar as this so-called over-
. 11 d 0 bl h ff . . d . 70 coming is actua y re uci e to anot er a ect gaining ominance. It 
would seem, however, that a similar argument is in order against his 
idea of taking the affects into one's service. Who or what takes them 
into service but another affect? Although the passage quoted above 
does not answer this question, there is a clear implication that the 
person, the individual, is in some way in control of this process; but 
it is precisely this which Nietzsche seems to have established as im-
possible within his framework. It could only be another affect which 
fulfills this function. 
It is true that one could identify the self with a particular 
affect, in which case such a position would make sense from a particular 
standpoint, but Nietzsche would have to acknowledge that the stand-
point is a falsification, for the self is a multiplicity of such affects, 
not simply the one which has gained ascendency. Thus, for example, he 
appears to distinguish between the self and its affects by saying that 
69see Nietzsche's comments on the false order of rank among the 
affects created by Schopenhauer and others in WM, §612, p. 417 = WP, 
§612, p. 329 =NF, VIII/2, 9(119), p. 68. 
7oJGB, IV, §117; VI/2, p. 93 = BGE, IV, §117, p. 86. 
the damage is less when the affects are let loose on others than on 
the self. 71 Such an assertion seems to posit a self which is unten-
able according to Nietzsche's own criteria. 
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Thus the self, including its thinking and willing, is reducible 
to evaluations, which in turn are themselves reducible to the interplay 
of affects. Attempts to identify a self standing over and against this 
multiplicity of affects fail to overcome Nietzsche's objection that 
even here it is but another affect which is at work. The affects in-
terpret, put other affects into their service--the self or the indi-
vidual does not do so. 
The apparent contradiction here can be resolved in terms of the 
category of play and the doctrine of the will to power. The will to 
power is the organizing principle of our affects. In a passage from 
one of his later notebooks, Nietzsche discusses the way in which willing 
in general is a willing to be stronger, adding: 
••• that the most universal and basic instinct in all doing and 
willing has for precisely this reason remained the least known and 
most hidden, because in praxi we always follow its commandments, 
because we are this commandment •.•• All valuations are only con-
sequences and narrower perspectives in the service of this one will: 
valuation. itself is only this will to power.72 
71uw, I, §857, p. 285. 
72WM, §675, p. 452 =WP, §675, p. 356 =NF, VIII/2, 11(96), p. 
287. " ••• daa der allgemeinste und unterste Instinkt in allem Thun 
und Wollen eben deshalb der unerkannteste und verborgenste geblieben 
ist, weil in praxi wir imrner seinem Gebote folgen, weil wir dies Gebot 
sind. . .. Alle Werthschatzungen sind nur Folgen und engere Perspek-
tiven im Dienste dieses Einen Willens: das Werthschatzen selbst ist 
nur dieser Wille zur Macht." 
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Once again, this calls for a distinction. We are the will to power, 
but this can be taken in two senses. First, we can be the will to 
power in such a way that it dominates our willing and thinking--even if 
we do not recognize it. Second, we can be the will to power in such a 
way that our thinking and willing is the highest expression of that will 
to power--the dominant aspect. This introduces a new self--a multi-
plicity of forces organized by this creative play of the will to power. 
The fragment quoted above begins with a passage which describes 
the process we have been examining: the destruction of the traditional 
concept of the self and its replacement by the notion of the creative 
player who orders the play of affects through his will to power. 
That one should take the doer back into the deed after having con-
ceptually removed the doer and thus emptied the deed; that one 
should take doing something, the "aim," "intention," "purpose," 
back into the deed after having artificially removed all this and 
thus emptied the deed.73 
Through his analysis of willing and thinking as being dependent upon 
evaluations, which in turn are reducible to affects, Nietzsche takes 
the doer out of the deed, reduces it to the interplay of affects; then 
brings the doer back in through the notions of the free spirit, the 
child, the highest in the order of rank, and the overman--all of which 
can be subsumed under the category of the creative player. So, too, 
73WM, §675, p. 451 =WP, §675, p. 356 =NF, VIII/2, 11(96), p. 
286. " ••. daB man den Thater wieder in das Thun hineinnimmt, nachdem 
man ihn begrifflich aus ihm herausgezogen und damit das Thun entleert 
hat; 
" ••• daB man das Etwas-thun, 'das Ziel,' die 'Absicht,' den 
1 Zweck' wieder in das Thun zurlicknimmt, nachdem man ihn klinstlich aus 
ihm herausgezogen und dami t das Thun entleert hat. 11 
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aim, intention, and purpose have been removed from the deed by means of 
the same reduction; they have been shown to be illusions, after-the-
fact rationalizations, massive self-deceptions. Now they are re-intro-
duced, all contained in one category: power. All deeds are done in 
order to increase power; they are instances of the will to power. 
Particular goals are set through creative play to increase that power. 
There is no meta-game in terms of which these individual games 
are to be judged. Another section of the fragment quoted above gives 
evidence of this. Following his statement that all valuations are only 
consequences and narrower perspectives of the will to power, Nietzsche 
. says: 
A critique of being from the point of view of any one of these 
values is something absurd and erroneous. Even supposing that a 
process of decline begins in this way, this process still stands 
in the service of this will . •. 
To appraise being itself: but this appraisal itself is 
still this being--: if we say no, we still do what we are ... 
One must comprehend the absurdity of this posture of judging ex-
istence, and then try to understand what is really involved in it. 
It is symptomatic.74 
The absurdity of trying to appraise being from any one point of view 
lies in this: these points of view are all in the service of one will. 
74WM, §675, p. 451 =WP, §675, pp. 356-57 =NF, VIII/2, 11(96), 
p. 287. " .•. eine Kritik des Seins aus irgend einem dieser Werthe 
heraus ist etwas Widersinniges und MiBverstandliches; gesetzt selbst, 
daB sich darin ein UntergangsprozeB einleitet, so steht dieser ProzeB 
noch im Dienste dieses Willens . . . 
"Das Sein selbst abschCitzen: aber Abschatzen selbst ist dieses 
Sein noch--; Man muB die AbsurditCit dieser daseinsrichtenden Gebarde 
einsehen; und sodann noch zu errathen suchen, was sich eigentlich 
damit begiebt. Es ist symptomatisch." 
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None of them offer a privileged position from which appraisal of the 
whole is possible. An order of rank can, however, be established ac-
cording to the degree of power. While there is one will to power, it 
develops into many forms. 75 These forms can be ranked according to 
their degree of power. Such a ranking is, as was shown in Chapter 
Three, a creative act of the powerful. This creative ranking extends 
the boundaries of one will to power to encompass other, weaker instances 
of the will to power. This is the creative play of the powerful ex-
tending the boundaries of its created world to encompass more and more 
of existence. A decline may stand 1n the service of a more powerful 
instance of the will to power, but this does not overshadow the fact 
that it is a decline. The creative play of the powerful expands to 
include and dominate the play of the weak. 
These powerful ones are the overmen. 
On the OVerman 
The significance of the doctrine of the overman in Nietzsche's 
philosophy is an open question. Most of the references to the overman 
in the writings Nietzsche himself published are confined to Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra. There are hardly more than six or seven references to the 
overman after Zarathustra. 76 Connnentators disagree on the importance 
of the concept. Jaspers devotes only a few pages to it, admitting 
75WM, §692, p. 468 =WP, §692, p. 369. 
76cf. Richard Oehler, Nietzsche Register (Stuttgart: Alfred 
Kroner Verlag, 1965), p. 461. 
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that "the image of the superman, as Nietzsche sees it, remains inde-
terminate.1177 Danto, discussing Zarathustra's description of the over-
man, maintains that it is, "divorced from the extravagant language and 
rushing cadences of Zarathustra's singing •.• a bland and all-too-
familiar reconnnendation, rather squarely in the moralistic tradition 
. • • to keep our passionate as well as our intellectual life in our 
connnand, not to deny one at the price of the other, and not . be 
petty and 'merely' human. 1178 Both Kaufmann79 and Morgan80 equate the 
overman and the notion of Dionysus which develops in Nietzsche's later 
writings. Heidegger accords more importance to the overman, making it 
one of the five fundamental words in Nietzsche's metaphysics. 81 He 
criticizes the overman because he negates the previous essence of man 
as reason in a nihilistic way. 82 Fink also admits that the image of 
the overman is at first "rather indeterminate, 1183 but he argues that 
the predecessors of the overman, which form the bridge between man and 
the overman, give content to this image--and the idea of the overman 
gives a unified form to that content. 84 
77Jaspers, Nietzsche, p. 166. 
79Kaufmann, Nietzsche, p. 316. 
78Danto, Nietzsche, p. 199. 
80George A. Morgan, What Nietzsche Means (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1965), pp. 301-03. 
81Heidegger, Nietzsche, II, pp. 259-60. 
82Ibid.' p. 293. 
83Fink, Nietzsches Philosophie, p. 69. 
84Ibid., pp. 69-70. 
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There is clearly room here for interpretation in regard to the 
importance of the concept of the overman. Other concepts, such as that 
of the free spirit or Dionysus, could also be used in developing an 
integrating image for Nietzsche's ideal. Three such images have been 
used in Chapter Three: the child, the free spirit, and the creators 
of the order of rank. Nietzsche presents in fact a multiplicity of 
images to describe his ideal. Among these, the overman is the most 
poetical and, for this reason, the one most easily subject to misin-
terpretation. 
In this section, I shall show that the notion of the overman 
functions as the unifying image in terms of which both the previous 
images of creative play and the notion of self-overcoming can be under-
stood. The overman is the player par excellence in existence. The 
overman is not a goal outside of existence, but the culmination of 
the creative play of the free spirit. 
In Thus Spoke Zarathustra Nietzsche first presents the idea of 
the overman in detail. Zarathustra is the teacher of the overman, 85 
who is "the meaning of the earth. 1186 For man, the overman is "'the 
meaning of their being'." In his notebooks, Nietzsche says that, "Not 
humanity, but oveY'l71an is the goal1 1187 
85z, "Vorrede," 3; VI/l, p. 8 = Z, "Preface," 3, p. 12. 
B6Ib·a 
'[, • ' p. 8 = Ibid.' p. 13. "Der Ubermensch ist der Sinn der 
Erde." 
87WM, §1001, p. 658 =WP, §1001, p. 519. "Nicht 'Menschheit,' 
sondern Vbermensch ist das Ziel." 
r 
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The descriptions of the overman have a religious dimension that 
seems quite intentional. The very name of Zarathustra evokes the image 
of Zoroaster and his religion. The tone of Zarathustr>a hints at shades 
of John the Baptist preparing the way for the savior. Other passages 
indicate that the overman is to take God's "place." (The qualifica-
tion implied by the quotation marks here is this: God's place may 
simply be eliminated and the overman may take up a different place, 
one which is not outside of human history.) Thus we are told, now that 
all the gods are dead, long live the overman. 88 When one used to say 
"God" when looking out over distant seas, now he is to say the name of 
the overman.89 With God dead, the higher men wish that the overman 
might live.90 In his notebooks, Nietzsche refers to the overman as 
"a completely epicurean God .•• the one who transfigures exist-
ence."91 
It is difficult not to be mistrustful of such statements, es-
pecially in the light of Nietzsche's own critique of Christianity and 
religion in general. Certainly he is not trying to start another 
88z, I, "Von der Schenkenden Tugend," 3; VI/l, p. 98 = Z, I, 
"On the Gift-giving Virtue," 3, p. 79. 
89z, II, "Auf den gliickseligen Inseln;" VI/1, p. 105 = Z, II, 
"Upon the Blessed Isles," p. 85. 
90z, IV, "Vorn hoheren Menschen," 2; VI/l, p. 353 = Z, IV, "On 
the Higher Man," 2, p. 287. 
91uw, II, §1409, p. 507. "Die Rangordnung, durchgefiihrt in 
einern System der Erdregierung; die Herren der Erde zuletzt, eine neue 
herrschende Kaste. Aus ihnen hier und da entspringend, ganz epikur-
ischer Gott, der Uberrnensch, der Verklarer des Daseins." 
r 
religion; he is not looking for disciples, but rather for equals. 
Nonetheless, the overman is somewhat problematic. Nietzsche would 
make great sacrifices for him; he would suffer anything to reach the 
overman for only a moment.9 2 To bring about the emergence of the 
overman, he would offer up himself and others.93 These and similar 
remarks suggest a denial of one's existence in the moment, a sacri-
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ficing of the moment to bring about a future redemption, which is char-
acteristic of the religious consciousness. Indeed, one could offer a 
counter argument: this sacrificing is really only being what one is, 
being one who prepares the way for the overman by participating in 
the self-overcoming of man. 94 Consequently it is not a denial of ex-
istence, but rather its affirmation. 
Additional problems arise from Zarathustra's contention that, 
"Never yet has there been an overman. 1195 Nietzsche's own argument 
against a final goal of becoming--if the world had a goal, it would 
have been reached by now96 __ seems equally valid in relation to the 
92uw, II, §1260, p. 453. 
93uw, II, §1211, p. 445. 
94cf. Eugen Fink, Nietzsches PhiZosophie, p. 69. "Der Mensch 
ist ein sich selbst ilberwindendes Wesen, weil in ihm das allgemeine 
Wesen des Lebens ilberhaupt, der Wille zur Macht, sich selbst erkennt, 
bzw. erkennen kann." 
95z, II, "Von den Priestern;" VI/l, p. 115 = Z, II, "On Priests," 
p. 93. "Niemals noch gab es einen Ubermenschen. 11 
96WM, §55, p. 44 =WP, §55, p. 36. "Wir leugnen Schluf3-Ziele: 
hatte das Dasein eins, so milBte es erreicht sein." Here I am following 
Ivan Soll's interpretation of this fragment: "According to the argu-
ment, given an infinite amount of time in the past and a finite number 
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overman: if the overman were going to appear, he would have appeared 
by now. But nowhere does Nietzsche maintain that the overman has 
already appeared, except perhaps in that passage from Ecce Homo on 
ZaPathustPa, where it is implied that in Zarathustra's interactions 
with men man is overcome at every moment, that "the concept of the 
'overman' has here become the greatest reality."97 But Zarathustra 
can be said to exist only in a very qualified sense, as a poetic crea-
tion. The overman's coming seems in general to be an event which Nie-
tzsche seeks as happening in the future. It 1s precisely the futurity 
of the overman which allows it to be a unifying concept. It pulls 
together the many different images considered so far--the child, the 
free spirit, the creators of the order of rank--and focuses them in 
one image: the overman. The overman is the symbol which represents 
the culmination of these developments. This is not a goal outside of 
the course of history, a final goal of the world, but rather the symbol 
of the highest reaches of man's process of self-transcendence, the goal 
which man sets for himself. 
The last man is characterized by his desire to avoid all devia-
tion from the norm, all exertion. Zarathustra describes him in the 
of possible states of the universe, every state, that will occur in the 
future has already recurrent in the past." "Reflections on Recurrence: 
A Re-examination of Nietzsche's Doctrine, DeP Ewige WiedePkehP des 
G7,,eichen," in Nietzsche. CPiticai Essays, p. 330. 
97EH, "Also sprach Zarathustra," 6; VI/3, p. 342 = EH, "Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra," 6, p. 305. "Hier ist in jedem Augenblick der 
Mensch liberwunden, der Begriff 't.ibermensch' ward hier hochste Real-
itat." 
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following terms. "No shepherd and one herd! Everybody wants the same, 
everybody is the same: whoever feels different goes voluntarily into a 
madhouse. 1198 While they can be said to be playing, it is clear that 
they are not doing so consciously or creatively. Their game has come 
to dominate them. They shrivel up and wait for it to end. 
The meaning of the overman can be seen more clearly by concen-
trating on the tendencies in existence to which it calls attention. 
The overman represents a sharpening of contradictions and tensions in 
existence, which results in the opposite of the overmen: the "last 
men11 • 99 Two other characteristics belong to the emergence of the 
overman. His coming brings about the greatest increase in his con-
sciousness of strength.loo Indeed, insofar as an increase in power is 
associated with a greater struggle, the highest instance of power--the 
overman--necessitates the greatest tension--that between the overman 
and the last men. Finally, the entire process under discussion here 
involves the overcoming of man. 101 
But just what is meant by "man" here? One fragment suggests 
that it is the species man which is to be overcome, 102 but the entire 
98z, "Vorrede," 5; VI/l, p. 14 = Z, "Prologue," 5, p. 18. "Kein 
Hirt und Eine Heerde! Jeder will das Gleiche, Jeder ist gleich: wer 
anders ftihlt, geht freiwillig in's Irrenhaus." 
99uw, II, §§1211, 1212, p. 445. 
lOOwM, §1060, p. 691 = WP, §1060, p. 546. 
lOlz, IV, "Vom hoheren Menschen," 3; VI/l, p. 353 = Z, IV, "On 
the Higher Man," 3, p. 287. 
102 UW, II, §1211, p. 445. 
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thrust of Nietzsche's writings suggests a more adequate formulation: 
the "man" that is to be overcome is everything in man which Nietzsche 
has criticized. The preceding sections of this chapter have shown the 
specific ways in which this overcoming is brought about in relation to 
willing, thinking, evaluating, sensing, and the play of affects. This 
is the fullness of Nietzsche's notion of self overcoming: the affects, 
sensations, evaluations, thinking and willing are brought together in 
the creative play of the will to power. The overman symbolizes the 
culmination of this process. It is not, as Heidegger maintains, a 
nihilistic overcoming only of thought. 103 Nor need it remain vague. 
The notion of overcoming in and through creative play, as presented 
in the preceding sections of this chapter, gives this overcoming spe-
cific content. 
There is one final aspect of the notion of the overman: his 
realization that everything recurs, 104 the eternal recurrence of the 
same. The way in which the eternal recurrence of the same completes 
Nietzsche's philosophy of creative play is the final problem to be 
considered in this work, the topic of the final chapter. 
Conalusion 
The result of Nietzsche's critique of thinking, willing, eval-
uating and sensations was to reduce the self to the interplay of the 
affects, which effectively removed the doer from the deed. This left 
103Heidegger, Nietzsche, II, p. 293. 
104 UW, II, §§1384, 1385, 1387, p. 500. 
r 
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the way open to a reinterpretation of the deed as a particular instance 
of the one will to power and a reconstitution of the self as the over-
man. The idea of the overman restores a unity to the self which had 
been destroyed in Nietzsche's critique, but this unity is of a very 
qualified type. "All unity is unity only as organization and inter-
play. "l05 The overman possesses unity only in the sense that he or-
ganizes the interplay of forces which are his affects through the 
will to power. Thus there are two ways in which the self is play in 
Nietzsche. The self may be the plaything of the affects, in which 
case they control him. This is the mark of weakness,. the absence of 
the will to power. Alternately, the self may creatively organize and 
control this interplay through the will to power, in which case the 
entire self--including the affects, eYaluations, thinking and willing 
--is a creative playins which seeks to extend itself. This two-fold 
meaning of play has been analyzed on several levels--on the level of 
willing, thinking, evaluating, sensing and the affective level. This 
lays the foundation for a unified self where the overcoming of the 
self on all levels is accomplished through creative play. The overman 
is the highest symbol of this process. 
It now remains to extend this interpretation to the doctrine 
of the eternal recurrence of the same. 
105WM, §561, p. 383 = WP, §561, p. 303. "Alle Einheit ist nur 
als Organisation und Zusammenspiel Einhei t." 
CHAPTER SIX 
THE ETERNAL RECURRENCE AND THE PLAY OF FORCES: 
TEMPORALITY AND PLAY 
Introduction 
In the last three chapters, the category of play in Nietzsche's 
philosophy has been developed on three levels: as the highest form of 
human activity, the creative play of the free spirits (Chapter Three); 
as the hidden meaning of morality, the game of self-deception (Chapter 
Four); and as constitutive of the self in the interplay of affects as 
shaped through the will to power. It now remains to consider the 
most fundamental level on which play is encountered in Nietzsche's 
philosophy: the eternal recurrence of the same. The following analysis 
of the doctrine of the eternal recurrence of the same will show that 
this doctrine yields a picture of the cosmos as fundamentally an inter-
play of forces, eternally creating and destroying, without end in 
either of two senses--without a final goal or purpose, and unending 
in time. 
By showing that the eternal recurrence of the same is essen-
tially a picture of the universe as an interplay of forces, this analysis 
will have been completed. It will have been shown that the category of 
play is the fundamental one in terms of which all of existence is to 
be understood for Nietzsche. At the same time, it will be shown that 
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this category shifts in meaning. In relation to the free spirits, play 
was considered as a free creative activity through which and in which 
the free spirit makes his own world, continually seeking to enlarge 
its boundaries to encompass other play worlds. The category of play 
in morality was somewhat different, for the moral ones did not realize 
that they were only playing; their game was the self-deceptive game 
of the mediocre, the herd. Through an analysis of human action in 
relation to its knowability, purposefulness and foundation in free 
will, it was possible to show that moral actions could be nothing but 
play, but a play in which the player deceives himself into thinking 
that he is doing something other than playing and in which he limits 
his own power in favor of the mediocre, the suffering ones, the herd. 
In considering the self as the interplay of affects, it became clear 
that this play was even less under the control of a player than the 
two previous forms. These forces are still free, not bound to any 
final goal or order of things in themselves, but the person is less 
conscious of the dimensions of this interplay of affects. Thus the 
meaning of the category of play in these last three chapters has been 
shifting steadily from human play to the play of forces beyond human 
control. 
The doctrine of the eternal recurrence of the same completes 
this movement insofar as play now becomes the play of forces which 
is completely beyond human control--a cosmic play. 1 However, it is 
lThe meaning of the category of play in this context corre-
sponds in general to that elaborated by Ingeborg Heidemann in her 
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possible to show that the movement does not stop here with the least 
human level of play. It will be argued that the eternal recurrence of 
the same is not a doctrine which refers to things in themselves, but 
itself is the expression of the play character of human existence which 
creates this doctrine. Cosmic play--as expressed in the doctrine of 
the eternal recurrence--reveals itself to be the result of human play. 
This argument, which will be developed in detail below, will 
show that Nietzsche's philosophy is not, as Karl Lowith has maintained, 
characterized by a fundamental contradiction. 2 It will be shown in 
this chapter that, when they are interpreted in terms of the category 
of play, the main tenets of Nietzsche's philosophy do not lead to 
fundamental contradictions. The apparent contradictions in Nietzsche's 
discussion of the four-fold definition of the concept of play in Kant: 
" •.• das Spiel als die Anordnung, in der keine Absicht ist. Diese 
Alternative konnte so aufgefaat werden, als ob sie der ersten ter-
minologischen Festlegung widersprechen wilrde, nach der die Spiel-
handlung zwar zweckfrei oder zwecklos ist, aber eine Absicht hat. 
Die Unterscheidung hangt jedoch ab von dem Standpunkt, unter dem 
die Anordnung betrachtet wird: als Handlung, als Form, als be-
stinnnte Koordination, als Ordnung Uberhaupt; oder auch, im Aspekt 
der Handlung: in bezug auf den Anfang oder das Ende, oder in bezug 
auf den Verlauf. So wird an anderer Stelle das Spiel als 'Be-
schaftigung ohne Absicht' damit begrilndet, daa es nicht 'am Ende' 
vergenilgt, sondern wahrend seiner Dauer gefallt." 
Der Begriff des SpieZes, p. 161. Play here is used in the sense of a 
free ordering of forces which is not intended to achieve any final 
goal. 
2
cf. Karl Lowith, Nietzsches PhiZosophie der Ewigen Wiederkehr 
des GZeichen (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1956), p. 14, where Lowith main-
tains that, "ein wesentlicher und umfassender [Widerspruch], der einem 
Grundkonflikt in Verhaltnis von Mensch und Welt--ohne Gott und gemein-
same Schopfungsordnung--entspringt " characterizes Nietzsche's 
philosophy. 
philosophy can be resolved in terms of the category of play, which 
functions as the unifying insight of Nietzschean philosophy. 
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The argument of this final chapter is somewhat complex. First, 
the context for Nietzsche's doctrine of the eternal recurrence will be 
developed: the problem of temporality. Four problems face Nietzsche 
in regard to temporality: how to affirm the past, the relationship 
between being and becoming, the adequacy of traditional concepts of 
time, and the possibility of creatively willing time. The eternal 
recurrence of the same is a response to these four areas of problems; 
it culminates in the notion of creatively willing time through the 
affirmation of the eternal recurrence of the same. This is the subject 
of the second part of this chapter: the meaning of the eternal re-
currence and the modes in which it is affirmed. It is necessary, in 
particular, to consider what Nietzsche means by naming, thinking and 
willing the eternal recurrence, for it is here that we see that the 
eternal recurrence is the expression of the free spirit's--or at least 
Nietzsche's--creative play. In other words, it will be shown that the 
eternal recurrence is play in two senses. First, the picture of the 
cosmos which it yields is basically that of a cosmos as the play of 
forces. Second, the creation of this picture is itself an act of play, 
playful naming, thinking, and willing. 
Having shown the two senses in which the eternal recurrence is 
play, it will be shown how the notion of the eternal recurrence re-
solves the four areas of problems in regard to the question of tem-
porality which were outlined at the beginning of this chapter. The 
chapter then concludes with a consideration of Nietzsche's final 
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vision of the world as play, emphasizing the unity of the Nietzschean 
position. 
A. The Framing of the Question of Temporality 
The meditation on time arises out of four fundamental areas of 
concern. First, time is something to be overcome as time past, as the 
"it was." Second, time must be affirmed within the context of the 
struggle between being and becoming. Third, the ideas of time in 
traditional interpretations of the world, both Christian and poly-
theistic, must be surpassed. Finally, time must be willed in a radi-
cally new way if man is to be truly creative, and if life as continuous 
self-transcendence is to become possible. 
Time Past: The "It Was " 
The first problem is posed most clearly in Zarathustra's speech 
d . 3 on re emption. Redemption can only be attained by a transf0rmation 
of the "it was" into a "thus I willed it." Time paralyzes the will 
because the "it was" cannot be affirmed. It is this which gives rise 
to revenge, the "will' s ill will against time and its 'it was'. 114 It 
is revenge which leads to looking upon time as that which must devour 
its children--indeed, it has even led us to positing this as the basic 
1 f . . . . 5 aw o time, its JUStice. 
3z, II, "Von der ErlOsung;" VI/l, p. 175 = Z, II, "On Redemp-
tion," p. 139. 
4Ibid., p. 176 =Ibid., p. 140. "Diess, ja diess allein ist 
Bache selber: des Willens Widerwille gegen die Zeit und ihr 'Es war'." 
5Ibid. 
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The will must be relieved of the folly of revenge; it must be 
taught to will even the frightful accident of the past. Zarathustra 
presents the creative will as the answer to the "it was," establishing 
the context of a possible solution. The past is transformed, brought 
under our control, by willing it again in the future. However, this 
still leaves a problem: "to work on the future and redeem with their 
creation all that has been116 is again to turn time against us, to 
create a division between the moment and that which is yet to happen. 
The final folly which we shall uncover here is not revenge, but the 
will itself. Insofar as man wills, he puts himself outside himself 1n 
time, subjecting himself to the tyranny of time's control over events 
beyond his reach. 
Being and Becoming 
Second, the problem of time is framed within the context of the 
tension between being and becoming. The difficulty to which the pre-
vious consideration leads--the impossibility of escaping the tyranny 
of time while one is still willing something--exists on the level of 
the individual. The corresponding problem, on the level of the world 
itself, is the impossibility of a final state of the world. Zarathustra 
has stated the need to praise all impermanence, 7and the notes in The 
6z, III, "Von alten und neuen Tafeln," 
"On the Old and New Tablets," 3, p. 198. " 
und Alles, das war--, schaffend zu erlosen." 
3; VI/l, p. 245 = Z, III, 
. an der Zukunft schaffen, 
7z, II, "Auf den gli.ickseligen Inseln;" VI/l, p. 106 = Z, II, 
"On the Blessed Isles," pp. 86-87. 
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Will to Power shed more light on this. 
Becoming must be explained without recourse to final intentions; 
becoming must appear justified at every moment (or incapable of 
being devalued; which amounts to the same thing); the present must 
absolutely not be justified §Y reference to a future, nor the past 
by reference to the present. 
We must not admit of anything with being least the world of becoming 
be devalued. 9 The primacy of the moment, which is also stressed in 
Zarathustra, 10 implies a fundamental rejection of any final state. All 
moments are of equivalent value. 
A rather unusual argument is advanced in support of the position 
that the world has no final state or goal. It, too, is to be found in 
The Wi U to Power. 
If the world had a goal, it must have been reached. If there were 
for it some unintended final state, this also must have been 
reached. If it were in any way capable of a pausing and becoming 
fixed, of "being," if in the whole course of its becoming it 
possessed even for .a moment this capability of "being," then all 
becoming would long since have come to an end, along with all 
thinking, all "spirit. nll 
8WM, §708, p. 479 =WP, §708, p. 377 =NF, VIII/2, 11(72), p. 
276. " ..• das Werden soll erklart werden, ohne zu solchen finalen 
Absichten Zuflucht zu nehmen: das Werden muB gerechtfertigt erscheinen 
in jedem Augenblick (oder unabwerthbar: was auf eins hinauslauft); es 
darf absolut nicht das Gegenwartige um eines Zukilnf tigen wegen oder 
das Vergangene um des Gegenwartigen willen gerechtfertigt werden." 
9NF, VIII/2, 11(72), p. 277. 
lOz, III, "Von Gesicht und Rathsel," 2; VI/l, p. 196 = Z, III, 
"On the Vision and the Riddle," 2, p. 158. 
11WM, §1062, p. 692 = WP, §1062, p. 546. "Hatte die Welt ein 
Ziel, so miiBte es erreicht sein. Gabe es fur sie einen unbeabsichtigten 
Endzustand, so miiBte er ebenfalls erreicht sein. Ware sie iiberhaupt 
eines Verharrens und Starrwerdens, eines 'Seins' fahig, hatte sie in 
allem ihrem Werden nur Einen Augenblick diese Fahigkeit des 'Seins,' so 
ware sie wiederum mit allem Werden langst zu Ende, also auch mit allem 
Denken, mit allem 'Geiste'." 
180 
These arguments, especially the first, could also be used against Nie-
tzsche.' s idea of the eternal recurrence of the same, just as they could 
be used against his concept of the overman. 12 If the same is taken in 
the sense of some being, entity or stability which exists in itself 
and recurs eternally, 13 then one can argue against Nietzsche that, if 
the same is to recur over and over again, one would expect to have 
found evidence of this--it must have done so by now. Clearly it has 
not. Yet what conclusion can we draw from that? It is possible to 
say that this simply shows that Nietzsche is wrong--perhaps even a 
fool to maintain such an obviously false doctrine.14 One could say 
12cf. above, Chapter Five, pp. 168 f. 
13Few of the English or American connnentators consider the ques-
tion of what it is that returns eternally the same by also considering 
Nietzsche's idea of sameness. Arthur Danto, for example, does not 
really take up the question at all, but he considers such possibilities 
as "the world," fossils and things in general, and states of energy--
but without trying to discover precisely what it is that returns the 
same. (Cf. Nietzsche as Philosopher, pp. 204 ff.) Walter Kaufmann 
generally considers the eternal recurrence to refer to events, but at 
times interprets it as the "doctrine of the eternal recurrence of all 
things." (Cf. Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, p. 
320.) It is not things which recur, ,and in this chapter it will be 
shown that the doctrine of the eternal recurrence is best understood 
in relation to the Nietzschean notion of sameness, which will be elab-
orated below. 
14connnenting on what he considers to be the three main theses in 
Nietzsche's philosophy--which include the eternal recurrence--Walter 
Brocker maintains: "Diese Lehre bleibt nicht nur ohne Beweis und ohne 
Wahrheit, sie ist liberhaupt nicht ernst zu nehmen und insofern Narr-
heit. In diese Narrheit fallt aber Nietzsche nicht, weil er ein Narr 
sein oder den Narren spielen will, sondern gegen seinen Willen, als 
Opfer seiner philosophischen Unbildung." ("Nietzsches Narrenturn," in 
Nietzsche Studien, Band I, p. 142.) As will be shown below, Nietzsche's 
notion of the eternal recurrence of the same is not without proof or 
truth, although the question of the foundation of this proof remains 
to be determined. 
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that Nietzsche meant something else by "the same" than the sense defined 
above. One could also say that his notions of thinking and proving 
the eternal recurrence are radically different from what we usually 
understand these notions to entail. In fact, both these alternatives 
are true. First, Nietzsche does not mean that the same beings, en-
tities or stability continually recurs. His notion of sameness, which 
will be elaborated below, is quite different from this and far more 
complex. Second, his notions of naming, thinking and willing eternal 
recurrence introduce modes for affirming the eternal recurrence which 
allow him to escape the criticisms made above. The ways in which this 
happens will be discussed below in the sections dealing with the con-
cept of "the same" and with the naming, thinking and willing of the 
eternal recurrence of the same. 
Traditional Concepts of Time 
The question of time emerges from two different traditions. 
On the one hand, there is the Christian tradition which has established 
the question of time as one of eternity. Christianity, by enlarging 
the sinfulness of every individual to cosmic proportions, established 
eternal perspectives around man, teaching him to see himself as some-
thing past. 15 The way in which we conceive of time will be in part 
rooted in the tendency to see ourselves from afar, to put ourselves 
in eternal perspectives. In such a framework, it is easy to imagine 
time as devouring her children. 
15FW, II, §78, p. 93 JW, II, §78, p. llO. 
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Juxtaposed to this is the free-thinking which is rooted in poly-
theism. It established the image of a free and ever-creative man for 
whom there are no eternal horizons and perspectives. 16 The absence of 
eternal horizons signals the dawn of a new world, an open sea that 
never existed before. 17 
Both traditions must be surpassed. Insofar as the Christian 
interpretation posits one meaning, devalues the world of becoming, and 
emaciates the power of the individual, it must be set aside. Insofar 
as the multi-perspectivism of polytheism leads to a thinking of in-
finite possibilities (not simply unlimited time, but also unlimited 
space and force), it posits a newness to which the eternal recurrence 
is opposed. These infinite horizons provide the background for the 
creative play of the free spirits, which will give them shape and 
meaning. A new way of thinking about temporality, going beyond both 
these traditions, is necessary. 
Creative Willing of Time 
The fourth aspect of the problematic of temporality is Nie-
tzsche 1 s philosophy is his demand that creativity yield a new attitude 
toward the problem of time. It has been shown that the will was pre-
sented by Zarathustra as the great liberator. Leaving aside for the 
moment the question of who it is that does the liberating, we may 
recall that it is not enough just for man to be free. Zarathustra 
16FW, III, §143, p. 151 = JW, §143, p. 180. 
17FW, V, §343, p. 236 = JW, V, §343, p. 276. 
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poses the question of freedom not in terms of that from which man is 
free, but rather in terms of the much more important question: free 
for what? 18 As is clear from the preceding consideration of the will 
to power, 19 the answer to this question is an increase in power. The 
question of freedom is then transformed into the issue of power and 
its exercise.20 
That the relationship between self-affirmation and the will 
to power is a problematic one which seems to demand simultaneously 
the affirmation and destruction of the self is clear from the pre-
ceding chapter. The specifically temporal dimension of this problem 
is to be found in the necessity for some sort of temporal distance 
in willing between the moment in which something is willed and that 
in which it is achieved. This points to the more general problem 
of the distance between the one willing and that which is willed. The 
possibility of complete self-affirmation becomes a real one only if 
time is not only overcome--in the sense that the tyranny of the "it 
was" is eliminated--but also reoconstituted. Time must not simply 
be escaped from, but must be affirmed in a radically new manner, in 
terms of power and force. 
The four-fold problem of time as it is outlined here will 
find its overcoming within the thinking of the eternal recurrence of 
18z, I, "Vom Wege des Schaffenden;" VI/l, p. 77 
the Way of the Creator," p. 63. 
19see above, Chapter Four, pp. 129 ff. 
20WM, §859, p. 582 = WP, §859, p. 458. 
Z, I, "On 
r 
the same; time will be given a new and positive affirmation in Nie-
tzsche's thinking about play. The following sections will consider 
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the meaning of the doctrine of the eternal recurrence, the way in which 
it allows man to escape the tyranny of time, and the reconstitution of 
time through play. Thus the following two parts give Nietzsche's 
answer to the first three aspects of the problem of time, while the 
fourth part of this chapter is concerned with the final aspect of the 
problem. 
B. The Eternal Recurrence of the Same 
In attempting to determine the meaning of the eternal recur-
rence of the same, I shall first consider some oblique references to 
the doctrine which establish the context and development of the problem. 
Second, it will be shown that the eternal recurrence is not one that 
involves a naive understanding of physical law as referring to the 
order of things in themselves. Third, the meaning of the eternal re-
currence will be considered within the context of force and power. 
Fourth, the primacy of power will be shown to be fundamental to Nie-
tzsche's position on the eternal recurrence. Fifth, the meaning of 
"the same" and its relation to willing and power will be explicated. 
These considerations establish the necessary framework within which 
the main theme can be considered: the thinking and naming of the 
eternal recurrence of the same and, following this, the willing of 
the eternal recurrence. The section will conclude with a considera-
tion of the primacy of praxis, showing how this enables us to under-
stand the eternal recurrence as the most horrible and the most liber-
ating of thoughts. 
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Oblique References to the Eternal Recurrence 
Before turning to a consideration of the doctrine of the eternal 
recurrence itself, I shall discuss certain oblique references to this 
idea. First, it will be shown that Nietzsche's reflections on monu-
mental history contain a notion of sameness which anticipates the one 
encountered in the doctrine of the eternal recurrence of the same; 
moreover, these reflections imply a cosmological doctrine of recur-
rence. Second, it will be shown that the eternal recurrence is pre-
sented as "a thought," a terrifying possibility, in "The Heaviest 
Burden." This early (1882) formulation of the doctrine of the eternal 
recurrence reveals its terrifying character and raises the question--
which will be answered in the sections on the naming, thinking and 
willing of the eternal recurrence--of whether the eternal recurrence 
is merely a thought or whether it is something more. In addition to 
this, it suggests the first meaning of what it is that recurs eternally 
the same: every aspect of one's life. The last part of this section 
considers some passages from Nietzsche's notebooks which suggest a 
second hypothesis in regard to the question of what returns the same: 
the continual creating of new worlds. 
In his essay, "On the Use and Abuse of History," Nietzsche 
takes up the problem of time within the context of forgetting, It is 
the power to forget which is the condition of overcoming becoming and 
of the establishment of the primacy of the moment. This power of 
forgetting, or of feeling "unhistorically," is a necessary property 
of all action, one which we see prevents man from losing himself in 
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the stream of becoming.21 
At this point in Nietzsche's development, there still remains 
a greater emphasis on the individual. Insofar as the individual is to 
be maintained, becoming stands as a threat because the individual 
demands permanence. The thinking of monumental history22 is a means 
of giving sameness by showing the possibility of recurrence. 23 How-
ever, if monumental history is a means of overcoming time, it remains 
at this stage a problematic means. 
First, the notion of monumental history yields the courage for 
such overcoming only at the expense of doing violence to the past. It 
is necessary to impose "sameness" on the past in order that comparisons 
with the past can have binding-power.24 But this forces the individ-
uality of the past into general formulae, destroying its uniqueness. 
Such an imposition is problematic for Nietzsche at this point, and 
would remain so until the notion of sameness had been clarified, be-
cause it does do violence to the past, destroying some of its unique-
ness. 
Second, a cosmological position is already implied in the con-
sideration of monumental history as the necessary condition of the 
21 11vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie fur das Leben," §1, in 
Unzeitgemasse Betrachtungen (Stuttgart: Alfred Kroner Verlag, 1964), p. 
103. Hereafter abbreviated as UB, II, followed by the section and 
page numbers. 
22cf. UB, II, §2, p. 113 for Nietzsche's definition of monumental 
history. 
23Ib 'd 
'{,, . ' p. 114. 
24Ibid.' p. 115. 
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attainment of the complete truth of monumental history. This allows a 
partial reconciliation of sameness and uniqueness. 
Only if the earth always began its drama after the fifth act, and 
it were certain that the same interaction of motives, the same deus 
ex machina, the same catastrophe would recur at particular inter-
vals, could the powerful desire monumental history in its full 
archetypic truthfulness, i.e. each fact set out precisely in its 
peculiarity and uniqueness ..•• Until then monumental history 
will never be able to make use of complete truthfulness; it will 
always bring together things that are not the same, generalize them, 
and make them the same; it will always weaken the difference be-
tween motives and occasions in order to depict effects at the ex-
pense of causes--monumentally, i.e., as examples for imitation. It 
disregards causes as much as possible, and might with less exag-
geration be called a collection of "effects in themselves," than 
of events that will have an effect on all ages.25 
This passage is significant for two reasons. It indicates the cosmo-
logical dimensions of the problem of sameness, and it also shows that 
this endeavor involves the overcoming of the category of causality, 
searching rather after "effects in themselves." Nietzsche refers in 
this same section to the Pythagorean view of the world as a presupposi-
tion of such a notion of history, 26 and there is indeed evidence that 
25Ibid., p. llS. "Nur wenn die Erde ihr Theatersti.ick jedesmal 
nach dem fi.inften Akt von neuem anfinge, wenn es feststlinde, daB dieselbe 
Verknotung von Motiven, derselbe deus ex machina, dieselbe Katastrophe 
in bestinnnten Zwischenraumen wiederkehrten, di.irfte der Machtige die 
monumentale Historie in voller ikonischer Wahr>haftigkeit, daB heiBt 
jedes Faktum in seiner genau geschilderten Eigenti.imlichkeit und Einzig-
keit begehren .•• Bis dahin wird die monumentale Historie jene volle 
Wahrhaftigkeit nicht brauchen konnen: innner wird sie das Ungleiche an-
nahern, verallgemeinern und endlich gleichsetzen; innner wird sie die 
Verschiedenheit der Motive und Anlasse abschwachen, um auf Kosten der 
causae die effectus monumental, namlich vorbildlich und nachahmungs-
wlirdig, hinzustellen: so daB man sie, weil sie moglichst von den Ur-
sachen absieht, mit geringer Ubertreibung eine Sannnlung der 'Effekte an 
sich' nennen konnte, als von Ereignissen, die zu allen Zeiten Effekt 
machen werden." 
26Ibid. 
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the Pythagoreans held a notion of the eternal recurrence of the same on 
h 1 1 f h 11 . h h" 27 t e eve o t e cosmos as we as 1n uman 1story. The passage 
is also of interest because it indicates another usage of play in 
Nietzsche's philosophy: the understanding of history in terms of a 
28 theater play. 
There is, then, in the consideration on monumental history the 
beginning of a meditation upon the problem of time and the eternal re-
currence. Many of the essential components of later formulations of 
the problem are already present: the threat of becoming, the inade-
quacy of the categories of cause and effect, the primacy of interpre-
tation, the problematic character of "the same," the need to frame the 
eternal recurrence in terms which stretch beyond the individual to 
human history itself and to the cosmos. ·The notion of play is already 
27
cf. W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, Volume 
One (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), pp. 279-80. 
28
rn the first section of "On the Use and Abuse of History," 
the image of the playing child--reminiscent of the discussion of Hera-
clitus as well as of "On the Three Metamorphoses" in 'Zarathustra--
recurs. Man with the burden of the past is compelled, as if looking 
upon some lost paradise, "das Kind zu sehen, das noch nichts Vergangenes 
zu verleugnen hat und zwischen den Zaunen der Vergangenheit und der 
Zukunft in iiberseliger Blindheit spielt. Und doch muB ihm sein Spiel 
gestort werden: nur zu zeitig wird es aus der Vergessenheit herauf-
gerufen." (UB, II, §1, p. 102.) Note that it is the imposition of 
real time which brings about the destruction of the child's game ("real 
time" here being "historical time"), while it was his ability to forget 
history and its time which made such playing first possible. 
The category of play in regard to history also arises as the 
interplay of historical forces. For example, in his notebooks from 
1875, Nietzsche writes of the interplay between Alexandrianism and 
Christianity: " .•• das rhythmische Spiel der beiden Faktoren gegen 
einander, an dem die Welt zu leiden hatte." (NF, IV/l, 11(22), p. 
284.) 
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present here, and the relation between play and temporality has already 
been hinted at. The central notion, that which will be used to over-
come many of the problems here, is still to be developed at this stage: 
the will to power. 
In the passage on "The Heaviest Burden," a theme is introduced 
which will enlarge the notion of the eternal recurrence: the power of 
the "thought" of the eternal recurrence. The demon introduces this 
terrifying thought, suggesting that the eternal recurrence would be the 
heaviest burden on one's activity, an eternal sanctioning and sealing. 29 
Two points should be noted here. 
First, it :is the "unspeakably small and great" of life which 
recurs. This indicates that every aspect of one's life recurs. 30 
Asking the question of what it is that recurs eternally, we have the 
first possible answer: every aspect of one's life, including the un-
speakably small and great. 
Second, the theory is not presented as a "fact"--the meaning 
of a "fact" will be discussed below--but rather as a "thought." What 
is significant at this point is the possibility of the eternal return, 
29FW, IV, §341, p. 231 = JW, IV, §341, p. 270. 
30cf. Ivan Soll, "Reflections on Recurrence: A Re-examination of 
Nietzsche's Doctrine, Die Ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen," in Nietzsche: 
A Collection of Critical Essays, p. 340. This does not necessarily 
entail the problem Soll poses when he states: "A person can have no 
direct memories of earlier recurrences. If he did, the increment of 
his mental life would make him different from his predecessors and 
hence not an identical recurrence of them." While this is true in rela-
tion to the past, once one does have the thought, then it is clear that 
in the future one will recur with the knowledge that one will recur in 
the future again. 
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the thinking of the eternal recurrence?1 Again, this will be considered 
in more detail below. Suffice it to note the way in which the eternal 
recurrence is advanced at this point. 
Several other oblique references to the problem of the eternal 
recurrence are to be found in the fragments collected in The Will to 
P()U)er, and a short consideration of them will conclude this treatment 
of indirect and preliminary statements of the eternal recurrence. 
In discussing the contrast between Apollo and Dionysus in 
1885-86, Nietzsche suggests that Apollo's deception is the eternity 
of the beautiful form, while the enjoyment of Dionysus' life is rooted 
in the continual creativity of productive and destructive force,32 A 
similar contrast is developed later (Spring-Fall, 1887), and it is 
clear that Nietzsche is not arguing specifically against eternity as 
such, but rather against the value of eternally remaining the same, 33 
In doing so, he is moving toward an affirmation of the transitory 
character of continual creating as rooted in power. 
3lsoll argues on this basis that the importance of any proof 
of the eternal recurrence is less than central to Nietzsche's position, 
"all that is really required is a demonstration of the doctrine's 
possibility." (Ibid., p. 325.) Soll's arguments in this regard are 
unconvincing for, even if it is the psychological impact of this doctrine 
which is at stake, a proof would obviously lend it much greater import. 
Moreover, Soll ignores the question of h()U) this could be proved--the 
question which is discussed below in the sections on the naming, 
thinking, and willing of the eternal recurrence. 
32 WM, §1049, p. 683 = WP, §1049, p. 539. 
33WM, §577, p. 392 =WP, §577, p. 310 =NF, VIII/2, 9(26), p. 
12. 
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Although the relationship between eternity and the moment is 
initially treated as an antithetical one, Nietzsche also argues that 
all eternity is necessary to affirm the moment. 34 His argument develops 
in two directions. On the one hand, it is the moment which redeems 
and affirms all of existence; one proceeds from the moment outward to 
eternity. On the other hand, the argtnnent also proceeds from the in-
sufficiency of all things and selves inward toward the moment, the 
necessary condition of the moment's completeness being its affirma-
tion by all eternity. Eternity is rejected only insofar as it re-
mains unmediated by the moment of creative action. 
While the moment is characterized by creativity, it is necessary 
to see the notion of the moment within the perspective of Nietzsche's 
statement that nothing exists for itself. One can say that the notion 
of a "true world" is put into question. In the search for a better 
world, or at least a more tolerable one, man continually creates new 
fictitious worlds. 35 It is a short step then to understanding the 
"real" world as "the apparent world once again. 1136 The "once again" 
34WM, §1032, p. 675 = WP, §1032, pp. 532-33. As Joan Stambaugh 
has pointed out, when the moment is thought to be "ein einmaliger Zu-
stand," a "nunc stans ..• zeitlose Ewigkeit," then the moment excludes 
all other moments. ("Das Gleiche in Nietzsche Gedanken der Ewigen 
Wiederkunft des Gleichen," Revue International de PhiZosophie, Vol. 67, 
No. 1 [1964), p. 111.) Clearly Nietzsche is not referring here to an 
isolated moment, but to a dynamic one in the flow of time. 
35WM, §586, p. 407 =WP, §586, p. 321 =NF, VIII/3, 14(168), p. 
144. 
36 WM, §566, p. 386 =WP, §566, p. 305 =NF, VIII/2, 11(50), p. 
266. "Die 'wahre Welt', wie immer auch man sie bisher concipirt hat,--
sie war immer die scheinbare Welt noch einmaZ." 
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character of this creation points to a second way of understanding the 
eternal recurrence: what recurs again and again is the same act, the 
act of creating new worlds. Nothing exists for itself, but rather it 
must be continually created in the moment. 
This corresponds to Nietzsche's description of truth in terms 
of an eternal, active creating which has its foundation in the will to 
power. 37 The process of truth is an eternal making, and one puts out 
of sight that which is false--just as one hides unused props and scenery 
behind the stage in a play. The eternal character of this process 
corresponds to the eternal creating discussed above. That out of which 
one creates, if one may interpolate from an earlier text, is the great 
and the small--that chaotic plurality which, as will be shown below, 
is fundamentally force. That which does the creating is the will to 
power. 
In descriptions of the physical world, it is therefore inade-
quate to speak of regularity or conformity to a law as if one were 
dealing with a real law expressive of the nature of things themselves. 
Such formulations are only metaphorica1. 38 Laws, rather than referring 
to things in themselves, are themselves the results of creative acts. 
The Law of the Eter>naZ Reaurrence of the Same 
In this section I shall show that the doctrine of the eternal 
recurrence of the same can be understood as a law--if law is taken in 
37WM, §552, p. 377 
38WM, §632, p. 426 
WP, §552, p. 298. 
WP, §632, p. 336. 
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the Nietzsche~n sense. First, laws for Nietzsche will be shown to be 
the result of creative interpretations, not statements about things 
in themselves. Second, it will be shown that the basis of this inter-
pretation is power--laws are creative expressions of the will to power. 
The eternal recurrence of the same is not based on an uncritical 
understanding of physical law. It is necessary to distinguish here 
between two different conceptions of law: (1) as descriptive of the 
way things in the world behave, thus applicable to things in them-
selves, and (2) law as a creative extension or exercise of the will to 
power. Although it appears to be presented as such in several places 
in Zarathustra and The Joyful Wisdom and in some of the discussions 
in the secondary literature, the doctrine of the eternal recurrence 
is clearly not meant to be a law in the first sense. 
One finds in The Joyful Wisdom a clear rejection of any mech-
anistic view of the world. One reason for such a rejection is that a 
structure of explanation such as this, one which interprets the world 
in terms of a machine, tends to posit a goal or end. 39 The same problem 
is considered elsewhere, and there it is argued that the mechanistic 
interpretation is worthless--and not in good taste--because it treats 
only what can be counted. 40 In so doing, it is not only totally 
ignoring the worth of that which is under consideration, but it is 
also divesting existence of its ambiguous character, substituting one 
39FW, III, §109, p. 126 = JW, III, §109, p. 151. 
40FW, V, §373, p. 290 = JW, V, §373, p. 339. 
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interpretation for the multiplicity of possible perspectives. 
When Nietzsche discusses the new "infinite" of the fearless 
ones, he argues that the world may contain infinite interpretations, 
especially in relation to time. 41 The possibility of perceiving time 
differently is presented as a "hopeless curiosity," but this hopeless 
curiosity will transform itself into "the most horrible and most 
liberating of thoughts," the eternal recurrence of the same. 
It seems, however, that this infinity of interpretations is 
such that it excludes some interpretations. Just as the world is not 
to be viewed mechanistically, so too it is not to be viewed as a living 
being. 42 Nietzsche also rejects the position that the world eternally 
creates the new or that there are eternally enduring substances. 43 In 
fact, much of his energy and writing was devoted to showing why some 
interpretations are untenable. If there is an infinity of interpre-
tations, some are considered to be much better than others--and pre-
sumably the eternal recurrence of the same is meant to be the best. 
Rejecting the above interpretations, Nietzsche does recognize 
the existence of necessity44 and chaos. Order, structure, form, beauty, 
wisdom and other aesthetic elements of humanness are absent from the 
world; there is necessity, but it is not such that it can be termed 
41FW, V, §374, p. 291 = JW, V, §374, pp. 340-41. 
42FW, III, §109, p. 126 = JW, III, §109, p. 151. 
43Ib ·a 
'l, • ' p. 127 =ibid., pp. 151-52. 
44Even this necessity is an interpretation. Cf, WM, §552, p, 
376 =WP, §552, p. 297. 
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a law in nature itself. 45 Given this, it is clearly impossible to main-
tain that the eternal recurrence of the same is to be interpreted as 
a physical law in the traditional sense of that term. 
The problem is clarified somewhat if one considers the rela-
tion between law and power. Law was rejected because it involved in 
some way a reduction of the manifold character of existence, and an 
imputation of purpose in that to which it refers or of a subject that 
directs the movement of phenomena. 46 Events simply have a "thus and 
not otherwise" character, and the foundation for this necessity is 
power. "There is no law: every power draws its ultimate consequence 
at every moment. Calculability exists precisely because there is no 
middle term. 1147 Thus it is power which is the foundation of the neces-
sity which Nietzsche admits as legitimate, but it escapes treatment as 
law because it exists fully in the moment, because there is no subject 
directing the movement and on purpose toward which it is moving. 
If every power draws its ultimate consequences at every moment, 
then it would appear that the eternal recurrence refers to power--since 
it apparently cannot refer to any structure (such as order, beauty, 
law, etc.) beyond or above power. At this point it is necessary to 
establish the relationship between the eternal recurrence and the will 
45FW, III, §109, p. 127 = JW, III, §109, p. 152. 
46WM, §632, p. 426 WP , § 6 3 2 , p • 33 7 . 
47WM, §634, p. 427 =WP, §634, p. 337 =NF, VIII/3, 14(79), p. 
50. "Es giebt kein Gesetz: jede Macht zieht in jedem Augenblick ihre 
letzte Consequenz. Gerade, daB es kein mezzo termine giebt, darauf 
beruht die Berechenbarkei t." (The Kroner edition has "Anderskonnen" 
for "mezzo termine.") 
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to power and force, The law of the eternal recurrence depends upon 
whether or not the law can be expressive of force. It cannot be ex-
pressive of force according to Nietzsche if this involves position a 
notion of a subject directing the force, if it implies a purpose, if 
it attempts to reach things in themselves, if it involves a reduction 
of the richness of existence, or if it covers up a real ambiguity. 
What we say about the relationship between the eternal recurrence and 
power cannot have the status of a law if it involves these conditions. 
The Relationship of the Eternal Recurrence and Power-Force 
In this section, I shall outline the basic meaning of the terms 
"force" and "power" within Nietzsche's philosophy and show how two 
additional meanings of "that which recurs eternally" emerge from his 
idea of force: the eternal recurrence of a given combination of 
centers of force and the eternal recurrence of given levels of energy. 
In doing this, I shall also examine briefly Nietzsche's proof of the 
eternal recurrence as developed in his notebooks. 
The remarks on the problem of force and power are to be found 
primarily in Nietzsche's notebooks. The consideration here will be 
based mainly on passages gathered together in The Will to Power. 
First, force (Kraft) and power (Macht) are treated together 
because in general they are related to each other as outer to inner. 
Will to power is the inner organizing will of force, 48 force specified 
as seeking to increase itself. 
48WM, §619, p. 421 = WP, §61§, pp. 332-33. 
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Second, the substratum of force is absolute space. In a passage 
to which I shall return below, Nietzsche discusses space and time. 
I believe in absolute space as the substratum of force: the latter 
limits and forms. Time eternal. But space and time do not exist 
in themselves. 49 
This is not an argument for the absolute character of space, but rather 
a statement of belief 1n it, a laying bare of presuppositions. Perhaps 
the reasoning behind this is that, were space infinite, then force would 
be continually dispersing itself over this infinite space. So force 
must limit and form this absolute space which does not exist in itself. 
Third, the force which exists in this manner must be a finite 
quantum. The idea of infinite force is clearly rejected as a contra-
diction in terms, presumably because it is the very nature of thinking 
to impose some kind of limit; thus unlimited force is unthinkable.SO 
It is for this reason that eternal novelty is impossible. Not only is 
there a finite amount of force, but there is also only a finite number 
of centers of force. 51 It is because of this that the "great dice game 
of existence" must repeat itself--if there is infinite time. Both 
force and space must be finite and time must be unending if the eternal 
recurrence is to be, not just possible, but necessary--and Nietzsche 
asks us to think the world in this manner. The eternal recurrence of 
49WM, §545, pp. 370-71 =WP, §545, p. 293. "Ich glaube an den 
absoluten Raum, als Substrat der Kraft: diese begrenzt und gestaltet. 
Die Zeit ewig. Aber an sich gibt es nicht Raum, nicht Zeit." 
50wM, §1062, p. 693 =WP, §1062, p. 547. 
51WM, §1066, p. 696 =WP, §1066, p. 549 =NF, VIII/3, 14(188), 
p. 168. 
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the same is the result of understanding existence as a dice game: a 
particular type of play with a finite number of pieces and limited 
space, but played on through eternity. 
A number of arguments have been arised against this notion of 
the eternal recurrence, notably by Simme152 and Capek.53 Simmel's 
argument is well summarized by Kaufmann: 
Simmel has offered a very elegant refutation of Nietzsche's attempted 
proof of the eternal recurrence of the same events. Even if there 
were exceedingly few things in a finite space in an infinite time, 
they would not have to repeat the same configurations. Suppose 
there were three wheels of equal size, rotating on the same axis, 
one point marked on the circumference of each wheel, and these 
three points lined up in one straight line. If the second wheel 
rotated twice as fast as the first, and if the speed of the third 
wheel was l/n of the speed of the first, the initial line-up would 
never recur. 54 
While Simmel's argument is valid in itself, it should be noted that 
there are two limitations to it. First, it is only an argument against 
the necessity of the eternal recurrence, not against its possibility. 
Second, it does interpret Nietzsche's doctrine of the eternal recurrence 
as referring to things in themselves. A more consistent interpretation 
of the doctrine of the eternal recurrence as a creative expression of 
the will to power allows one to maintain the doctrine of the eternal 
recurrence in a sense other than Simmel has interpreted it, since 
Simmel's argument is based on an understanding of eternal recurrence 
52Georg Simmel, Schopenhauer und Nietzsche: Ein Vortragszyklus 
(Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1907), pp. 250 f. 
53Milic Capek, "The Theory of the Eternal Recurrence in Modern 
Philosophy," Journal of Philosophy, LVII, 9 (April, 1960), 289-95, 
54Kaufmann, Nietzsche, p, 327. 
199 
as a physical law referring to things in themselves, 
Capek's criticisms are significant in that they show that the 
eternal recurrence of the same can be shown to be necessary on the level 
of the cosmos, "asswning, of coUPse, that the universe is Zike a pack 
of cards. 1155 Such an assumption, in Capek's view, is clearly incon-
sistent with the results of contemporary physics, which does not deal 
with a universe of things, but rather of events and dynamic quanta. 
Insofar as Nietzsche also seeks to deal with the universe in these 
terms, Capek's criticisms of the eternal recurrence appear to be quite 
applicable to Nietzsche's position, suggesting that Nietzsche's proof 
of the eternal recurrence is not consistent with his conception of 
the universe as composed of dynamic quanta of force. Further develop-
ment of the Nietzschean idea of a quantum of force is necessary here in 
order to determine whether the eternal recurrence of the same quanta 
of force can be consistently maintained within Nietzsche's framework, 
For Nietzsche, a quantum of force is not to be conceived as an 
"unfree will. 1156 It simply implies that things are "thus and thus, n57 
Dynamic quanta remain, all of which are in relation to all the others. 
What one might call their "essence" is their relation to all other 
quanta, their "effect" upon them,58 although such language is at best 
55capek, "Eternal Recurrence," p. 291. 
56WM, §552, p. 375 = WP, §552, p. 297. 
57WM, §632, p. 426 = WP, §632, pp. 336-37. 
58WM, §635' p. 429 = WP' §635, p. 339 =NF, VIII/3, 14 (79)' 
p. 51. 
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only metaphorical. These quanta are referred to as power-will (Macht-
wiZZen) and as the will to power. They are designated by the effects 
they produce. The eternal recurrence of the same is in this sense 
merely an expression of the tautological character of force present in 
its givenness as will to power, its being what it is and nothing more. 
The absolute necessity of the same events occurring in the course 
of one world, as in all others, is in eternity not a determinism 
ruling events, merely the expression of the fact that the impossible 
is not possible . . • that a certain force cannot be other than 
this certain force; that it can react to a quantum of resisting 
force only according to the measure of its strength; event and 
necessary event is a tautoZogy.59 
The tautological character of force, its being what it is in the moment 
and nothing more, when placed within absolute space and when force is 
seen as finite, serves as the basis of the eternal recurrence of the 
same if time is infinite. The eternal recurrence is not a law governing 
events, but rather an expression of the tautologous character of force. 
Thus the appropiateness of pathos, rather than becoming or effect, as 
the most elementary starting-point: 60 pathos is the event of a multi-
plicity of centers of force being themselves by being in relation to 
all other centers of force. 
59WM, §639, p. 432 =WP, §639, p. 341 =NF, VIII/2, 10(138), 
pp. 201-02. " ... die absolute Necessitat des gleichen Geschehens in 
einem Weltlauf wie in allen ilbrigen in Ewigkeit, nicht ein Determinismus 
ilber dem Geschehen, sondern bloB der Ausdruck <lessen, daB das Unmogliche 
nicht mogliche ist • . • daB eine bestimmte Kraft eben nichts anderes 
sein kann als eben diese bestimmte Kraft; daB sie sich an einem Quantum 
Kraft-Widerstand nicht anders auslaBt, als ihrer Starke gemaB ist--
Geschehen und Nothwendig-Geschehen ist eine TautoZogie." 
60wm, §635, p. 429 =WP, §635, p. 339 =NF, VIII/3, 14(79), 
p. 51. 
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Yet one must be careful about how this totality is conceptual-
ized. The totality does not remain the same; rather, existence is 
first and foremost an event, and it is implied that it is develop-
mental insofar as the energy rises and falls. 
Regarded mechanistically, the energy of the totality of becoming 
remains constant; regarded economically, it rises to a high point 
and sinks down again in an eternal circle. This "will to power" 
expresses itself in the interpretation, in the manner in which 
force is used up; transformation of energy into life, and "life at 
its highest potency," thus appears as the goal. The same quantum 
of energy means different things at different stages of evolu-
tion. 61 
Here then the notion of the eternal recurrence is presented with a 
slightly different emphasis: the rising and falling of the energy of 
the totality in an eternal circle, in which what continually returns 
is the same level of energy. Such an interpretation is not subject 
to the criticisms that Capek has levelled against the notion of the 
eternal recurrence. The will to power is the principle of motion in 
this unending circle of expansion and contraction, It is an inter-
preter in the original sense of the word: an agent, in this case the 
agent of power. This relationship will be explored in more detail 
below. 
Two preliminary meanings of the eternal recurrence have thus 
61WM, §639, p. 431 =WP, §639, p. 340 =NF, VIII/2, 10(138), 
p. 201. "--mechanisch betrachtet, bleibt die Energie des Gesaromt-
werdens constant; okonomisch betrachtet, steigt sie bis zu einem Hohe-
punkt und sinkt van ihm wieder herab in einem ewigen Kreislauf; dieser 
'Wille zur Macht' drlickt sich in der Ausdeutung, in der Art des Kraft-
verbrauchs aus--Verwandlung der Energie in Leben und Leben in hochster 
Potenz erscheint demnach als Ziel. Dasselbe Quantum Energie bedeutet 
auf den verschiedenen Stufen der Entwicklung Verschiedenes ••• " 
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far presented themselves in this section. In the first, the eternal 
recurrence is merely an expression of the tautological character of 
power given the following conditions: limited space, a finite number of 
centers of force, unending time. That which returns then is the given 
combination of centers of force. In the second instance, the eternal 
recurrence expresses the rising and sinking of the energy of the totality 
of becoming, considered economically (rather than mechanistically), in 
an eternal circulation. In this case, that which returns is the same 
level of energy as interpreted by the will to power.62 While it may 
be possible to show that these are but two different ways of stating 
the same general condition, it should be noted that there are important 
differences, both in regard to the reasons given for them and in rela-
tion to their determinateness. The first formulation, with its emphasis 
on centers of force, is rather more specific than the second, which 
is concerned with the level of energy. That the will to power inter-
prets such energy and consequently defines centers of force is indeed 
true for Nietzsche, but this formulation does not state that it is 
these centers of force which return. 
Before considering in more detail the ways in which force and 
power are interpreted--through naming, willing, acting and the artistic 
act--it is necessary to consider briefly the primacy of power, since 
this provides the basis for the subsequent discussion of knowing the 
62These are the third and fourth possible meanings of "that 
which retu!·ns eternally the same." The first two were (1) all aspects 
of one's personal existence, including the unspeakably great and small 7 
and (2) the act of continually creating new worlds, 
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eternal recurrence. 
The Primacy of Power-Force 
The primacy of power and force, discussed above in relation to 
the universe as a whole, is also found in the human world. The concept 
which provides the mediating link between the cosmological analysis and 
the analysis of human behavior is that of the event. As used above, 
event was something which occurred in the world. All events are 
necessary; event and necessary event is a tautology. Events are 
determinations of force, in respect to both degree and relation. 63 
B h d . . f f . 1 f . f . 64 ut t e etermination o orce is a so a unction o sensation. 
Both the event and sensation are determinations of force. Sensation 
is a specific kind of event, retaining the general structure of inter-
preting power. It is on this foundation that knowing stands--and that 
will be of upmost importance when considering the possibility of knowing 
the eternal recurrence. 
The event then exists not only in the cosmological sense, but 
also as the foundation of the human world and of knowing. Insofar as 
the event is rooted in force, then the foundation of both orders--the 
reference to two orders here is not meant to imply that there are 
necessarily two distinct orders existing in themselves--is the struc-
ture of the event, its determination of force, which is the will to 
power. This presents a fifth possible meaning of that which returns 
63WM, §552, p. 378 =WP, §552, p. 297. 
64WM, §563, pp. 384-85 = WP, §563, p. 304; WM, §500, p. 345 = 
WP, §500, p. 273. 
eternally the same; the event as a determination of force. 
The Meaning of ''the Same 11 
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At this point in the analysis, before considering how the 
eternal recurrence is willed, it is necessary to inquire in more depth 
into the meaning of "the same" in the doctrine of the eternal recurrence 
of the same in order to show the foundation of sameness in power. On 
the basis of these considerations, I shall show that there are two 
additional possible meanings of "that which recurs eternally": the 
same apparent world, in either of two senses as (1) the specific content 
of such a world, and (2) its character as being an appearance, i.e. its 
falsity. These constitute the sixth and seventh possible meanings of 
that which eternally recurs the same. In addition to this, it will be 
shown that sameness is not given in the world, but rather that we 
create sameness. It is an expression of our power over the world. In 
this sense, the strongest will to power demands the greatest creation 
of sameness--this is the creation of the eternal recurrence of the 
same. Finally, the following section establishes the framework within 
which the modes of affirming the eternal recurrence--especially naming, 
thinking, and willing as expressions of the will to power--can be con-
sidered. 
One can begin such an investigation by recognizing that the 
general character of the world is chaos. 65 If this is the case, then 
a sixth possible meaning of that which eternally recurs the same is 
65Fw, III, §109, p. 127 = JW, III, §109, p. 152. 
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chaos. In his description of "the most dangerous point of view, 11 Nie-
tzsche sets the stage for such an interpretation, "What I now do, or 
neglect to do, is as important for all that is to come, as the greatest 
event of the past: in this immense perspective of effects all actions 
are equally great and small. 1166 ·, ... ;,.-- .: ·What are "the same" are all 
actions--they are equally great and small. If "great and small" is 
taken to indicate an undifferentiated plurality, then the sameness in 
which they share here is quite close to chaos. What seems to happen in 
this most dangerous of perspectives is that all measure disappears, 
thus allowing all things to be equally great and small, significant 
and insiginificant. Chaos is just such an absence of measure. ln this 
case, the "same" which would recur eternally would be chaos 1 the real-
ization in the end that there is no final measure in terms of which the 
manifold of existence may be judged. 
Yet such an explanation is insufficient as it stands, for the 
notion of "the same" must be shown to be consonant with Nietzsche's 
demand for a total affirmation of life in a creative manner. Sameness 
must be creatively affirmed, not simply given. 
A first clue to the solution of this problem is found in Nie-
tzsche's analysis of the function of logic. Just as the world is 
chaos, so one originally encounters a chaos of ideas. 67 The function 
66FW, III, §233, p. 170 = JW, III, §233, p, 202, "Was ich jetzt 
tue oder lasse, ist fur alles Kommende so wichtig als das groBte Ereignis 
der Vergangenheit: in dieser ungeheuren Perspektive der Wirkung sind 
alle Handlungen gleich groB und klein. 11 
67WM, §508, p. 348 = WP, §508, p, 276. 
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of logic is to impose order upon this chaos by seeing things as the 
same. On the natural level, there exists a movement toward "making the 
same" what is appro{iated--the limits of this being usefulness and 
harmfulness. On the human level, the same movement of making--positing 
and seeing--things as equal exists, and it is this which is the founda-
tion of logic.68 
The background out of which logic arises is then this original 
chaos--again, existence as a form of play, but this time a lawless 
play, hardly d~erving of the term.69 Logic uses this chaos as the 
raw stuff out of which it seeks to establish identities by creating 
fictitious worlds. Only after this fundamental falsificiation of 
events is assumed does logic become possible. 70 
There is a distinction here between identity and sameness, but 
Nietzsche hardly takes pains to make clear what it is. It is important 
in understanding the eternal recurrence to know whether Nietzsche means 
that the same, the identical, or the self-identical eternally recurs. 
One can begin by suggesting that identity has its foundation 
in sameness, the appearance that things are the same. 71 It is this, 
the creation of sameness, which allows us to comprehend the world, even 
if the world which we comprehend is a falsification. However, the 
68 
·WM, §510, p. 349 =WP, §510, p. 276. 
69we do, however, use the word in this sense when we speak, for 
example, of "the play of reflections on the water." 
70WM, §512, pp. 349-50 =WP, §512, p. 277. 
71WM, §520, pp. 355-56 = WP, §520, p. 281. 
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appearance of "same things" is open to question 1n a number of ways. 
First, the foundation of these "same things" is located in our 
belief in things--which is the precondition of our belief in logic. 72 
But Nietzsche himself rejects such a belief73 insofar as it claims to 
refer to anything but an apparent world. 
Second, the notion is criticized from the standpoint of "same-
ness." Sameness is not simply posited, it is made. The process of 
making things the same (ein Gleich-maehen) comes before that of positing 
sameness (ein Gleichsetzen). 74 If the foundations of logic are seen 
within this context, then logic can be interpreted as a creative act. 
Third, Nietzsche criticizes the notion of sameness in terms of 
its origins. Logic grows out of the herd instinct, and is used to 
achieve mutual agreement and domination. The positing of sameness in 
various events presupposes similar or same souls (gleiche Seele). 75 
The effects of this drive toward sameness are powerful enough that 
Nietzsche feels justified in saying that this changes the very way that 
we sense things. The compulsion to create a world of identical cases 
reshapes our sense of reality. 
This same compulsion exists in the sense activities which support 
reason--by simplification, coarsening, emphasizing, and elaborating, 
upon which all "recognition," all ability to make oneself intel-
ligible rests. Our needs have made our senses so precise that the 
72WM, §516, p. 353 =WP, §516, p. 279 =NF, VIII/2, 9(97), p. 53. 
73Ibid.; WM, §553, p. 379 = WP, §553, p. 300. 
74WM, §501, p. 345 =WP, §501, pp. 273-74. 
75
.WM, §509, p. 349 WP, §509, p. 276. 
"same apparent world" always reappears and thus has acquired the 
semblance of reality.76 
That "the same apparent world always reappears" would apparently be 
rooted in these needs: to construct concepts, species, forms, laws, 
purposes, etc., which presumably are in turn rooted in more funda-
mental needs to live and to increase power. The foundation of same-
ness is in the same sensations, 77 but such sensations themselves are 
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a function of something else. At this point a seventh possible meaning 
of the eternal recurrence appears: it is the same apparent world that 
recurs eternally. The emphasis could be placed here on either the 
content of that world or its formal characteristic as being "apparent." 
In the latter case, whatever world occurs would be a falsification, in 
which case, it is the falsity of one's world which eternally recurs. 
Thus we encounter here the eternal recurrence of the same in two 
senses: the same characteristic of falseness keeps recurring, and 
sameness is itself this process of falsification. 
In attempting to discover what these needs for the recurrence 
of the same apparent world are, we uncover several levels. The Sich-
selbst-Gleiche is necessary for knowing. 78 The construction of 
76WM, §521, p. 357 =WP, §521, p. 282 =NF, VIII/2, 9(144), p. 
82. " •• diese selbe Nothigung besteht in der Sinnen-Aktivitat, 
welche der Verstand unterstiltzt,--diese Vereinfachen, Vergrobern, Unter-
streichen und Ausdichten, auf dem alles 'Wiedererkennen,' alles Sich-
verstandlich-rnachen-konnen beruht. Unsre Bedurfnisse haben unsre Sinne 
so pracisirt, daB die 'gleiche Erscheinungswelt' inuner wieder kehrt und 
dadurch den Anschein der Wirklichkeit bekonunen hat." 
77WM, §532, p. 366 = WP, §532, p. 289. 
78WM, §574, p. 391 = WP, §574, p. 309. 
--
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identical cases, of the appearance of sameness, is necessary for 
thought.79 It is this, the construction of identical cases, which 
is the foundation of reality. "The 'reality' [of the phenomenal world] 
lies in the continual recurrence of same, familiar, related things in 
their logicized character, in the belief that here we are able to reckon 
and calculate. 1180 Furthermore, the foundation of life itself is a 
belief in regular and recurring things. 81 With this as the premise of 
life, the more powerful life is characterized by a wider and more know-
able world. The most powerful life demands the most knowable world in 
which in turn the most recurring things are demanded--thus the demand 
for the eternal recurrence of the same arises out of an increase in 
power. In this sense, the foundation of the creation of sameness is 
located 1n the fact that it is a necessary condition of the possibility 
of life. 
Moreover, sameness is a necessary condition of life, and the 
creation of sameness involves the very idea of the eternal recurrence. 
Insofar as creative life necessarily involves the creation of sameness, 
it simultaneously creates the necessity of the eternal recurrence. By 
presenting sameness as a condition of life, Nietzsche moves toward 
79WM, §544, p. 370 WP, §544, p. 293 =NF, VIII/2, 10(159), 
p. 216. 
BOWM, §569, p. 388 =WP, §569, p. 307 =NF, VIII/2, 9(106), 
pp. 59-60. "Die 'Realitat' liegt in dem bestandigen Wiederkonnnen 
gleicher, bekannter, verwandter Dinge, in ihrem logisirten Charakter, 
im Glauben, daB wir hier rechnen, berechnen konnen." 
81WM, §552, p. 377 = WP, §552, p. 278. 
establishing a transcendental argument for the eternal recurrence of 
the same. 
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Finally, it has been shown that Nietzsche argues against attrib-
uting sameness to any effective subject, and that he also argues against 
positing a notion in which it resides. In its fullness, the notion of 
sameness refers neither to subject nor to object, but to event.82 Now 
it has been shown above that the foundation of the event is power, and 
its organizing principle the will to power. Then sameness refers to 
the tautological character of power which is present always and fully 
and necessarily in the moment. The foundation of sameness is thus 
not in things or subjects, but rather in events. The creation of same-
ness is simultaneously the creating of the eternal recurrence of the 
same. The foundation of the creation of sameness is located, on the 
one hand, in the tautological character of power, and, on the other 
hand, in the will to power. In this sense, an eighth possible inter-
pretation of that which recurs eternally the same reveals itself: 
force recurs eternally and is the foundation of all sameness. 
There remains this problem: can the eternal recurrence of the 
same be affirmed (whether this involves willing, thinking, or some 
other means) without introducing difference by the one who is doing 
the affirming? If difference were introduced, this would seem to 
result in a different situation recurring--or occurring--and conse-
quently destroying the sameness of the eternal recurrence. In order 
to avoid this, the affirmation of sameness must contain within it its 
82WM, §552, p. 376 =WP, §552, p. 298. 
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own ground in terms of sameness. The act of affirming the same must 
be a necessary consequence of sameness itself if we are to avoid intro-
ducing difference into the affirmation itself. 
Now this is in fact the case for Nietzsche insofar as sameness 
is always an expression of power: when considered with a "cosmolog-
ical" perspective, sameness is expressive of the tautological character 
of power; when considered from the perspective of the individual, same-
ness is the will to power affirming the necessary character of events 
which exist as q~a of power. Sameness, as the expression of power, 
involves the affirmation of itself on both the cosmological and the 
individual levels. 
The primacy of power, which was established in the previous 
section, is then reaffirmed by the notion of sameness. It now remains. 
to be shown that this is consistent with the various modes of affirma-
tion of the eternal recurrence. 
The Thinking and Naming of the Eternal Recurrence 
The eternal recurrence does not refer as a doctrine to things 
in themselves, nor can it be taken as a law descriptive of a mechan-
istic universe. If it were, it would indeed be disproved by the 
criticisms of Simmel and Capek discussed above; but it is not. The 
eternal recurrence of the same is an expression of power which must 
be affirmed in appropriate ways. If we are to understand the funda-
mental meaning of the eternal recurrence, we must consider the ways 
in which Nietzsche meant it to be affirmed. The notion is clearly 
not a statement about a mechanistic world. Three of the modes of such 
creative affirmation are naming, thinking, and willing. 
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The naming and thinking of the eternal recurrence stand as two 
ways, distinguishable but not separate, in which it is not simply 
affirmed but created. To think and to name the eternal recurrence are 
to create it. Let us examine the basis for such a statement, and then 
explore some of its consequences. 
As the comments on Nietzsche's treatment of logic have indi-
cated, language is an expression of the will to power. Poetry, for 
example, is a form of power used to constrain the gods.83 Naming is 
fundamental to this process, for naming suffices in the end to create 
new things. 84 The demand to create anew can be seen in some senses 
as a demand for the purification of language and feeling. 85 This 
applies not only to the creation of language, but also to its inter-
pretation. 86 The creative power of the individual is thus located in 
his speaking--both naming and interpreting. 
Treating naming and interpreting as creative acts is consonant 
with Nietzsche's view of knowledge and its experimental character. Both 
life and knowledge are experiments, and the fundamental question is the 
question of the degree to which truth can be embodied.87 Although 
Nietzsche will maintain elsewhere that this is actually an experiment 
83FW, II, §84, pp. 98-102 = JW, II, §84, pp. 116-20. 
84FW, II, §58, p. 81 = JW, II, §58, p. 97. 
85FW, IV, §335, p. 224 JW, IV, §335, p. 262. 
86WM, §767, p. 512 =WP, §767, p. 403. 
87FW, III, §110, p. 130 = JW, III, §110, p. 156. 
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of the thinker,88 the fundamental ground of this experimenting, as has 
been shown in Chapter Five, cannot be the self, but rather must be 
power. Even the conflict between truth and error is a conflict between 
two powers. Life is an experiment, but we are not cast solely in the 
role of the experimenters, but rather are also part of the experiment 
itself. The degree to which we are experimenters depends upon the 
degree to which we manifest the will to power; the weaker we are, the 
more we become the object of the experiment.89 
Naming is also given as the basis of law, and this is again 
directly related to power. 90 Naming by the powerful ~s the basis of 
any law, and if the eternal recurrence of the same is taken in any 
sense as expressive of a law, it must be seen within this context. In 
this sense, the law of the eternal recurrence of the same can be seen 
to be expressive of a ~reative act rooted in power.91 
88FW, IV, §324, p. 213 = JW, IV, §324, p. 250. 
89This is a matter of degree and depends in part on the notion 
of the self which was discussed in Chapter Five. Presuming that the 
experimenter is the active one, then the experimenter is the one who 
reaches out for power, while the passive one--the object of the ex-
periment--is the one who (or which) is hindered from moving forward. 
(This interpretation is based on the notions of "active" and "passive" 
in WM, §657, p. 439 =WP, §657, pp. 346-47.) Again it should be noted 
that this is a matter of degree, not an absolute dichotomy. 
90WM, §513, p. 350 =WP, §513, p. 277. 
91Jaspers indicates this in his treatment of the eternal re-
currence and shows how even the mechanical view of the world involves 
transforming a "lawless play" into a consistent one. Cf. his Nietzsche: 
An Introduction to the Unders-tnading of his Philosophical Activity, p. 
355. 
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We can only comprehend a world which we create.92 The founda-
tion of this creation is power. Knowledge itself is a tool of the 
will to power, and it increases proportionately with every increase in 
power.93 As already noted, this is a process which involves creating 
a deception. Thus there is in us a power (Macht, not Vermogen) that is 
the basis of knowledge.94 Knowledge is the result of power creating 
and shaping its world. Insofar as we can say that we know the eternal 
recurrence, we again do so as an expression of a creative power. 
Not only does the structure of naming, thinking and knowing 
reveal to us its foundation in power--and its consequent tautological 
character as power affirming itself--but we find again that this in-
volves also the affirmation of sameness. We have already shown that 
behind the principle of identity is the "appearance" that things are 
the same.95 We construct sameness before we think it.96 Insofar as 
we can be said to know the eternal recurrence'of the same, it would 
appear that we are fully exercising knowing itself: the fullness of 
knowing demands sameness, but it also demands the creation of sameness. 
Thus the continual creative recurrence of the same arises necessarily 
92WM, §495, p. 433 WP, §495, P· 272. 
93WM, §480, p. 336 WP' §480, p. 266 =NF, VIII/3, 14(122), 
p. 94. 
94WM, §517, p. 354 = WP, §517, p. 280 = NF, VIII/2, 9(89), 
p. 46. 
95WM, §§ 520-21, pp. 355-58 =WP, §§ 520-21, pp. 281-83. 
96WM, §544, p. 370 =WP, §544, pp. 292-93 =NF, VIII/2, 10(159), 
p. 216. 
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as the basic presupposition--the foundation--of knowing as the creation 
of sameness. 
Before this consideration of knowing the eternal recurrence can 
be complete, it is necessary to consider the relative impotence of 
such knowing as it is confined to the strictly intellectual level, 
le•st one think that the eternal recurrence is created merely through 
an isolated act of thinking. Even as early as The Birth of Tragedy 
Nietzsche was conscious of the problem of the impotence of language 
and thought divorced from feeling and will--commenting, for example, 
on the inadequacy of language in regard to music.9 7 Zarathustra speaks 
of the impotence of words--of the fool's words which, even if they 
were right, were nevertheless wrong.98 What is necessary is to go to 
that which is behind naming, thinking and knowing: willing. It is 
necessary to wiU to make all things thinkable. 99 In this sense, "all 
meaning is will to power. 11100 The thinking of the eternal recurrence 
can be reduced to something more fundamental: the willing of it. 
The Willing of the Eternal Recurrence Through Power 
In the previous discussions of the nature of the will and of 
the will to power, it was established that all of existence was to be 
97GT, VI; III/l, p. 47 = BT, VI, p. 55. 
98z, III, "Vom Vorilbergehen;" VI/l, p. 221 = Z, III, "On Apos-
tates," p. 178. 
99z, II, "Von der Selbst-Ueberwindung;" VI/l, p. 142 
"On Self-Overcoming," p. ll3. 
Z, II, 
lOOWM, §590, p. 410 = WP, §590, p. 323. "Aller Sinn ist Wille 
zur Macht • • • 11 
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understood ultimately in terms of will to power and that the will to 
power was basically one will which took on, or was specified, in the 
many different centers of force in the world. Willing, to express it 
in language not quite suitable to it, must always have an object (a 
something which is willed), and the basic nature of that "something" 
is power. 
The act of willing is then expressive of force or power bringing 
itself into focus and seeking to extend its boundaries of influence. 
Will as a free act of an independent individual gives way to the will 
to power, which is the force which is at work within individuals. This 
leads finally to an identification of force and will in the notion of 
the will to power, which one might express in un-Nietzschean terms 
as force becoming conscious of itself, seeking to increase itself. 
Will, emerging as the organizing principle of force, leads to the 
self-grounding character of the will to power. While justification 
may be needed for willing anything but power, willing power is self-
justifying in that willing is power and what is thus willed is itself. 
When one asks who interprets an event, the final answer one 
receives is that the interpreting itself, which is will to power, does 
the interpreting.101 The same answer would apply to willing. Who 
wills power? The will to power wills itself--and in so doing creates 
another meaning for the eternal recurrence of the same. What recurs 
eternally the same is the structure of all events as manifestations 
or instances of the will to power and nothing more. This is the ninth 
lOlWM, §556, p. 381 = WP, §556, p. 302. 
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and final possible meaning of the eternal recurrence of the same. 
There follows from this a specific kind of primacy which is 
given to "praxis" in Nietzsche's philosophy. Referring to the fear-
less ones as &ensualists and representatives of the present and future 
in philosophy according to praxis rather than theoretically,102 Nie-
tzsche points toward the direction philosophy was supposed to take: 
it should become a concrete activity, rather than a theoretical one 
divorced from life and power!03But even this activity appears, in the 
end, to be the will to power as thinking and interpreting; to phil-
osophize about the will to power is at the same time to be will to 
power. 
Conclusion: the Meaning of the Eternal Recurrence of the Same 
The interdependence among sameness, the plurality of events 
which include the unsp~akably large and small, force, event, inter-
pretation, thinking and naming, and will has been shown by uncovering 
their common foundation in force organizing itself as will to power. 
The idea overarching these interpenetrating activities or events is 
the eternal recurrence of the same. It has been shown that the idea 
of the eternal recurrence of the same arises out of this framework in 
several ways. 
In response to the question of what it is that recurs eternally 
102 FW, V, §372, p. 288 = JW, V, §372, p. 336. 
l03Nietzsche's emphasis on the unity of theory and practice is 
indicated, for example, in WM, §423, pp. 287 ff. =WP, §423, pp. 227 
FF. =NF, VIII/2, 14(142), pp. 117 ff.; WM, §458, pp. 318 f. =WP, 
§458, p. 251 =NF, VIII/3, 14(107), pp. 77-78. 
the same, there are a number of possible answers: (1) all aspects of 
one's existence, including the unspeakably great and small; (2) the 
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act of continually creating new worlds; (3) all given combinations of 
centers of force as in the dice game of existence; (4) the periodic 
rising and sinking of the level of the energy of existence economically 
considered; (5) the event as such, with the realization that all of 
existence has in itself the character of an event and nothing more; 
(6) chaos, whether in existence itself or in our ideas; (7) the same 
apparent world, whether in terms of its specific content as such or 
in respect to its being an appearance, i.e. its falsity; (8) power or 
force, le~ding to the insight that beneath all appearance there is 
only force or power; (9) the will to power, which leads to the real-
ization that the world is will to power and nothing more. In addition 
to this it has been shown that the creation of sameness is the neces-
sary result of a number of our activities: (1) living itself demands 
the creation of sameness; (2) the activity of sensation involves making 
things the same; (3) thinking logically continues this process; (4) 
naming makes things the same; (5) thinking, (6) willing, and (7) willing 
power all involve creating sameness. These meanings are not contra-
dictory, but rather are quite complementary, being descriptive of 
different aspects of the same phenomenon. 
Moreover, these meanings help explain why the eternal recurrence 
of the same is the most horrible and the most liberating of thoughts. 
Its horribleness is to be found in the fact that it undercuts all pre-
vious concepts of the world. The experience of existence as a bare 
plurality, chaos, event, force, and appearance are constitutive of 
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this horribleness; they are all aspects of the nihilist's experience 
of meaninglessness. Yet, once the shock of this realization is over-
come, one begins to discover a certain kind of orderliness, the founda-
tion of which is to be located in the will to power. Thus the many 
apparent worlds have something in connnon: their created apparentness. 
The chaos of events and ideas reveals itself to be of one fabric: 
force. These appearances in turn prove themselves to have a common 
structure: they are all manifestations of force organizing and in-
creasing itself, will to power. A connnon element in the many ways 
in which the will to power organizes force is this: the creation of 
sameness. The will to power as the will to life creates sameness in 
many ways: through sensation, logic, naming, thinking, and willing. 
Insight into the nature of these activities yields the realization 
of the eternal recurrence of the same, which is in the end equivalent 
to the realization that the world is will to power and nothing more. 
What was called the tautological character of power is fundamentally 
this same thing: there is only the will to power, and it exists fully 
in the moment as an event, drawing its full consequences in each and 
every moment. 
This means that the world simply happens; it is neither being 
nor becoming, but simply an on-going event. There is no justifica-
tion for measuring one moment in terms of another moment, for all 
moments are of equal value; they all simply happen. Granting this, 
one begins to see the way in which this is the most liberating of 
thoughts: the absence of measure allows each moment to happen in its 
fullness. Precisely this is the overcoming of time, for time was the 
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ultimate measure of all events. The "it was" had become the unchange-
able measure of the present and the future. In willing the eternal 
recurrence, one now affirms all moments, including the past. Being 
had become the measure of becoming, sentencing it to insignificance 
by comparison. Now each moment is its own measure, not to be judged 
in terms of an absolute. The Christian conception of time had measured 
man in relation to eternity, putting a false weight on the individual's 
actions, a false measure. The eternal recurrence insures that nothing 
is measured in terms of a final goal, an eternity. The polytheistic 
view of time presented unlimited possibilities. The creation of the 
eternal recurrence prevents man's actions from being reduced to in-
significance in the face of this infinity--they are to recur over and 
over again eternally. It now remains to explore the relationship 
between time and the eternal recurrence of the same. 
C. Time and the Eternal Recurrence of the Same 
Let us review our progress so far. The problem of time has 
four major aspects for Nietzsche: (1) the "it was," which paralyzes 
the will; (2) the tension between being and becoming; (3) the need to 
overcome traditional concepts of time; and (4) the demand for a crea-
tive affirmation of time. The doctrine of the eternal recurrence of 
the same offers a solution to these problems. The way in which it does 
so for the first three aspects of the problem has been indicated at 
the end of the preceding section. I shall now expand on this position, 
showing that time as the measure of appearances is overcome through 
the willing of the eternal recurrence, through the will to power. The 
221 
result of this creative willing is a new experience of time. This 
interpretation lays the foundation for the final section, in which the 
unity of the will to power and the eternal recurrence will be shown 
to reside in Nietzsche's vision of existence as creative play. 
The Nature of Time 
We have already considered Zarathustra's exhortation to praise 
all impermanence, and the general primacy of becoming (more precisely, 
of the happening of the will to power) is evident at this point. It 
is within this context that the rejection of timelessness is to be 
understood. 
'Timelessness' is to be rejected. At any precise moment of a 
force, the absolute conditionality of a new distribution of all 
its forces is given: it cannot stand still. 'Change' belongs to 
the essence, therefore also temporality: with this, however, the 
necessity of change has only been once more posited conceptually.l04 
This passage is significant not only in that it shows the necessity of 
temporality, but also in that it shows this necessity to be only "con-
ceptual." When Nietzsche writes elsewhere during the same year about 
this problem, he acknowledges that changes are only appearance. 105 
But time is not an appearance; it is the measure of appear-
ance, and it is for this reason that it must be overcome. In Zara-
thustra, it is madness which preaches that the law of time demands 
104WM, §1064, p. 694 =WP, §1064, p. 547. "'Zeitlos' abzuweisen. 
In einem bestimmten Augenblick der Kraft ist die absolute Bedingtheit 
einer neuen Verteilung aller ihrer Krafte gegeben: sie kann nicht 
stillstehn. 'Veranderung' gehort ins Wesen hinein, also auch die 
Zeitlichkeit: womit aber nur die Notwendigkeit der Veranderung noch 
einmal begrifflich gesetzt wird." 
105WM, §545, p. 371 = WP, §545, p. 293. 
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that it must devour its own children.l06 The passage which should be 
juxtaposed to this is in The WiZZ to Power, where Nietzsche indicates 
that eternity must be given to everything in order to save it fully. 107 
When eternity is given to everything, then nothing is measured in terms 
of anything else. Consequently, everything becomes the same in that 
it is no longer measured in relation to anything else: it is mean-
ingless to say that something is different from something else without 
a common denominator, a basic measure. Difference, insofar as that 
depends upon measure of one thing in terms of another, is overcome. 
In this sense, the eternity of time demands that everything be re-
garded as self-identical, which results in no final state. Each moment 
remains, but not as a measure of any other. 
The notion of time is further connected with the imposition of 
sameness insofar as knowledge of time and motion is dependent upon the 
need to believe in something at rest. 108 This is in part attributed 
to the fact that we think only in the form of language. 109 Part of 
the problem of time is rooted specifically in the nature of language, 
which transforms events into things, dynamic processes into eternal 
110 truths. The demand for sameness is at the root of logical thinking 
106z, II, "Von der ErlOsung;" VI/l, p. 176 
demption," p. 140. 
107™· §1065, p. 694 WP, §1065, p. 548 
p. 285. 
108™ §520, p. 355 = WP, §520, p. 281. , 
109wm , §522, p. 358 WP, §522, p. 283. 
llOcf. Fink, Nietzsches PhiZosophie, p. 87. 
Z, II, "On Re-
NF, VIII/2, 11(94), 
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and leads to an eternal stasis if there is not something to overcome 
this. 
The foundation of logic in power has already been noted. The 
solution to the problem of thinking time is to be found not simply in 
a new conceptualization of the problem--Nietzsche has indicated the 
insufficiency of this solution--but in changing the foundation of sensa-
tion itself. The foundation of sensation is pleasure, and the basis 
of pleasure is power, which in the case of intoxication involves an 
altered sensation of space and time. 111 Time is to be overcome not 
simply on a conceptual level, but rather it must be overcome funda-
mentally on the level of sensation, and the basis of such an over-
coming is power. 
Time as the measure of appearance is then overcome in the will 
to power, and the consequence of this overcoming is the eternal re-
currence of the same as the equality of appearance. The great and the 
small are seen as equal. 112 It is this equality of appearance which 
allows the primacy of the moment, for everything to be a dance of the 
gods. 113 It is at this point that appearance exists as sufficient in 
its own right, no longer measured in terms of anything else. Time 
remains as expressive of the interconnectedness of all events as 
lllWM, §800, p. 535 = WP, §800, p. 421 NF, VIII/3, 14(117), 
p. 86. 
112Fw, III, §233, p. 170 = JW, III, §233, p. 202; Z, III, "Der 
Genesende," 2; VI/l, p. 272 = Z, III, "The Convalescent," p. 220. 
113z, III, "Von alten und neuen Tafeln," 2; VI/l, p. 243 = Z, 
III, "On the Old and New Tablets," 2, p. 197. 
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organized by our will to power, but in giving up its function as a 
measure--imposed from outside--of those events, it is no longer ex-
perienced as an imposed measure. There is just a continual happening 
which we shape by our will to power. 
Thus the first three aspects of the problem of time in Nie-
tzsche's philosophy--the threat of the "it was," the tension between 
being and becoming, and the overcoming of traditional concepts of 
time--find their answer in his doctrine of the eternal recurrence of 
the same. 114 The fourth aspect, the demand for a creative affirma-
tion of time, has also been confronted in the consideration of the 
modes of affirming the eternal recurrence, modes which have been shown 
to be reducible to the will to power. The new experience of time is 
the measure which our will to power creates: the eternal recurrence of 
the same. It now remains to consider the relationship of this to the 
category of play. 
D. Play and the Eternal Recurrence 
The relationship between play and the eternal recurrence of 
the same has two basic aspects: the picture of the universe as a play 
of forces which is implicit (and sometimes explicit) in Nietzsche's 
descriptions of the universe, and the play character of the modes of 
affirming the eternal recurrence. The second aspect of this problem 
has already been explored in detail in the preceding chapter, where 
it was shown how thinking and willing were reducible in the end to the 
114see above, especially pp. 219-20. 
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interplay of affects, centers of force. In a similar manner, it was 
shown that the will to power on its most basic level was but the ex-
pression of this same interplay of forces. The modes of affirmation 
of the eternal recurrence are, when considered in regard to their most 
fundamental character, instances of the play of forces in which the 
individual is, properly speaking, both the player and the plaything of 
this world-play. The more powerful and active he is, the more will 
to power he has, the more he is a player. The weaker he is, the more 
he is a plaything. 
In these concluding remarks on the eternal recurrence, I shall 
show that, if this doctrine is interpreted in terms of the category of 
play developed above, the unity and internal consistency of Nietzsche's 
view of man and the world becomes clear. The doctrine of the eternal 
recurrence does not mean, as Kaufmann erroneously claims, "that all 
events are repeated endlessly, that there is no plan [or] goal to give 
meaning to history or life, and indeed that we are mere puppets in an 
absolutely senseless play. 11115 Indeed, such a misinterpretation arises 
precisely out of a failure to understand the true nature of play as 
creative activity and the way in which play permeates Nietzsche's vision 
of existence. In play, plans and goals are continually created and then 
destroyed. If men are puppets, they can also pull some of the strings--
and their ability to do so is a mark of their will to power. All events 
115
walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Anti-
christ, p. 327. 
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are repeated endlessly~ but this repetition is itself characteristic of 
116 play. Moreover, as has been shown in the preceding analysis of the 
modes of affirming the eternal recurrence, it is a created recurrence, 
the full expression of the will to power. The compatibility of the will 
to power and the eternal recurrence becomes apparent when these are seen 
in relation to the category of play. 
The Play of the World: the Early Writings 
The picture of the universe itself which is contained in the 
doctrine of the eternal recurrence of the same is best expressed in 
those two fragments which have been placed at the end of The Will to 
Power, but the theme itself was already present in Nietzsche's analysis 
of Heraclitus in his lectures on philosophy in the tragic age of the 
Greeks. Although this earliest description occurs as a description of 
Heraclitus's universe, it is clear from Nietzsche's remarks, both when 
writing "Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, 11117 and from a 
later remark in Ecce Homo 118 that he is describing a view to which he 
. d 1 h . 119 is eep y sympat etic. The view itself has already been considered 
11711Die Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen," in 
Nietzsche Werke, III/2, p. 329 = Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the 
Greeks, translated by Marianne Cowan (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 
1962), p. 68. "Denn die Welt braucht ewig die Wahrheit, also braucht 
sie ewig Heraklit ... Das, was er schaute, die Lehre vom Gesetz im 
Werden und vom Spiel in der Nothi.uendigkeit, mue von jetzt ab ewig 
geschaut werden: er hat von diesem groeten Schauspiel den Vorhang 
aufgezogen." 
llSEH, "GT," 3; VI/3, p. 311 =EH, "BT," 3, pp. 273-74. 
1191n addition to this evidence, there are the similarities be-
tween this description and the final two fragments of The Will to 
Power (§§1066, 1067). 
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..ibove in relation to the will to power and play, 120 but some aspects 
of the description given by Nietzsche are pertinent to the discussion 
of the world as play and the eternal recurrence. 
First, the world itself is a game which the aeon plays with 
itself. Thus when one asks questions about the ultimate nature of the 
ld d f . f 1 h f' . 1 f. 121 wor an o existence-- or examp e, w y ire is not a ways ire, 
or why voD~ would impel a random material particle into a whirling 
d d . 122 . 1 ance aroun it --one receives a c ear answer: it is all a game, 
play. Play is the final category of explanation, beyond which one 
cannot go, and the explanation it offers is this: that is the way 
things are; they have no significance except within this particular 
game, but insofar as we have been fellow-players, we have helped to 
create this game. The question ''why" presupposes a meta-game within 
which the answer would be possible, but there is no such meta-game. 
Second, the notion of the cosmos as play itself implies a notion 
of recurrence. Nietzsche's treatment of Heraclitus and Schopenhauer 
tend to merge into oneness at this point. 123 Not only is the notion 
of time as devouring its children present here, but also the idea that 
this ceaseless coming-to-be, the impermanence of everything actual, is 
120see above, Chapter Four. 
12l"Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen, 11 7; III/2, 
p. 326 = "Philosophy in Tragic Age of Greeks," p. 64. 
122Ibid., 19; III/2, p. 363 =ibid., 19, p. 112. 
123Ibid., 5; III/2, p. 317 = ibid. , 5, p. 52. 
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a terrible, paralyzing thought, 124 a description strikingly similar 
to Zarathustra's descriptions of the eternal recurrence. The descrip-
tion of the play of the child and the aeon implies eternal recurrence: 
the continual creating of worlds, their destruction, then the starting 
anew with the creation of another world. Here the continual creating 
and destroying of worlds is what recurs, but it is not said that these 
worlds are all the same in the sense that their specific content is 
the same. They are, however, all the same in that they are all crea-
tions of the will to power. 
The Play of the World: the Final Vision 
The final two fragments of The Will to Power develop in more 
detail Nietzsche's view of the world as play. 125 Fragment 1067, written 
in 1885, begins with the question: "And do you know what 'the world' 
is to me? 11 126 The Nietzschean world is a "monster of energy, without 
beginning, without end," its definite quantum of force confined to a 
finite space by the boundaries of nothingness. The space of this world 
124Ibid., 5; III/2, p. 318 =Ibid., 5, p. 54. 
125This analysis agrees with Eugen Fink's position (Nietzsches 
PhiZosophie, p. 106), when he writes: "Im Wissen von der Ewigen Wieder-
kunft laBt sich das Dasein ganz ein in das Spiel der Welt, wird zum 
Mitspieler des groBen Spiels, die Trennung zwischen Notwendigkeit und 
Freiheit wird aufgehoben--und ahnlich, wie die Vergangenheit Zukunfts-
charaktere gewinnt und die Zukunft Vergangenehitscharaktere, so liegt 
jetzt in der Freiheit Notwendigkeit und in der Notwendigkeit Freiheit." 
The main difference between the two interpretations is that my position 
puts more emphasis on the importance of the player. 
126WM, §106 7, p. 696 = WP, §106 7, p. 549. "Und wiBt ihr auch, 
was mir 'die Welt' ist?" 
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is completely occupied by force: 
••. as a play of forces and waves of forces, at the same time one 
and many, increasing here and at the same time decreasing there; 
a sea of forces flowing and rushing together, eternally changing, 
eternally flooding back, with tremendous years of recurrence, with 
an ebb and flood of its forms.127 
Just as Heraclitus' child creates regular worlds, which he then des-
troys, Nietzsche also creates order in his world, the order which is 
a play of contradictions and of concord: 
out of the simplest forms striving toward the most complex, 
out of the stillest, most rigid, coldest forms toward the hottest, 
most turbulent, most self-contradictory, and then again returning 
home to the simple out of this abundance, out of the play of con-
tradictions to the joy of concord, still affirming itself in this 
uniformity of its courses and its years, blessing itself as that 
which must return eternally, as a becoming that knows no satiety, 
no disgust, no weariness • 128 
This is the world which is the will to power and nothing more: the will 
to power is the interplay of forces described here. The degree to 
which we become the will to power determines the degree to which we 
cease to be playthings and become players in the game of existence. 
127 WM, §1067, p. 697 =WP, §1067, p. 550. " •.• ·als Spiel von 
Kraften und Kraftwellen zugleich eins und vieles, hier sich haufend und 
zugleich dort sich mindernd, ein Meer in sich selber stilrmender und 
flutender Krafte, ewig sich wandelnd, ewig zurilcklaufend, mit unge-
heuren Jahren der Wiederkehr, mit einer Ebbe und Flut seiner Gestalt-
ungen . II 
128Ibid. = ibid. ". . . aus den einfachs ten in die vielfal t-
igs ten hinaustreibend, aus dem Stillsten, Starrsten, Kaltesten hinaus 
in das Glilhendste, Wildeste, Sich-selber-Widersprechendste, und dann 
wieder aus der Fillle heimkehrend zum Einfachen, aus dem Spiel der Wider-
sprilche zurilck bis zur Lust des Einklangs, sich selber bejahend noch 
in dieser Gleichheit seiner Bahnen und Jahre, sich selber segnend als 
Das, was ewig wiederkommen muB, als ein Werden, das kein Sattwerden, 
keinen UberdruB, keine Miidigkeit kennt ••• " 
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The same view of the world as play remained with Nietzsche 
until the end of his active life. In a fragment entitled "The New 
World-Conception," dating from the spring of 1888, 129 Nietzsche again 
presents a picture of the world as a ceaseless coming-to-be and passing-
away, without beginning or end, living on itself, its own excrements. 
But now he gives an argument for his conception of the universe which 
is directed against all those who would posit some final state for 
the world. In it the final meaning of the eternal recurrence of the 
same as play is presented, and the conditions of the possibility of 
such a world-view are enumerated: the world must be thought of as (1) 
a certain definite quantity of force, (2) with a certain definite 
number of centers of force, (3) existing in infinite time, and (4) 
finite space. 130 Given these conditions, the world, "in the great 
dice game of its existence, 11 131 must eventually repeat itself--must, 
in fact, repeat itself infinitely. 
And since between every combination and its next recurrence all 
other possible combinations would have to have taken place, and 
each of these combinations conditions the entire sequence of 
129WM, §1066, pp. 694-96 II WP, §1066, pp. 548-49 =NF, VIII/3, 
14(188), pp. 166-68. The Colli and Montinari text contains a number of 
corrections, including the sub-title "Die ewige Wiederkunft. Phil-
osophie" before the third paragraph. This is omitted in both the Kroner 
and Kaufmann editions. 
130This fourth necessary condition, finite space, is omitted 
in §1066, but clearly indicated as necessary in §1067. 
131WM, §1066, p. 696 =WP, §1066, p. 549 =NF, VIII/3, 14(188), 
p. 168. " ... im groBen Wlirfelspiel ihres Daseins ..• " Kaufrnann's 
translation omits "its" in this phrase, although the relative pronoun 
is to be found in both the Kroner and Colli and Montinari texts. 
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combinations in the same series, a circular movement of absolutely 
identical series would thus be demonstrated: the world as a cir-
cular movement that has already repeated itself infinitely often 
and plays its game in infinitum.132 
The world in its most fundamental character is thus a game which, be-
cause of the finite number of pieces and its infinite duration, must 
eternally repeat itself. 
We play along in this game of existence, following either of 
two paths. We may affirm existence as a game, as play, thereby real-
izing the croeated character of all order and meaning, and transforming 
the game as it is given to us by our own creative play. To do this is 
to become the free spirit, to overcome nihilism, to manifest one's 
will to power. The other possibility is that, instead of becoming 
players, we become playthings. We try to cover up the true character 
of existence by creating little games--systems of morality--which we 
then mistake for reality itself; but in doing so, we deny reality, 
the powerfulness of our passions and the like. This does not make them 
go away; they remain and continue to be powerful. We simply refuse 
to recognize them for what they are. This refusal makes us their 
playthings--and our little games are exercises in self-deception. 
Existence is indeed a game for both the strong and the weak, for the 
132Ibid. = ibid. = ibid. "Und da zwischen jeder 'Combination' 
und ihrer nachsten 'Wiederkehr' alle Uberhaupt noch moglichen Combina-
tionen abgelaufen sein milBten und jede dieser Combinationen die ganze 
Folge der Combinationen in derselben Reihe bedingt, so ware damit ein 
Kreislauf von absolut identischen Reihen bewiesen: die Welt als Kreis-
lauf der slch unendlich oft bereits wiederholt hat und der sein Spiel 
in infinitum spielt." The sentence is in the subjective mood, which 
Kaufmann's translation (e.g., "is thus demonstrated" instead of "would 
thus be demonstrated") seems to ignore. 
innnoralists and the moralists, but the difference is that for the 
strong--the immoralists, the free spirits, the overman--it is a game 
that they play, while for the weak, the moralists and other "nay-
sayers to life," it is a game in which they are but toys. 
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CONCLUSION 
Three main objectives have directed this inquiry. The first 
was that of discovering whether Nietzsche's philosophy was a phil-
osophy of play. The second was to see if, by thinking through Nie-
tzsche's philosophy in terms of play, it would be possible to make 
more sense out of his position than other commentators have done. The 
third and final objective was to think through the philosophy of play 
itself. 
The first objective has been fulfilled. It has been estab-
lished, not only in terms of textual evidence, but more importantly in 
terms of the meaning of his fundamental categories, that Nietzsche's 
philosophy was indeed a philosophy of play. 
In the writings centering around The Birth of Tragedy, we have 
uncovered a five-fold meaning of the category of play: two types of 
Apollinian and Dionysian play respectively, and the tragic as the 
interplay of these two sets. Among the significant differences be-
tween Apollinian and Dionysian play was the one which centered around 
the role of the player: the Apollinian player was much more a player 
and in control of his game of illusions than his Dionysian counter-
part. On the other hand, the Dionysian man was much closer to the 
truth of existence than the Apollinian player. When this opposition 
was raised from the natural to the artistic level, the types of play 
remained fundamentally the same, but the role of the player in both 
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cases was strengthened. The Dionysian artist has an independent ex-
istence outside the flux of primordial existence. By reflecting that 
flux, he was able to confront and play with it and yet not destroy 
himself. The Apollinian artist, on the other hand, did not mirror 
this primordial contradiction, but rather sought to create a beautiful 
illusion to cover up the ugliness of existence. The notion of the 
tragic was that of a coming together of these irreconcilable worlds 
into a brief moment of synthesis, a synthesis to be understood as the 
interplay of these two worlds. This notion of play was seen, however, 
to be founded fundamentally in slavery: the slavery of the many pro-
vided the basis for the creative freedom of the few. 
The notion of play found in Nietzsche's later philosophy is a 
development of that view already presented in the writings on the 
Greeks, but the differences are highly significant. There are two 
basic types of play in Nietzsche's mature thought--although the word 
"types" is misleading here. It is more precise to say that there 
is an order of rank in play. The lowest rank is formless, chaotic 
play: the interplay of forces in the cosmos. However, qualification 
is again needed. It is a formless play of forces for those who lack 
the power to create something more out of it. The highest place in 
this order of rank is occupied by the powerful, creative play which 
gives order, form, meaning and value to the world. This is the play 
which, in Chapter Three, was seen as characteristic of the child, the 
free ~irit, and those highest in the order of rank. In Chapter Five 
it was shown that this was the proper activity of the overman, a 
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category which unifies the previously developed images of the child, 
free spirit and highest in the order of rank. 
This order of rank of play also provided an order of rank of 
players, stretching from the least powerful to the strongest. The 
least powerful were only minimally players, since they were least in 
control of the games that they played. They are more adequately de-
scribed as playthings than players. The most powerful ones, epitomized 
by the overman, were players in the fullest sense: not only were they 
in control of the games they were playing, they were also the very 
creators of those games. 
These are not two separate orders of rank, one of which refers 
to play in itself, the other of which refers to players. Rather, 
there is only one order of rank of play: that which is founded in the 
player. Formless, chaotic play is a mark of the interpreter's lack of 
power. The stronger the will to power, the more the player will impose 
his own order on that which, for the weaker ones, is chaos. 
This interpretation brings together the central themes in Nie-
tzsche' s position and shows the fundamental harmony among them. ·.''the 
overman is the player par excellence, the notion of the will to power 
expresses the nature of his activity as creative play, and the doctrine 
,. 
of the etenal recurrence of the same expresses the fundamental nature 
of the game which he creates out of the lawless interplay of forces in 
the cosmos. Nietzsche's critique of morality and the lower orders of 
rank flows from the order of rank of play: the lower ranks are ex-
amples of less powerful playing, weaker instances of the will to power. 
While the overman affirms all of existence in his creative play, he 
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does so creatively. This inv0lves, a.n10ng other things, making a new 
order of rank in which the lower ranks are recognized for what they 
are: less powerful instances of the will to power, often declining in-
stances of it. The notions of the eternal recurrence of the same, the 
will to power and the overman are in fundamental harmony--and the basis 
of that harmony is the category of play. Moreover, there is no contra-
diction between Nietzsche's critical philosophy and his own positive 
position. The basis of his criticisms is clear: he contrasts less 
powerful, less creative play to the more powerful, creative play of 
the overman's will to power. He criticizes the weaker forms of play 
precisely because they are weaker and because they do not lead to 
more powerful forms of play. 
This position represents a development which goes beyond the 
position presented in the writings from the period of The Birth of 
Tragedy. The overman is in control of his play in a way similar to 
the Apollinian player, but he is also able to recognize the insights 
of the Dionysian man into the chaotic character of primordial existence. 
However, he goes beyond both by realizing that primordial existence is 
chaotic only because of the absence of a creative will to power which 
gives form, meaning and value. There is no existence "in itself" which 
is chaotic--there are, in the end, only interpretations which are 
distinguished according to power. 
In this view of play, there need be no difference between work 
and play. Play creates worlds, as does work. The activity of the 
overman is in this sense a synthesis of work and play. However, a 
distinction can be drawn between work and play in another sense, What 
most people commonly regard as work is less powerful, less free, a 
weaker form of play: it is a plodding, weary, coerced participation 
in creating a world. 
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Thus Nietzsche's mature philosophy of play goes beyond that 
developed in his early writings on the Greeks and overcomes the ten-
sions between the Apollinian and the Dionysian worldviews and between 
work and play. 
The first two objectives of this study have thus been achieved. 
Nietzsche's philosophy is one of play and in its mature form a con-
sistent one, overcoming the tensions in his earlier position and not 
subject to the contradicitions some of his critics have claimed to 
find there. 
The third objective, however, has only been partially achieved. 
Whileaphilosophy of play has been developed, the philosophy of play 
certainly has not been exhausted. There are other ways in which it 
can be done, and I am not yet satisfied that Nietzsche's way of develop-
ing a philosophy of play is the best. The reservations that I have in 
regard to Nietzsche's position have already been stated in Chapter One, 
and it would serve no purpose to repeat them here. To develop them 
fully would require another volume--hardly the thing to begin in a 
conclusion. 
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APPENDIX 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
The following abbreviations have been used when referring to Nie-
tzsche's works. Where both the German and the English editions have 
been cited, both abbreviations are given. The German is given first, 
followed by the English. Where only one abbreviation appears, only 
the German text has been cited. Full bibliographical information 
about the editions cited in given in the Bibliography. 
A= A 
EH = EH 
FW = JW 
GD = TI 
GM = GM 
GT = BT 
JGB = BGE 
M 
MA 
NF 
UB 
WM= WP 
z = z 
Der Antichrist = The Antichrist 
Ecce Homo = Ecce Homo 
Die frohliche Wissenschaft = The Joyful Wisdom 
Die Gotzen-DG:mmerung = The Twilight of the Idols 
Zur Genealogie der Moral = On the Genealogy of Morals 
Die Geburt der Tragodie = The Birth of Tragedy 
Jenseits von Gut und Bose = Beyond Good and Evil 
Morgenrothe 
Menschliches, Allzwnenschliches 
Nachgelassene Fragmente 
Unzeitgemasse Betrachtungen 
Der Wille zur Macht = The Will to Power 
Also sprach Zarathustra = Thus Spoke Zarathustra 
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